

THE PERIODIZATION OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Oleksiy Diedush

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У статті здійснено спробу проаналізувати та порівняти періодизацію історії української та російської національної ідентичності. Головною проблемою дослідження окреслено політичні та ментальні особливості обох націй, що були спричинені політичними й історичними відмінностями.

Ключові слова: українська національна ідентичність, російська національна ідентичність, ментальність, політична історія України, політична історія Росії, націобудівництво.

В статье сделана попытка проанализировать и сравнить периодизацию истории украинской и российской национальной идентичности. Главной проблемой исследования выделены политические и ментальные особенности обеих наций, которые были вызваны политическими и историческими различиями.

Ключевые слова: украинская национальная идентичность, российская национальная идентичность, ментальность, политическая история Украины, политическая история России, нациестроительство

The article attempts to analyze and compare the historical periodization of Ukrainian and Russian national identity. The main problem of this research is a political and mentality specificity of both nations caused by the political and historical differences.

Keywords: Ukrainian national identity, Russian national identity, mentality, political history of Ukraine, political history of Russia, nation-building.

The Western cultural and historical studies considered Ukrainian ethnicity and its identity in context of Russian history. The phenomena of Ukraine and its people were represented in Western science only after disintegration of former USSR. But straight stereotypes couldn't disappear as fast as it had been demanded by the geopolitical situation. Only the first civic protests in 2004 showed the Ukrainians as a sovereign nation in the world publicity. But Russian political circles didn't recognize the fact of a Ukrainian political nation's formation. And not just because they confessed an imperial myth about the Ukrainians as a branch of the Russian super-ethnos. Pro-Russian political elite of Ukraine tried to grade Ukrainian nation-building processes during its own cadence. As a result, the Ukrainian community started a struggle against those tendencies that had founded a new page of history in Ukrainian national identity. Russian military and information aggression put the differences in genesis between the Russian and Ukrainian nations onto the Agenda.

Both of the national historiographical positions try to make the start of formatting their own nation more ancient. Russian historians infer their own ethnicity from the times of the Mongol invasion of Rus when Dmitry Donskoy Prince's forces inflicted a defeat of Tatars army in 1380. Another opinion refers to activity of Alexander Nevsky as the first powerful Northern-East prince [23, c. 141–164] that collaborated with Mongolian occupants for the sake of getting an authority. The Ukrainian «aged position» refers to the epoch of Principality of Galicia and Volhynia during which all Ukrainian ethnic territories were integrated [9, c. 44–54]. Especially the reign of Daniel the Galician was characterized by an increasing influence of Ukrainian ethnic territory within Rus terrains. The causes of Russian's history myth have imperial tendencies and attempts to demonstrate its own regional leadership especially within East Slavic space. In Ukrainian science and society such processes may be caused by national inferiority complex. The long occupation of the Ukrainian territories by different states and their repressive

actions against the Ukrainian national movement performed their specific role in formation of that destructive phenomenon [6, c. 14].

Generally The Ukrainian researchers accentuate such periods of Ukrainian national identity's history:

1. The incipient period (last 16th – middle 17th centuries). Sometimes it is called «period of crystallization» [2, c. 13]. These times characterized the first Cossack's rebellions against religious pressure of Polish Catholic powers owing to implementation of the Union of Brest and feudal exploitation of peasants. The Ukrainian terrains obtained new Orthodox autonomy because of that struggle, and the Cossacks were legalized as military state troops. The successful wars with the Ottoman Empire glorified Cossacks as the defenders of Christianity in all Europe. Generally this period prepared a basis for the future political resistance of the Ukrainians from Polish offensive actions.

2. The period of a national liberation war against Rzecz Pospolita (1648–1660's). Active and successful Cossacks army's military campaigns under ruling of Bohdan Khmelnytsky liberated the majority of Ukrainian territories from Polish administration. Importantly is that firstly the cavalry of Crimean Khanate had helped Cossack's army in the warfare that showed a possible interaction of both states like neighbours. But economic and geopolitical complications couldn't finish the valuable state building, so Cossack's elite started picking out new political patrons [20, c. 11–41]. It made a choice to sign the Treaty with Muscovy – feudal Orthodox autocracy. The Violence of this Treaty by Muscovy's side became a cause of the Ruin.

