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LOUIS MALLET IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF “THE TIMES”: CRITICISM OF ACTIONS OF THE BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN CONSTANTINOPLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The article is devoted to the publication of “A Mortifying Disclosure” in the British newspaper “The Times” on August 24, 1917, with criticism of British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, in particular the actions of Louis Mallet, the British ambassador in Constantinople.

The mentioned publication, as well as the discussion caused by it, are little covered in historiography. Much more information is provided by the primary sources, represented by the documents of the British National Archives (The National Archives, TNA), and also by the memoirs of the participants of researched events.

In the mentioned article, Louis Mallet was criticized for short-sightedness and excessive credulity. According to the author of the publication, the Turkish grand vizier deceived the British ambassador, even when the choice of the Ottoman Empire in favor of entering the war on the side of the Central Powers became obvious. In turn, the fact that British diplomats failed to find out about the existence of the German-Turkish treaty became the basis for sharp criticism of the Foreign Office at all.

In response to this publication, Louis Mallet spoke in defense of his actions in Constantinople. He was supported by other Foreign Office officials, including former Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. They argued that the Foreign Office was fully aware of the pro-German course of the Porte, but intended to delay the state of war with her as far as possible in order to prepare for the defense of Egypt, the Suez Canal and India. These circumstances led to the accommodating position of British diplomacy.

The characteristics of both Mallet himself and the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire, Said Helim, are separately analyzed from the point of view of historiography and their contemporaries. Also the importance of the defense of India and Egypt, its importance as a key factor in shaping the course of British diplomacy was researched. Finally, the work contains the author’s interpretations and evaluations of the analyzed events.

Keywords: Louis Mallet, Great Britain, Ottoman Empire, “The Times”, press, newspaper, diplomacy, foreign policy.

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ЛУЇ МАЛЛЕТ ПІД ПРИЦІЛОМ “THE TIMES”: КРИТИКА ДІЙ БРИТАНСЬКОЇ ДИПЛОМАТІЇ У КОНСТАНТИНОПОЛІ НА ПОЧАТКУ ПЕРШОЇ СВІТОВОЇ ВІЙНИ

Стаття присвячена публікації “A Mortifying Disclosure” у британській газеті “The Times” 24 серпня 1917 р. з критикою британської зовнішньої політики щодо Османської імперії, зокрема дій посла Великої Британії у Константинополі Луї Маллета.

Означена публікація, а також дискусія, викликана нею, мало висвітлені в історіографії. Куди більш розгорнуту інформацію містить джерельна база, представлена документами Британського національного архіву (The National Archives, TNA) та мемуарами учасників подій.

В означеній статті Луї Маллета розкритиковано за недалекоглядність та надмірну довірливість. За словами автора публікації, турецькому візиру вдалося обдурити британського посла, навіть коли вибір Османської імперії на користь вступу у війну на боці Центральних держав став очевидним. Своєю чергою, той факт, що британським дипломатам не вдалося дізнатися про існування німецько-турецького договору, став підставою для гострої критики Foreign Office загалом.

Луї Маллет у відповідь на цю публікацію висловився на захист своїх дій у Константинополі. Він був підтриманий іншими співробітниками

зовнішньополітичного відомства, включно з колишнім міністром закордонних справ Едуардом Греєм. Вони стверджували, що у Foreign Office цілком усвідомлювали пронимецький курс Порти, однак мали на меті відтермінувати стан війни з нею настільки далеко, наскільки це можливо, щоби підготуватися до оборони Єгипту, Суецького каналу та Індії. Ці обставини й зумовили поступливу позицію британської дипломатії.

Окремо проаналізовано характеристики як самого Маллета, так і великого візира Османської імперії Саїда Хеліма з погляду історіографії та їхніх сучасників. Встановлено важливість проблеми оборони Індії та Єгипту з погляду британського військово-політичного командування на початку Першої світової війни, її значення як ключового чинника у формуванні курсу британської дипломатії. Насамкінець, у праці подано авторські інтерпретації і оцінки проаналізованих подій.

