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DYNAMICS OF THE PUBLIC MOOD OF UKRAINIANS IN THE CONDITIONS OF A FULL-SCALE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IN 2022–2023 (Exemplified by Vinnytsia Region)

Анотація / Abstract

Мета статті – на основі польових матеріалів простежити динаміку суспільних настроїв українців в умовах повномасштабного російського вторгнення в Україну. Продемонструвати світоглядно-поведінкові установки щодо очікувань та підготовки до війни; спогади про перші дні війни; особливості життя під час війни; оцінки дій української влади / ЗСУ щодо протидії російському вторгненню; формування пантеону героїв; класифікацію російсько-української війни до повномасштабного вторгнення; місце та роль радянської культурної спадщини в процесах національної і регіональної ідентифікації тощо. Перспективність теми звучить як у науковому, так і в громадському дискурсах. Оскільки повномасштабне російське вторгнення вплинуло на о(перео)смищення своєї ідентичності (громадянської, етнічної, регіональної, конфесійної), йдеться про напрацювання ефективного дослідницького інструментарію в міждисциплінарній парадигмі для вивчення когнітивних (мисленневих, змістовно-сміслових) та поведінкових громадських настроїв українців. **Методологія** дослідження побудована на польовій (спостереження, опитування) та соціологічній (статистичний, контент-аналіз) методиках. Важливе місце в польових студіях відведено наративним інтерв'ю, які дозволили не лише отримати розгорнені відповіді, а й простежити механізм конструювання ідентичностей. Наратив дозволяє підкреслити цінність досвіду кожного інформатора та відрефлексувати з огляду на те, що фактично всі українці стали безпосередніми учасниками цієї війни. Систематичні польові дослідження динаміки різних аспектів російсько-української війни уможливають відстежувати як причини та наслідки світоглядно-поведінкових установок українців загалом, так і регіональні особливості у протистоянні агресору, а також виразніше актуалізувати цю тему в публічному просторі з метою терапії спільної травми.

Ключові слова: суспільні настрої, Вінниччина, повномасштабне російське вторгнення, польові матеріали.

The article is aimed at describing the dynamics of the public mood of Ukrainians in the conditions of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ideological and behavioral attitudes regarding expectations and preparation for the war are demonstrated. Reminiscences on the first days of war are submitted. The peculiarities of life during the war; assessment of the actions of the Ukrainian authorities / Armed Forces of Ukraine on countering the Russian invasion are considered. The formation of a pantheon of heroes; classification of the Russian-Ukrainian war before the full-scale invasion; the place and significance of the Soviet cultural heritage in the processes of national and regional identification, etc. are analyzed. The topic can be considered relevant and perspective both in scientific and public discourses. Since the full-scale Russian invasion influenced the recognition and revision of one's identity (civil, ethnic, regional, confessional), we share the results of our attempt to develop effective research tools in an interdisciplinary paradigm for the study of cognitive (mental, content-semantic) and behavioral contexts of the public mood of Ukrainians. The research methodology is based on field methods (observation, survey) and sociological methods (statistical, content analysis). An important place in field studies is given to narrative interviews, enabling to get the detailed answers as well as to trace the mechanism of identity construction. The narrative is used to emphasize the value of each informant's experience and reflects on the fact that practically all Ukrainians have become direct participants of this war. Systematic field studies of the dynamics of various aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war make it possible to study the causes and consequences of worldview and behavioral attitudes among Ukrainians in general, as well as regional peculiarities in resisting the aggressor, and also highlight this topic in the public space more clearly for the purpose of collective trauma therapy.

Keywords: public moods, Vinnytsia region, full-scale Russian invasion, field materials.

Introduction. Nowadays the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2023 has become one of the most pressing topics in the paradigm of global challenges for the whole world, especially for Western civilization [4, p. 1], etc.

But it is undeniably the most important topic for the Ukrainians themselves, who, in their greater majority, have overcome dramatic changes in their outlook, ideological and behavioral attitudes regarding the perception of

this war since the Russian large-scale invasion. This change manifests itself the most clearly in the public mood whose dynamics within 2022–23 would be of great interest to trace.