3. The Braking period [2, c. 13] or the Ruin (1660's – middle 1680's). The period was defined by a series of civil and political conflicts among Ukrainian Cossack's elite. As a result, the Cossack Hetmanate was divided on two parts within different spheres of influence. It happened because of Ukrainian non-collectivistic mentality specificity and impossibility to recognize «law power» of central authorities [15, c. 419].

4. The period of cultural stability (middle 1680 – the first quarter of 18th century). The period was linked with person of Ivan Mazepa who conducted active cultural and educational steps. He had united both of parts of former Cossack Hetmanate under his authority that became a significant event for elite's identity. Mazepa understood that Muscovy's protectorate was dangerous for autonomy of Ukrainian terrains [12, c. 112–114]. But the venture with change of protector was failed and Moscow intensified a general integration of Hetmanate's autonomy into unitary autocratic state.

5. The period of destroying of Ukrainian autonomy (the second quarter of 18th – the last 18th century). Russian (former Muscovy) state due to its own regional consolidation undertakes measures for liquidation of the Ukrainian self-ruling. Firstly, Zaporizka Sich was destroyed after loss of their Anti-Tatar defense function. Secondly, hetman's authority and regimental district's structure were canceled [16, c. 424–426]. After the suppressing of Koliivshchyna uprising and conducting geopolitical intrigues against Rzecz Pospolita, Ukrainian lands were occupied by Russia and Austria. Both empires tried to quell patriotic senses in Ukrainians.

6. The period of cultural and politic renaissance (the late 18th – middle 19th centuries). The first Ukrainian literature language poem «Eneida» was published by Kotliarevskyi then and generally this epoch was fundamental for Ukrainian classical literature that went in all European romantics' trend. Ukrainian literature became the battlefield for national identity because it was the legal way to impress own views [10, c. 10–18].

7. The period of ideological development of the national movement (middle 19th – 1917). After crushing the Ukrainian organizations in Russian empire and suppressing Revolution in Austria the national intelligence started the elaboration of the ideological basis for a future independence struggle. It caused an appearance of another political currents and parties that confessed all ideologies, from nationalism to monarchism. But there wasn't unity in vision of future state system so

national movement was separated on federalists and «independents».

8. The period of an attempt of the national state building (1917–1921). The revolutionary events in Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires gave a chance for the Ukrainian state's own creation. But socialistic and federalist illusions of Ukrainian elite majority obstructed consolidation of national military forces that had to stop Bolshevik's and another invasions. Negative egalitarianism [21, c. 45–51] of Ukrainian population destroyed the unity of nation. Although Ukraine was first in modern history to be united under future national symbolic but its territory became the parts of other states.

9. The period of divided occupation (the early 1920's – 1940). The Ukrainian lands that were occupied by states with different political systems started developing in other ways. Soviet Ukraine had a period of a cultural intensification that was changed by an epoch of a political terror and genocide in form of Holodomor. The Polish and other states had more liberal regimes but the Ukrainian national movements were severely restricted [16, c. 731–736] so it partially reformed into a radical form. In 1939–1940 almost all Ukrainian lands were concentrated under Soviet authority that reduced to a new wave of terrors against national-democratic and nationalistic activists.

10. The period of the denationalization with national liberational outbursts (1940–1989). These years were marked by horrors of World War the Second and war crimes against the ethnic group in Ukraine. After WWS ethnic map of Ukrainian terrains was totally changed because of Holocaust, Stalin's deportations and warfare's victims [14]. Post-war stage had some pages of struggle OUN-UPA against Soviet authority during 10 years and destroying of nationalist's movements. The features of renaissance contained the movement of the Sixtiers [8] though that continued during short time. Perestrojka accelerated processes of national identities' renaissance in the parts of USSR.

11. The period of an independent state creation (1990–2003). During this period the national and state elite reached a compromise and initially

proclaimed a state sovereignty and then the independence, either. The Ukrainian authority did not undertake measures for a new Ukrainian political nation consolidation. The economic crisis and a wave of criminality divided Ukraine on the clan territories that stimulated indifferent positions to the Ukrainian identity [17, c. 388].