Ключові слова: Луї Маллет, Велика Британія, Османська імперія, “The Times”, преса, дипломатія, зовнішня політика.

Pro-German position of the Ottoman Empire in August 1914 was “le secret de Polichinelle” for European diplomacy. However, Foreign Office and its representatives, in accordance with tradition of maneuvers and “playing until the end”, tried to maximally postpone the entering of Turkey to the war de jure.

Individual moments of diplomatic struggle of British representatives in Constantinople became known to the public on 24 August 1917. This day the British newspaper “The Times” published the article “A Mortifying Disclosure”¹, which criticized the actions of British ambassador to the Ottoman empire Louis Mallet in the first months of the Great War. This short publication (about one newspaper column), according to the words of French diplomat Leon Ostrorog, took much attention of public², but it caused outrage for both Louis Mallet and other diplomats.

This episode of British foreign policy is poorly discovered in historiography. The only known work on the subject is an article by Joseph Heller in the “Middle Eastern Studies”, but it also sheds light on the problem slightly³.

Source base of the research covers, actually, materials of newspaper “The Times” and documents of The National Archives (TNA), which contain separate citations from mentioned publication and reactions to the article of Louis Mallet and other diplomats. Memoirs of the United States ambassador Henry Morgenthau⁴ and British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Edward Grey⁵ contain useful information about events before the entering of the Ottoman empire to the war.

The article “A Mortifying Disclosure” begins with a message about publishing “The White Book” in Greece — a collection of diplomatic

documents, related to the outbreak of the world war. At the moment of publication, "The White Book" was not translated to English, but separate parts of French-written text came to Britain. In this text journalists of "The Times" were interested in details of joining of the Ottoman empire to Central powers⁶.

According to the author of the article, a few hours before Britain declared war on Germany, the latter had concluded an alliance with the Ottoman empire. German kaiser Wilhelm II called Greek ambassador Theotokis on 4 August 1914 and conveyed through him to Constantine I, the King of Greece, news about German-Turkish agreement, and also hinted, that Romania and Bulgaria are going to join to Berlin⁷.

The German-Turkish treaty was really concluded at those days, and the fact of agreement was kept secret. From the Turkish side only Grand Vizier Said Helim, Minister of War Enver Pasha and Minister of Interior Affairs Talaat Pasha knew about it⁸. The British found out about the existence of the agreement only the post-factum of entering the Ottoman empire to war, certain date and other details were not known to them. Actually, the treaty was signed on 2 August by ambassador Hans von Wangenheim from German side and Said Helim from Ottoman⁹.

However, the article "A Mortifying Disclosure" cited the following Theotokis' telegram text: the emperor informed him, that "an alliance has been concluded to-day between Germany and Turkey"¹⁰. The telegram was sent on 4 August, so from Theotokis' "today" it looked like the treaty was signed on 4th but not 2 August. This date — 4 August — as a date of signing the treaty was taken by Mallet and the rest of the figures, related to events around the scandalous publication. "'The Times' criticised me [...] that a treaty was concluded on the 4 August, 1917 [a typo, correct year is 1914. — *Author*]", — Mallet wrote¹¹.

The author of the scandalous articles notes that, apart from Constantine, Entente's diplomacy was not involved in the situation. He adds: "Our ambassador [Louis Mallet. — *Author*] at Constantinople was himself in England when the alliance was made, and seems to have returned to Constantinople with general instructions to work with Turkish 'Moderates' [...] ...his messages after his return, so far from correcting, only confirmed the Foreign Office view"¹². The article states that Mallet tried not to provoke Turks, and this way he only weakened the resistance of the moderate part of the Turkish government to pro-German oriented military minister Enver Pasha. In their turn, after signing the treaty, Vizier and Sultan Mehmed V repeated promises they gave earlier, about keeping strict neutrality. The article cites the words of Louis Mallet: he "convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of the Grand Vizier"¹³. However, it is known that exactly Vizier had signed the secret German-Turkish treaty. Nevertheless, Mallet, as "The Times" wrote, despite

some doubts, was sure that the moderate part of the Turkish government was getting stronger every day. Insidious Vizier only contributed to this point of view. Shortly, he informed Mallet that he would like to receive all possible Entente's assistance¹⁴.