The History Department research team of Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi Vinnytsia State Pedagogical University has been systematically conducting scientific research since 2014 for this purpose.

It is based partially on the methodology of identity construction (mutual perception of Vinnytsia region residents and internally displaced persons (hereinafter – IDPs) from Eastern and Southern Ukraine). The subject of the study is defined as the specifics of regional and local identity, as well as the place and role of Soviet cultural heritage in the processes of national and regional identification. The relevance of the «Soviet» construct re-examination stems from the fact that it was during the Soviet times that the socialization of the majority of modern Ukraine adult population has taken place, and the Soviet past continues to manifest itself in their worldview and behavioral patterns.

This research acquires even greater importance in the context of correlation analysis with previous studies (projects «Donbas and Podillia through the Eyes of People», «Experience of Resettlement and Adaptation in Connection with Current Military Events»), aimed at examining the influence of Soviet mentality on the formation of public attitudes, perception and assessment of the Russian-Ukrainian war by the representatives of various regions [5, units of issue 1–60, folios 1458].

Presenting the main material of the research. The military conflict in the east of Ukraine has been also studied through the lens of cultural-landscape discourse (human activities in certain environment, an approach which focuses on comprehensive investigation of personal and common space organization, concepts of nature and cultural values). Field studies of 2018–2021 have shown that 55% of informants defined this conflict as a Russian-Ukrainian war, about 30% – as a war of oligarch clans fighting for the redistribution of property

and spheres of influence. Such answer options as «Conflict between the USA and Russia involving Ukraine», «Conflict between the mainland of Ukraine and Donbas (civil war)», «It's hard to answer» have scored 5% each.

The results of the research have enabled us to conclude that the civilizational identity of the Ukrainians is represented by two main components: European and post-Soviet. Altogether, more than 75% of the surveyed residents of Vinnytsia region identify themselves as Europeans (those who are proud of the corresponding self-identification), which is three times more than the adherents of post-Soviet identity – 25%. However, it is worth noting that ambivalence has been considered as a distinctive feature of the Ukrainian society before the full-scale Russian invasion. This is manifested frequently in the divergence between democratic declarations and practices of socio-political institutions, and therefore in the absence of a clear civic position. At the same time, in the terms of national identity, absolutely all respondents have positioned themselves first and foremost as citizens of Ukraine and singled out the Ukrainian as the only state language [2].

Therefore, it stands to reason that in the conditions of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, a subsequent field study has to focus on the goals of clarifying the dynamics of the public mood of Vinnytsia region residents [3]. The 2023 survey is aimed at recording changes in ideological and behavioral attitudes.

Two projects developed for this purpose have covered all districts of Vinnytsia oblast and collected 600 narrative texts: 300 narrations in 2022 and 300 – in 2023 [5–8]. Interviewees – 392 women and 208 men of the following age groups: 15–24 years old – adolescent age (15%); 25–45 years old – young age (70%); 46–65 years old – middle age (10%), 66–75 years old – old age (5%). 350 narrators have higher education.

The research methodology was built within interdisciplinary coordinates combining, in particular, ethnographic field tools (observation, survey), the method of visual anthropology (fixation of the interaction of a respondent

with the researcher and space, which makes it possible to «see» the real state of affairs), and sociological methodology (statistical, content analysis, narrative as a discourse).

Emphasis on the narrative as a discourse in the research paradigm is justified by its organic connection with the construction of identities. It is both a way and means of self-determination. The narrative has interested us not only as a story, but primarily as an algorithm for understanding and organizing the surrounding world and ourselves in it. This implies the possibility of interpretation and moving beyond the text into the context. Narrative as a discourse is also a valuable tool for the comprehensive study of cognitive (mental), content-semantic and motivational-pragmatic (behavioral) contexts of the public mood.

Narrative makes it possible to emphasize the value of each narrator's experience and create a platform for self-reflection, given the fact that virtually all Ukrainians have become direct participants of this war (in which the line between the front and the rear is actually blurred).