12. The period of civil society building within the Ukrainian political nation (2004 – till nowadays). The civil protest against pro-Russian autocracy in 2004 made it possible to implement democracy in Ukraine. But permanent political crisis had led to pro-Russian revenge. These political powers provoked a new civil protest and a new revolution under patriotic mottos. A Victory of Protestants meant a geopolitical fail for imperial politics of Russia so this state was resorted to direct a military aggression. The common threat consolidated the Ukrainian nation and it was showed up in decommunization [5] and active volunteer movements against aggressor. Nowadays the Ukrainians create an idea of Ukraine as a democratic bastion of Western world.

The periodization of Russian national identity unlike Ukrainian analogue was related to development of a Muscovy and Russian statehood and its history. One can point out such periods:

1. The Times of Troubles (1598–1613). This period was marked by a series of state problems, which eventually consolidated the Russian ethnicity. The Muscovy state lost the Rurik dynasty line that referred to the Rus epoch [24, p. 48] and was deformed with its symbolic importance as an independent part of a former powerful East-Slavic State. The geopolitical and dynasty intrigues had led to a foreign intervention under the formal pretender's ruling. The Polish and Swedish occupants endangered Orthodox Church and other Russian traditional life institutes. The military actions of Minin and Pozharsky were the first expression of civic resistance [3, c. 30–31] in Russian history and were inspired by Orthodox clerics and a conservative specificity of local mentality. As a result, the Muscovy kingdom was saved and got the new Romanov dynasty that had determined a state course for next 300 years.

2. The period of a pre-imperial transformation (the early 17th – the early 18th). The new dynasty continued colonization of a scarcely populated east land and an extension of the state territory. After the Ukrainian national liberational war against Rzech Pospolita, Muscovy started formatting its own system of protectorates signing the Treaty with Cossack Hetmanate. That event diseased traditional isolation of Moscow state and showed up outdated religious and governmental institutes [25, p. 40]. Tsar's authority dared to reform Orthodox Church that distanced from Athos' Canon laws because of clerical communicative absence [19]. The resistance of Orthodox reforming led to the split of Russian ethnicity on Old Believers and Nikon's canon supporters. New monarch Peter the First reformed the state institution and the army in a European way and liquidated Patriarchy as threat of Tsar's absolute power. The Participation on Northern War turned the Russian state into a huge empire and the imperial archetypes became an integral part of a Russian identity.

3. The development of Russian empire (the first quarter 18th – the early 19th century). Russian imperators made war on European theatres and extended their own West domains. At this period the majority of autonomy protectorates, such as Ukrainian land, Crimean Khanate, Georgia were liquidated and included into Russian administrative system. After partitions of Poland the borders of Russia in the West had been in contact with powerful Austria and Prussia that stopped an expansion there. At the same time complete enslaving of peasants occurred and determined a feudal character of imperial economy and specificity of worldview among Russian peasants. Then imperial expansionistic myth about Byzantium's inheritance of Russian empire was reanimated for further offensive on the Balkans for to «protect» Orthodox population of the region.

4. The period of ideological and politic constructing of Russian nationalism (early 19th – 1905). Nikolay Karamzin as an official historiographer formulated the idea about «exclusive» role and development way of Russia in world history. The victory in the Napoleonic wars,

the Russian period of them was named like Patriotic War, increased nationalistic tendencies in Russian elite. The duke Uvarov's doctrine «Orthodox, Autocracy and Nationality» had become the main directs of intern and extern politics of Russian empire. Democratic and national liberation movements were destroyed. Official ideologists turned Russia into the center of pan Slavism and Slavophilia [13] that masked expansionistic plans to conquest all Slavic terrains. Simultaneously Russian intellectual from times of Decemrist's acting formulated liberal and democratic alternative idea about Western way of Russian development, called zapadnichestvo. Feudal economics and its exploitation of peasant caused popularity of Russian socialism ideas that were formulated by Alexander Herzen. Some reforms and war victory in 70s of 19th century made it possible to save the autocratic system till 1905 year.