The author of the article summarized that the Turkish government was stalling for three months and fooled Foreign Office. Turks were openly preparing for the war, hypocritically assuring diplomats of Entente, including Mallet, that the Ottoman empire would keep peace. The journalist emphasized: "With what scorn, with what delighted sense of their own intellectual superiority, they [Turks. — *Author*] must have seen the guileless simplicity with which our diplomacy swallowed fictions so unplausible, so flagrantly incompatible with manifest facts"¹⁵.

Mallet had sharply reacted to the publication in "The Times". There is a document in the materials of TNA, written by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Cecil and dated 30 August 1917. Cecil wrote that the Cabinet had to see a note by Louis Mallet, which is "a powerful defence of the policy adopted by him". The text of the note, dated 27 August 1917 was attached to the document¹⁶.

A course to supporting the moderate part of the Turkish government in time when a treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Germany existed, was a solid accusation against Mallet. Mallet opposed that he was not able to give any estimation of agreement, about which he did not even know. Accordingly, there could not be any reaction from his side. At the same time, he suggested that it was a treaty with Enver, and it was not even agreed with Sultan¹⁷.

In the note an accusation of negligence, towards preparation of the Ottoman empire for the war, were also refuted. Mallet wrote that he, in contrast, was fully aware of the situation, because "Goeben" and "Breslau" stood close to his window, and he regularly informed London about Turkish military preparations. Mallet and Foreign Office knew that the situation was controlled by Turkish military minister Enver Pasha, so the ambassador, as he pointed in his note, was following the tactic of avoiding provocations to postpone the severance with the Ottoman empire as long as possible¹⁸.

Mallet wrote: "But to make out that I misled His Majesty's Government, having myself been 'taken in' by the Grand Vizier, is a preposterous travesty of the facts [...] The Turkish situation was by no means so simple as the 'Times' would have us suppose"¹⁹. In August 1914 Mallet was faced with a dilemma: "...the choice lay between sending a properly equipped expedition to force the Straits and an endeavour by diplomatic means to postpone the intervention of Turkey, if possible, indefinitely"²⁰. He did not know if the Government was discussing forcing the Straits at that moment, but he consulted with the military attaché and cabelled War Office about this on approximately 1 September. He

completely realized the risk of conducting such military operation without sufficient preparation²¹.

The British ambassador referred to his conversation with Hebert Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War, which took place at the time when Mallet in July–August 1914 visited Britain. He got the impression that even if the operation of forcing Straits was discussed in military circles, it was rejected. The diplomat also stated that this rejection might be based not on his reports of neutrality of the Ottoman empire, but on potential worsening of the situation in Egypt, Near and Middle East and India²².

Kitchener informed Mallet that if the rupture occurred earlier, while contingents from India were just crossing the Suez channel and there were not enough forces in Egypt, it might cause serious troubles on the British-Ottoman fronts or even a military disaster. So Kitchener, wrote Mallet, was completely satisfied with the situation²³.

Mallet noted that Britain entered the war with Germany almost without its own army. "Disaster had already happened in Belgium, — wrote Mallet, — and was that the moment to embark upon hostilities with Turkey considering the risks we should run in India and Egypt? It seems to be that no one but a madman could have contemplated war in the Near East at that moment, and the policy we pursued, which was admittedly the lesser of two evils, was the only possible one, namely, to make the best of a bad situation and try and prevent altogether, or at any rate stave off, the inevitable rupture until we were readier"²⁴.

Most of the Ottoman ministers resisted entering the war to the end. Characteristically, even the well-known attack on Russian ports was organized unbeknownst to Vizier and sea minister Djemal Pasha. As argument to this, stated Mallet, indicated his confidential sources. For example, he was informed about orders for the Turkish army in the Caucasus to attack Russian forces, which provoked a loud argument in the Government. Further, the orders were cancelled²⁵.