The level of expectations and preparation for the full-scale Russian invasion has been one of the important issues that revealed the mood of Vinnytsia region residents regarding their perception of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

About 1/3 of the surveyed women and 2/3 of men confirmed a high degree of expectation, but at the same time admitted a very low level of preparation (majority even lacked a so-called «emergency» suitcase): «Everything indicated it <...> all embassies were leaving, evacuation <...> I was not getting ready» (man, born in 1977); «Yes, I read a lot of analytical information and Western intelligence repeatedly warned the Ukrainian authorities that a full-scale invasion would take place <...> no, I was not getting ready, and no one was – as far as I heard» (woman, born in 1979) [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110].

We believe that it was the Soviet concept of «fraternal nations» that manifested itself in such cognitive and behavioral ambivalence: «This is

horrible! Russia could not have done that» (woman, born in 1972); «I couldn't believe it! Well, it looked like, brother against brother <...> and then I thought: what kind of brothers are we then?! And we never were ones!» (man, born in 1974); «Absolutely astonished, no one could think that a fraternal people would attack our native Ukraine» (woman, born in 1960) [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110], etc.

It is precisely to this contradictory nature of the public mood, that we attribute the gradation of Ukrainians' initial reactions to the war: anger and indignation (55%); tension (40%); fear / shock (30%); irritation (30%); disappointment (20%), panic (10%). In this context, it is particularly meaningful that such mental manifestations as stress / fear / shock, those are expected above all in such highly stressful situations. The respondents have been overtaken by anger, indignation, irritation and disappointment.

This indicates an extremely high level of irreversible existential gap, which clearly and deeply symbolically transforms any kind of Russian-Ukrainian interaction or coexistence into a system of discrepant civilizational communities.

And it is also worth noting that anger and hatred as the leading emotions of the Ukrainian majority have indicated clearly their readiness for strong resistance and struggle, those, in fact, are displayed immediately in various regions and at different levels (high motivation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the AFU), the fearlessness and courage of territorial defense, the national volunteer movement, etc.). They have devalued decisively the thesis of the so-called «fair» military occupation for the sake of protection of Russia-oriented people's rights.

The second year of the Russian full-scale invasion has witnessed deep revision of many Ukrainians' ideological and behavioral attitudes and shown changes in the perception of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In particular, it concerns the further acknowledging the fact that the Russian-Ukrainian war has been going

on since 2014: «<...> as the war on the territory of Ukraine has been going on for 8 years, we could expect anything from the Russian Federation» (woman, born in 2005), «Very alarming, <...> was very worried, considering what we experienced in Donbas in 2014, we were, of course, very upset, very <...> and realized there was nothing good to expect from such a neighbor» (woman, IDP, born in 1937) [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110], etc.

The answers of 2023 also show a greater understanding of along-standing historical Russian-Ukrainian confrontation and the imperial essence of Russian policy: «<...> the Russians have always fought to destroy the Ukrainian state and they have not acknowledged the Ukrainian people as a nation for three hundred and fifty years or more» (woman, IDP, born in 1964); «Russians are imperialists, so they are not interested in small territories» (woman, born in 1967)» [5, units of issue 1–12, folios 1458].

In 2023 the public information space has introduced the discourse of opposing the enemy IPSO (informational and psychological operation). The narratives have shown a significant decrease in the level of public trust in television channels, a preference for messengers and You Tube instead. This might be caused by extreme conditions in which people nowadays receive, monitor and compare information quickly and simultaneously from several channels, make instant decisions and interact with others.

The respondents more noticeably and frequently speak on the need to build state-social institutions of Ukrainian type, taking into account the historical position of Ukraine as a «buffer» between Western and Eastern types of civilizations and long-term absence of a recognized statehood. We regard as positive the fact that the public discourse develops the theme of an urgent need to reconsider seriously the hyperbolized role of external factors and their responsibility for our numerous troubles. It is in this fact that the interviewees see the main reason for our permanent reconciliation with negative

phenomena, patience, excessive shyness, the desire to avoid personal responsibility for the state of public affairs.

Other determinators of the public mood are the important events those influenced the whole country. Thus, 80% of the respondents regard the siege of Mariupol and the destruction of civilians in Bucha, Borodianka, Hostomel, and Irpin as the most crucial events. More than 30% of informants (mostly middle-aged and elderly people) shared their fear of the possibility of the capital being captured: «I was afraid they would take Kyiv, change the government, I was afraid of that, it was the most frightening thing» (woman, born in 1960); «Probably when they were 10 kilometers from Kyiv» (man, born in 1952) [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110].