5. The period of a deep social and politic transformation in Russia (1905–1921). An economic problem and defeat from Japanese empire caused a revolutionary movement in Russia. The consolidation of elite and partial reforming stopped collapse of autocratic regime though process of political polarization was launched. The intelligence and work classes supported «left-side» political parties that impressed traditional collectivistic views of Russian peasants. The failure of imperator's war venture led to starting of new Revolution that established a new liberal authority. Democratic realties and wartime chaos accelerate searching for a new «strong hand» for establishing former order [4, c. 168–169]. Bolsheviks as new radical «left» movement won the sympathy of Russian workers and peasants because of simple and justice mottos. Moreover they stopped disintegrating of huge Russian state suppressing national movements and destroying of new independent states. And in spite of civic war between Bolsheviks and White Army, authority was retained for the first group because of wide terror actions and mass repressions.

6. The period of strengthening Soviet realties (1921–1941). Bolsheviks started colossal rebuilding in all spheres of life according to Marxism postulates. The messianic myth of «The

third Rome» was transformed in the myth about Russia as a bastion of communism that fought for worker's law. The system of collective farms was a new form of feudal enslaving that impressed Russian peasant and jeopardized other occupied ethnicities with an individual economic system. The destroyed Orthodox Church had been changed by a new communism ideology with elements of quasi-religion [1]. Such deformed social sentiments facilitated creation of Stalin's personality cult that had been accelerated by a mass politic terror. Soviet society permanently prepared for the world anti-capitalism war that apparently militarized all spheres of each citizen [11].

7. The period of developed Soviet regime (1941–1989). Soviet participation in World War the Second marked out numerous victims and horror demolitions. But these facts were used by Soviet propaganda for creation of image «winner of fascism» for Russian (Soviet) people. Post-war system of international relations created Soviet influence sphere that was the biggest in all Russian history. The obtaining of nuclear weapon set up in Russian conscience the conviction about own invincibility. The official authority committed to Russification of other ethnicities under a motto of consolidation of Soviet citizens into Soviet people as modern social formation. Economic stability convicted wide masses in efficiency of Soviet order and socialism. The aggravation of national relations because of the Russification and economic inequality of other Soviet republics caused crisis of all system.

8. The period of liberalization and attempts of democratic experiments (1990–2000). In spite of a dominate status of the Russians in Soviet Union, the national Russian intelligence started demanding of systematic changes. A disintegration of a huge state till almost national borders made a sense of frustration and nostalgia in Russian society. Economic failures and defeat in the first Chechen campaign led to a new request on traditional «strong hand». Russian political and ideological

circles tried to combine opposite pages of Russian history – Soviet and imperial ones that reflected on national symbols and worldview of citizens.

9. The period of autocracy and expansionism building (2000 – till nowadays). The new political regime to cease the democratic processes though economic situation was stabilized and separatism tendencies were suppressed in the national republics. Russian authorities reanimated conception of the «Russian world» for strengthening of their own influence on post-Soviet space where a big Russian language community is [18, с. 338–342; 22]. Soviet myth of a stand-alone victory over fascism became the main part of a new state ideology [7]. Orthodox Church returned itself the role of state institution that had a monopoly to determine the moral principles in society. The extern policy was concentrated on aggressive military and information actions against neighbours with total supporting of citizens.

As it can be seen, Russian's identity development was more stable than Ukrainian because its genesis occurred within Russian authoritarian statehood. The long term of isolation from Europe and proximity to Asian space created specific Russian mentality and identity based on cult of «strong hand», collectivistic forms of economy and a deep Orthodox religiousness. The Ukrainian ethnicity has other markers because it was a part of different European states during long term. The historical circumstances led to a partition of the Ukrainians for religious confessions though it didn't have an influence on an ethnic unity. The absence of independence set up a destructive inferiority complex unlike in Russian that has a messianic conception. Ukrainian individual economy system reflected on mentality and identity with tendencies to democracy and personal freedom. A cultural and some linguistic similarities of the Ukrainians and Russians convinced the second ones that the first ones are merely a rame of their ethnicity. That myth determined the bilateral relations as unequal ones until nowadays.

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