The British ambassador also recalled telegrams from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople Johann von Pallavicini to Vienna, which Russian diplomats managed to get by bribery. According to this information, Talaat and Halil (the Head of the Chamber of deputies — the lower house in The General Assembly of the Ottoman empire²⁶) planned to postpone entry into war until spring, while Pallavicini was convincing them that the time has come. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador had made a "stormy scene" with Talaat and Halil, then went to Enver. Thus, wrote Mallet, Turkish political leadership was clearly divided²⁷.

The ambassador noted that "every day that passed the Turkish defences got stronger, but, on the other hand, every day was a gain to the Entente [...] but

when it [the rupture. — *Author*] came we were at any rate able to show to the Mahomedan world that we had done everything possible to prevent it”²⁸. Position of the Foreign Office forced the Ottoman government to look as an aggressor, which weighted in favour of the British empire and its Muslim subjects²⁹.

An important argument by Mallet in defence of his tactic was the fact that during saved time he managed to withdraw sixty British merchant vessels from the Black Sea and Turkish ports. Many British women and children, who lived in the Ottoman empire followed Mallet’s advice to leave the country. At the initiative of Mallet, the British council on Bagdad prepared a steamer, so British subjects were enabled to leave the city. When the Ottoman empire entered the war, from its territory all the British councils were safely evacuated, only one had been detained for a few days³⁰. Confirmation of this information is present in memoirs of the United States ambassador in Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau. According to his words, Mallet refused to leave the Ottoman empire until the last British subject would stay there³¹.

Mallet summarized his note with the following: “It was not an heroic or agreeable policy, and no one can imagine that I enjoyed our daily humiliations at the hands of the Turks; but there was nothing else to do, and it was not I — as the ‘Times’ implies — who by my misrepresentations and imbecile credulity prevented His Majesty’s Government from applying some infallible remedy”³².

It should be stated that Mallet, in fact, repeated his point of view from 1914. In December he prepared a report about rupture with the Ottoman empire with description of circumstances at that time. It might be summarized to the following submissions: the political life of the Ottoman empire was controlled by Germans; the threat of a conflict with Muslim British subject in India and Egypt was an important factor; thus limited Mallet’s room for manoeuvre³³.

The file TNA FO 800/206 contains an unsigned document (probably a letter or a telegram); its author supported Mallet’s position. This message is dated 29 August 1917³⁴. Most likely, the author was Eric Drummond, Foreign Office secretary, because the next document in the file is Mallet’s gratitude for support dated 31 August 1917 exactly to Drummond’s name. Mallet also asked whether to show this text to credible journalists³⁵. An unknown author (obviously still Drummond) answered on 1 September 1917 that it is better not to do this, because no one would read counter-arguments, so things must be left as they are without causing any unwanted attention³⁶.

The article in “The Times” was also criticised by the French layer and the Ottoman Government council (he left the Ottoman empire in 1914) Leon Ostrorog, who considered unverified sightings in the argumentation. Informing Greek ambassador about the agreement by Kaiser, wrote Ostrorog, was considered as a “documentary evidence”, which shows “all the diplomatic

secrets of the East" and exposes the naivety and hopeless credulity of Allied diplomacy in Constantinople³⁷. At the same time, according to his words, this so-called evidence is just Kaiser's and his foreign affairs minister's words to pro-German diplomat Theotocis. They were nothing but an obvious attempt to bring Greece to the war by misrepresentation of the facts, what was done many times by German diplomacy³⁸.

Ostrorog drew attention to the circumstances that were reported to the Greek ambassador. When Germany's entry into the war became known in Constantinople, he wrote, an urgent meeting of the Cabinet was called there. Enver Pasha declared a resolution about immediate accession to the Central Powers, but all the ministers opposed. Enver achieved only partial mobilisation to strengthen the defence³⁹. Most of the Turkish Cabinet, Ostrorog explained, and also Vizier and Sultan were against war (Vizier and some ministers even threatened to resign) because the Ottoman empire had already been exhausted by the Italo-Turkish and Balkan wars⁴⁰.