About 90 % of respondents have regarded the events of their own empirical experience as the most critical ones: when their native settlement / district / region was hit; «When dad said he was going to war – and mother cut his hair, before that my uncle left, and it was scary» (girl, born in 2006); «when I was wounded on my birthday, on April 18, in Dovhenky, this is Donetsk region» (man, born in 1975); «winter blackouts» (woman, born in 2001); «loss of job» (woman, born in 1993), etc. [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110].

Narrators also associate tense emotions with displacement: «Crossing the Ukraine-Poland border, because for me it was very difficult both physically and morally. You leave your home <...> and you don't know what to do next, whether they will help you in a foreign country, how long will it last, what should you do next» (woman, born in 2004) [6, units of issue 1–50, folios 1110].

The narratives obtained in 2023 also demonstrate eloquently that during a year and a half of the large-scale Russian invasion, the Ukrainians have overcome a qualitative revision of the war scale and its possible consequences. In this context, every second respondent first of all mentions the explosion of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (hereinafter – HPP): «Before the detonation of the HPP, I had a clear

understanding that it was a war, with debris, with rockets that hit. One way or another, it all means terrorism. But Ukrainian area is more than 600,000 square kilometers. The war is not only on the left bank, the war is all over Ukraine. I had a relatively calm attitude to it <...> But when the Kakhovka HPP is blown up, I have understood that these are such terrible people, that they are trying to frighten us with a nuclear bomb, that is, with an explosion at a nuclear plant, that this is also possible, but one should not play with such things. That is, after the Kakhovka HPP, I have lost the illusion that it was all a bluff finally» (woman, born in 1992).

Today's narratives voice the theme of fear of a possible decline of patriotism and weakening of the unity of the nation. Such moods are generally dictated by the mental attitudes of Ukrainians, which are characterized by instability and rapid emotional changes. However, in these conditions, we should also take into account such general human behavior traits as an instinct of self-preservation and focusing on oneself and one's family in order to save vital resources.

The other concern that the respondents have demonstrated is connected with the apprehension of a decrease in the delivery of weapons for the AFU from Western partners and the decline of global financial aid for Ukraine. As the 2023 research shows, it is the timely supply of the AFU with military aid that has become the most important source of inspiration for Ukrainians.

Among the painful topics, there remain the spread of treasonous mood at various levels of government, demoralizing panic among the population, increase of personal despair and hopelessness, etc.

Majority of the Ukrainians have rated the resistance of the civilian population in the occupied territories as the most inspirational events: «For me, the most inspiring event was the strike of Kherson residents, who were brave enough to take to the streets of their city with the slogans 'Kherson is Ukraine!', and some daring people even threw themselves under

tanks of the occupants <...> When I saw such fearlessness, I felt proud for my country and my fellow citizens, and finally understood that the resistance of our country will be unbreakable until the end» (woman, born in 1978); AFU victories and the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories; acts of the Ukrainian citizens' unity in resistance to the enemy (volunteer movement, 2/3 of which have been started independently / spontaneously in various formats after the full-scale Russian invasion), donations to AFU (about 70% of respondents donate systematically), cultural and educational events of a patriotic nature): «Volunteers come every Thursdays and collect what the villagers bring for the soldiers <...> a grandmother came, she's single <...> she brought a lot of things that she bought – sugar, flour <...> and later she also brought 1000 hryvnias. When she was asked why she brought so much, she replied that I will be glad if I live until the end of the month only because these boys are fighting for me there. It was actually very inspiring – to the point of tears» (woman, born in 2005); «Many people have become interested in our history, culture <...> begun to separate our real culture from the so-called 'Sharovarshchyna' <...> started using the Ukrainian language, it's really fascinating. And I have really always wanted to be a part of such a society» (woman, born in 1980), etc.

It is worth noting that 10% of respondents feel remorse because of the insufficient efforts they think they have made to contribute to the victory, so they continue to look for new possibilities to help.

Compared to 2022, in 2023 the interviewees have noted a noticeable increase in patriotism among the younger generation (especially the Russian-speaking one): «Children have become more patriotic, they do not approve of the Russian language, they recognize nothing that is Russian as valid» (woman, born in 1963). The proof of this is the increase and improvement of the quality of Ukrainian cultural and educational content in social networks for, or with the participation of, children of different age.

Over the course of a year and a half, the number of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians has increased significantly: «We are doing our best to support everything Ukrainian that comes out, we go to all the film premieres <...> If earlier I was not particularly interested in Ukrainian cinema, now we realize that we must support what is our own» (woman, born in 1980); «I completely gave up Russian music, language, films, books» (woman, born in 2001); «Yes, I've started to reject everything related to orcs, from music to food» (woman, born in 1991), etc.

Compared to the beginning of a full-scale invasion, the number of the Ukrainians who use shelters has decreased significantly. Thus, in the first months of the war, 70% of Vinnytsia region residents have used to hide in shelters, but in June 2023, despite the increase in Russian rockets and other types of shelling, 90% of population follow the rule of 'two walls' during air raids, or have set up a 'shelter' in their houses, or do not hide at all.

According to the respondents, if such a choice in 2022 was primarily dictated by the lack of a sufficient number of specially equipped premises and was connected with the fact that Vinnytsia does not belong to the zone of active hostilities, in 2023, the main argument, despite the appearance of new shelters, lay in high trust in the professionalism of the Air Forces of Ukraine and a significant increase in air defense equipment. In a way, we connect such behavior with the peculiarities of the Ukrainians' mentality. Their emotional-sensual (intuitive) components in the ideological and behavioral attitudes dominate over the rational one. This can be proved by the folklore of various genres, in particular, Internet memes about the 'lottery-like' or fatalistic perception of the war by the Ukrainians (the archetype of destiny is a certain sequence of events in a person's life: 'what must happen, cannot be avoided'). This 'carelessness' of behavior is also prompted by such mental structure as individualism, which is distinguished by contemplativeness, self-absorption, concentration on one's own experience, and the absence of a strong

collective feeling. Ukrainian individualism can be defined as a survival strategy not so much of the community as of an individual. It can be recognized, in particular, in frequent ignoring of air alarms as a kind of manifestation of social infantilism. But in this context, it is possible to notice the appearance of a new trend dictated by the war, which affects the worldview and the social mood: the collective has disturbed significantly the strong foundations of an individual ('it is easier to survive in a group').

Since the full-scale Russian invasion, 2/3 of the narrators in the unoccupied territories generally did not note cardinal changes in daily routine. Their way of life has been to a certain degree influenced by the lack of opportunity to buy / get access to certain services or by the necessity of keep savings («I can't buy expensive things or services» (about 60%)); disorder of physical or psychological state («have acquired bad habits or have health / sleep problems» (50%)), («can't focus on usual activities (reading, sports, watching movies, etc.)» (about 45%)). 30% of respondents have their working conditions changed in some way (started to work remotely / lost their job / work load or salary decreased, etc.). 25% of the interviewees had life activities relatively normalized after the first 2–3 months of the full-scale invasion, 45% – after a year of the full-scale war.

In 2022, 75% of residents of Vinnytsia region had relatives / familiar persons involved in hostilities (in 2023, this number increased to 90%). Euromaidan was supported by 90% of the respondents: «We have shown that the people are important in the country. And only the people can be the driving force of everything» (man, born in 1977).

During the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, about 80% of informants who have relatives / acquaintances in the temporarily occupied territories stopped communicating with them. The main reason is the difference in views on the war and the instability of communication. Compared to 2022, the number of respondents who denied categorically the possibility of restoring friendly relations between the

Ukrainians and the Russians increased from 42% to 70%.

If at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, only 65% of Vinnytsia region residents felt confident in Ukraine's return of control over the occupied territories, today 90% express this opinion (the same number plans to stay in Ukraine in the near future).

As the narratives show, in 2023 about 90% of Ukrainians find any territorial concessions to the Russian Federation unacceptable, even if it means longer war and new threats to the country. Only 10% believe that in order to achieve peace and preserve independence, it is possible to give up some territories.