This is why Germans had to make an effort to enhance Enver's position. They began to misinform their allies in neutral states that Romania was about to join Berlin and Vienna, that the French front was broken, the French army was trapped and France was about to be defeated⁴¹. Leon Ostrorog summarized that on 4 August Germany just provoked Greece to join the Central powers⁴².

Mallet's position was also echoed by the former minister of Great Britain Edward Grey (in 1917 this position was occupied by Arthur James Balfour). Furthermore he was consistent with the understanding of his employee's steps both in 1914, after diplomatic defeat of Entente in Constantinople, and also in 1917, after published criticism of "The Times". On 4 December 1914 Grey sent his gratitude to Mallet and noted that the war was initiated by German and Turks, and the desire of His Majesty Government was to postpone the rupture as long as it was possible. The course chosen by Mallet, according to Grey's words, was fully consistent with views in London⁴³. On 5 October 1917 Grey wrote: "Sir Louis Mallet's defence of his own action and of our diplomacy at Constantinople in the first weeks of the war is both able and true"⁴⁴.

The former foreign minister also agreed with the position of Leon Ostrotog⁴⁵. However, unlike Ostrorog, who considered that Willhlem II's words to Teothocis were just a provocation, Grey showed more foresight and suggested that the treaty did exist. Grey thought that it was signed by Enver Pasha with Germany someday in August 1914, despite there were ministers in Turkish government, who were against the war with Entente⁴⁶.

Grey substantiated the moderate position of British diplomacy. If London would like to have a war with the Ottoman empire it would be declared immediately after transferring "Goeben" and "Breslau" to the Turkish fleet, but the Admiralty, the War Office and the India Office opposed it. Therefore, the

aim of the Foreign Office was to do everything possible to avoid immediate *casus belli*. British diplomats had to prevent the war, and in case when “Turkey were already committed hand and heart to Germany” to postpone the beginning of the war as long as possible. Grey also supported Mallet by taking attention to the necessity to make obvious to public Ottomane but not British initiative to begun the war, and to the factor of large number of Muslim in India and Egypt⁴⁷.

Grey also wrote about accusing Mallet of shortsightedness, which eventually led to war: “We failed to prevent war. Could we have prevented it? Obviously not, if Turkey was already committed irrevocably to Germany in 1914”⁴⁸. The only solution Grey saw was to kill Enver Push, but “in my judgement Enver and his friends belonged to the class of those who assassinated, whereas the Grand Vizier and his friends belonged to the class of those who are assassinated”⁴⁹, that is the moderate part of the Ottoman government was not able to use such methods. The only thing that could change the mind of Enver Pasha himself was a large military success of Allies, but at that moment they were defeated in Mons and Tannenberg and Germans captured Antwerp. At the same time, “the Miracle of Marna” did not make the desired impression on Turks⁵⁰. Therefore, as Mallet, Grey also supported the point about the influence of the situation on the front lines as a justification of the position of British diplomacy.

In general, Grey had appreciated Mallets actions: “Sir Louis Mallet’s part at Constantinople may [...] fairly be compared to that of a general, who with inferior forces and guns is ordered to hold a position as long as he can and to make the best fight he can, even if he knows the position to be untenable. A general [...] might not necessarily expect to be acclaimed as a victorious hero, but he would at least expect sympathy, and would surely be justly surprised and indigent if he were denounced as a fool for having fought at all [...] He did this under exceptional difficulties and no one could have done it with more skill and success”⁵¹.

Thus, Mallet’s position was unanimously supported by the rest of the diplomats. At the very least, processed sources do not mention anybody who expressed another point of view.

It is necessary to find out how reasonable were the arguments of the article of “The Times” and figures that supported Mallet. First l, reference should be made to characteristics of Louis Mallet in historiography. Marian Kent wrote that Mallet, unlike his predecessor and acting at the beginning of the war dragoman Andrew Ryan, tried to find a conciliation with Turks by goodwill⁵². David Fromkin noted that Mallet sympathized to Young Turks and his reports to the Foreign Office were too optimistic⁵³. These characteristics of Mallet correspond to assessments in the article of “The Times”.