Another important question that helps to clarify the dynamics of the public mood is the attitude to military operations in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine till February 24, 2022. The majority of respondents called them «Russia's war against Ukraine» (50%); «annexation and occupation», «military aggression», «aggressive actions» (10% each). The rest have chosen several options simultaneously or hesitated with the answer.

However, after the full-scale Russian invasion, the gradation looked different: «Russia's war against Ukraine» (2022 – 50%; 2023 – 65%); «full-scale Russian invasion» (2022 – 35%; 2023 – 35%). There appeared such new evaluation categories as «national liberation war» (2022 – 10%; 2023 – 25%); «Patriotic war of the Ukrainian people» (2022 – 10%; 2023 – 10%); «Genocide of the Ukrainian people» (2022 – 5%; 2023 – 20%), indicating a qualitative revision of the national identity and perception of this war by the Ukrainians [8, unit of issue 16, folios 26].

The respondents' assessment of the actions of the Ukrainian authorities in countering the Russian invasion until February 24 was as follows: «sufficient» (60%); «insufficient» (40%). Half a year of the full-scale war has brought forward the following change in attitude: «sufficient» (82%); «insufficient» (18%). Today trust in various levels of government has decreased significantly:

«sufficient» (60%); «insufficient» (30%). The AFU actions before the full-scale invasion are rated as «sufficient» (70%), «insufficient» (20%), «don't know» (10%); after the full-scale invasion – «sufficient» (100%): «I believe that AFU actions are sufficient, one might say, even more than can be done on the front lines, but the government's – fifty-fifty. The information available on the Internet is filtered, that is why I am not satisfied with the authorities. Since there are a lot of corruption-related scandals... I believe that nowadays war cannot be used for personal enrichment...» (man, born in 1996); «I consider the actions of the authorities to be sufficient, but there are still some questions to ask them; as regards AFU, I will say that they are doing even more than possible» (man, born in 2007); «Our guys in AFU – yes! And the authorities – no. Our boys give their best – not even 100%, but 150%. But the authorities make tons of mistakes and then hide behind our boys» (man, born in 1984); «The local government should be doing something completely different <...> instead, they repair roads that no one needs, that could wait until the end of the war. They repair tram tracks... but when the mayor was asked to rebuild a school that was hit by a rocket, he said that the city budget doesn't have money <...> but they built three rows of curbs, three sidewalks. But we know only too well that the money used for these three rows of curbs is the money that someone needs to launder. This is what the government actually does» (woman, born in 1972), etc.

At the same time, there are enough interviewees who support the local authorities: «Vinnytsia is very, very helpful, especially Vinnytsia Military Administration. To be honest, our military authorities did not even expect so much help from Vinnytsia» (man, born in 1975); «It seems to me that it is very good, because Vinnytsia has a lot of aid headquarters with clothes. Vinnytsia also provided homes for displaced persons. And information on missile danger also works well» (girl, born in 2005); «Regional and city councils help a lot, send a lot

to the front, volunteer, whoever can help» (man, born in 1947), etc.

About 70% of the respondents have noted that change of government during the war could have a negative impact on Ukraine: «There are many questions to the government, but these questions should be clarified after the end of the war... I am not an ardent supporter of Zelenskyy's government, well, let's be honest, but if we start to sort them out now, it will only result in a new Hetmanship, a new Directory (*author's note – historical forms of government in the Ukrainian state, which, according to the narrator, were short-lived and ended in defeat*), we do not need it now» (man, born in 2000). [8, unit of issue 16, folios 26].