Some correction of the moderate image of Mallet was made by analyzing his telegram to Edward Grey on 6 September 1914. In this message he wrote that while a single German officer stays in the Ottoman empire, Mallet will treat the least as a German protectorate⁵⁴. So, in contrary to his benevolence, Mallet seemed to be completely categorical about the foreign policy of the Ottomans.

The answer to the question "Did Said Halim tricked Louis Mallet and the rest of Entente's ambassadors", looks difficult. On the one hand, Vizier had signed the treaty on 2 August⁵⁵. On the other hand, it is known that he was against of buying of "Goeben" and "Breslau" by the Ottoman empire, which might provoke the war⁵⁶. Ostrorog's words above are about Said Halim's adherence to neutrality. That was also reflected in Morgenthau's memoirs, where he wrote that Vizier was upset because of the attack of Russian ports by "Goeben" and "Breslau"⁵⁷.

Detailed characteristics of Said Halim's views were described by Ahmet Seyhun in his dissertation. Vizier was sure that safety for the Ottoman empire was possible only in union with the Great Powers. Said Halim's plans included rapprochement with France, but the least was rejected the proposition about alliance (made by Djemal Pasha in July 1914), so Vizier considered that Entente itself led the Ottoman empire to German's hands. Said Halim, however, at the beginning of the conflict believed that the time had not yet come for the Ottoman Empire to enter the war, and he really tried to delay the rupture with Entente as long as possible. He really, as Ostrorog wrote, threatened to resign⁵⁸.

The situation with Said Halim looked paradoxical. He, as a person who signed the German-Turkish treaty on 2 August 1914, for which three years later Louis Mallet was criticised, kept same course as Foreign Office and especially Mallet itself — to avoid declaring war as long as possible. It is also important to pay attention to Said Halim's motives. He considered the French diplomat's rejection but not the Foreign Office's actions, as it was written in 1917 in "The Times", as a justification for joining the Central Powers.

Mallet and Grey, answering on "The Times" charges about too indecisive and too short-sighted politics, drew attention to problems of India, Egypt, defense of Suez channel and the factor of British Muslim subjects. Indeed, in this period both Grey and Kitchener were strict about achieving if not neutrality of the Ottoman empire then avoiding the conflict with it as long as possible. Kitchener insisted on postponing the rupture with the Ottoman empire at least for the moment when colonial troops from India would get to Suez⁵⁹.

The importance of Muslim factor is also shown by meeting of British Cabinet of 1–3 September 1914. At the meeting, the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposed to send a fleet to Dardanelles imme-

diately (these days a well-known *avanture* with “Goeben” and “Breslau” was going). The Cabinet, however, supported Kitchener, who was opposite. For forcing the Straits, he thought, it was necessary to involve 60 000 troops, but British soldiers were needed in France, while using Indian troops, according to war minister’s belief, was dangerous because of a threat of Muslim uprising in this country⁶⁰.

Mallet’s statement that the situation in Constantinople was under German and headed by Enver Pasha Young Turk triumvirate control also matched the reality⁶¹.

In the end, we consider “The Times” charges as unjust. Even if it is possible to agree with Mallet’s views’ characteristics as too optimistic, he acted within the constraints of the situation and got the results that were possible under then conditions. He bought time for preparing British armies in Egypt and for evacuation of British subjects from the Ottoman empire.

It is difficult to say what journalists of “The Times” were guided by while preparing the article: looking for sensation or willingness to rightly denounce short-sighted, according to their point of view, diplomat. The publication with criticism of Mallet’s diplomacy also says about the difference of perception and interpretation of foreign policy by ordinary citizens. It is also clear that the article accuses Mallet that he did not manage to get the British win in Constantinople, but does not mention under which circumstances he was forced to act, and which consequences were possible in case of involving more radical measures. Unlike it, Mallet’s and his colleagues’ contraargumentation is based exactly on understanding the situation and its prospects. However, such details are lost in the press and public perception of events, which is summarized to black-and-white thinking about events as wins or losses. But instead, it should be agreed with Mallet, the affairs in Constantinople were incomparably more difficult than it was seen by journalists.

¹ A Mortifying Disclosure. *The Times*. August 24, 1917. P. 7.

² TNA (The National Archives of UK). FO 800/206. Notes by Count Ostrorog. Communicated by Lord Murray, 3 September 1917. F. 303 recto.

³ Heller J. Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Jan. 1976. Vol. 12. No. 1 (Jan., 1976). PP. 36–37.

⁴ Morgenthau H. *Secrets of the Bosphorus*. London: Hutchinson & Co. 1918.

⁵ Grey E. *Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916*. Volume II. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. 1925. P. 352.

⁶ A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

⁷ A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

⁸ Айрапетов О.Р. Участие Российской империи в Первой мировой войне (1914–1917): 1914. Начало. Москва: Куликово поле, 2014. С. 327; Trumpener U. *Turkey's Entry*

into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities. *The Journal of Modern History*. Vol. 34. No. 4 (Dec., 1962). P. 369.

⁹ Şeyhun A. Said Halim Pasha: An Ottoman Statesman and An Islamist Thinker (1865–1921). Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University, 2002. PP. 154–156; Heller J., Sir Louis Mallet... PP. 6, 37.

¹⁰ A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

¹¹ TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries, 5 October 1917. F. 257 recto

¹² A Mortifying Disclosure... P. 7.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 recto.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Heller J., Sir Louis Mallet..., P. 8; TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 verso.

²³ TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 257 verso.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., F. 258 recto.

²⁶ Trumpener U. Turkey's Entry into World War I... P. 375.

²⁷ TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 258 recto.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Morgenthau H. Secrets of the Bosphorus... PP. 88–89.

³² TNA. FO 800/206. Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries. F. 258 recto.

³³ TNA. FO 800/240. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey, and Reply thereto, 20 November 1914. P. 722.

³⁴ TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet, 29 August 1917. F. 297 recto.

³⁵ TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Drummond. F. 298 recto.

³⁶ TNA. FO 800/206. Sir L. Mallet, 1 September 1917. F. 300 recto.

³⁷ TNA. FO 800/206. Communicated by Lord Murray, 3 September 1917. F. 303 recto.

³⁸ Ibid., FF. 303 recto — 304 recto.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., FF. 305 recto — 306 recto.

⁴¹ Ibid., F. 305 recto.

⁴² Ibid., FF. 307 recto — 308 recto.

⁴³ TNA. FO 800/240. Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey, and Reply thereto, 20 November 1914. P. 725.

⁴⁴ TNA. FO 800/206. Enclosure 2 in letter from Lord Grey of Fallodon to the Private Secretaries, 5 October 1917. F. 311 recto.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Kent M. Kent, Marian (Ed.). *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. London : Frank Class, 2005. P. 167.

⁵³ Fromkin D. H. *A Peace To End All Peace, The Fall Of The Ottoman Empire And The Creation Of The Middle East*. New York, 1989. P. 44.

⁵⁴ Grey E. *Twenty-Five Years...* P. 182.

⁵⁵ Şeyhun A. Said Halim Pasha... P. 156.

⁵⁶ Ibid. P. 159.

⁵⁷ Morgenthau H. *Secrets of the Bosphorus...* PP. 81–82.

⁵⁸ Şeyhun A. Said Halim Pasha... PP. 159–162.

⁵⁹ Grey E. *Twenty-Five Years...* P. 170; Готлиб В.В. *Тайная дипломатия во время Первой мировой войны*. Москва: Соцэкгиз, 1960. С. 74–75.

⁶⁰ Машевський О.П. *Проблема Чорноморських проток у міжнародних відносинах (1870 р. — початок 1920-х рр.)*. Київ: «Аквілон-Плюс», 2010. P. 565.

⁶¹ *За Балканскими фронтами Первой мировой войны*. Отв. редактор В.Н. Виноградов. Москва: Издательство «Индрик», 2002. С. 37.

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