A question of the so-called pantheon of war heroes is an important issue for diagnosing the public mood. In the first months of the full-scale invasion, among the leaders were: AFU (20%); Volodymyr Zelenskyy (current President of Ukraine), Vitaly Kim (Chairman of Mykolaiv Regional State Administration), Oleksii Arestovych (Ukrainian blogger, political and military analyst, propagandist), «ghosts» of Kyiv (a legend, a character of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a Ukrainian ace pilot, a collective image of pilots of the 40th tactical aviation brigade) (10% each); the Ukrainian people, «the Azov-brigade» (a formation in the National Guard of Ukraine, the Azov assault brigade were among the Ukrainian military who resisted the Russian troops the longest in Mariupol near the Azov sea), Valerii Zaluzhnyi (Ukrainian military commander, general, the current Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) (5% each); hesitated to answer (25%). In 2023, the AFU (100%) and Valerii Zaluzhnyi (100%) have become the undisputed leaders, with 10% given to each – Volodymyr Zelenskyy, «Azov-brigade» and Kyrylo Budanov (Ukrainian military leader, chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major General).

Identifying themselves according to a proposed scale of identity types, 96% of respondents have positioned themselves as

citizens of Ukraine; 50% added a regional identity (resident of Vinnytsia region); 30% also highlighted their local identity (a resident of their locality). In general, this gradation testifies to the high level of unity and cohesion of the Ukrainians at various levels.

Narratives obtained in 2023 indicate that more than 70% of the Ukrainians are prepared that the war will be long (from one to five years) (at the beginning of the full-scale invasion this answer comes from 40% of the interviewed). This shows that the Ukrainians have become more realistic and rational. Although at the same time, more than 90% of respondents anticipate the unquestionable victory of Ukraine.

The victory for Ukraine, according to the interviewees, is, first of all: «Not even when we return the territories and the state borders of 1991, but when Putin's regime, not only Putin's, in general – the Russian Federation, the empire, this hybrid entity, is destroyed, for Ukraine – victory is the destruction of Russia» (man, born in 2000); «Victory means the liberation of the occupied territories and return to the borders of 2014 and the reconstruction of everything that was destroyed» (man, born in 1973); «These are security guarantees from Western countries... That's why we definitely need to join NATO, in my opinion, we definitely need to join the European Union in order to improve our economy» (man, born in 1996); «Well, to start with, this is the recognition for the Ukrainians themselves that we are a strong country» (boy, born in 2006); «First of all, the victory for Ukraine means being able to say that the Ukrainians are a very strong nation. We are always perceived as hired hands, a poor country. We must show that we are a worthy nation, that we have one of the best armies, that we are power!» (woman, born in 1984), etc.

The data we received generally correlate with the data of sociological companies of Ukraine.

Ukrainian society during the full-scale invasion, despite a fairly high level of negative emotions, demonstrates a high level of vitality. For most Ukrainians, self-limitations become inherent. Narratives testify to the growing level of

tolerance (toward IDPs, representatives of other religions and denominations (except believers of the UOC MP), LGBT, etc.) and faith in God. Simultaneously, the degree of «foreignness» to everything Russian and Russian-language cultural and informational content has increased rapidly (from 20% to 60%).

The majority of respondents assessed Ukraine's position in the world as above average, which means a change in international relations in the world and preparations for joining the EU. Ukraine is on the way to be accepted as a strong partner. The Ukrainians begin to demonstrate the growing Euro-Atlantic tendency: about 90% of respondents support Ukraine's accession to the European Union and NATO.

Social self-esteem has increased significantly and the inferiority complex has decreased. The majority of Ukrainians are re-examining their civic position and civic involvement. The nationwide feeling of invincibility and pride for one's country is strengthening in the light of personal participation in the struggle. The Ukrainians believe in victory and work for it.

Conclusions. Thus, the study of the dynamics of the public mood regarding the

Russian-Ukrainian war in conditions of the full-scale invasion is a relevant study from several points of view. In particular, it allows us to interpret general changes in the ideological and behavioral attitudes of Vinnytsia region residents during the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2023.

The choice of narrative as a methodological-methodical paradigm makes it possible to trace the cause-and-effect relationships of subjective cognitive (mental) and motivational-behavioral constructs more objectively; to identify, represent, project oneself at different levels (ethnic, national, social, gender, confessional, etc.) more clearly; pursue the topic of war in the public space as the therapy for common trauma.

We recognize the necessity of further work over this topic. The collected material requires a systematic interdisciplinary approach in order to verify further the data, as well as a deeper analysis of the attitude towards internally displaced persons and the Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories; assessment of the place of Vinnytsia region and Vinnytsia city in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

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