

Tetiana Poiarkova

Sumy State A. S. Makarenko Pedagogical University

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS THE STRATEGY OF UKRAINIAN STATEHOOD DESTRUCTION

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In the article the problem to determine the nature, peculiarities of origin and means to overcome military conflicts like Russian-Ukrainian war (have been continuing since 2014) is studied.

Modern scientific approaches to understanding of modern wars' essence such as the theory of "hybrid wars", "conflicts of low intensity", "privatized wars", post-modern conflict and degenerate warfare are analyzed.

Special attention is given to M. Kaldor's conception of "new war" and the unusual character of modern wars is emphasized, when elements of partisan confrontation and international warring parties are combined. In reality it is impossible to distinguish civilian population from warring parties. A very important feature is the formation of new forces, which are decentralized and consist of many different types (para-military secessionist units, local field commanders, mercenaries and regular armies).

The author gives special consideration to such nuance of Russian-Ukrainian war as the destruction of Ukrainian statehood by the Russian Federation (RF) using not only the external front but the inner one. In the article the influence of the RF on home Ukrainian problems is proposed to study in three projections: political, economic and cultural. At the same time the accent is made on the RF's using of democratic Ukrainian procedures and institutions for Russia's benefit.

As to the economic component, Russia holds an interest in creating of additional expenses for Ukraine because of: 1) population that in fact is in occupation (social services: pensions, indemnities for health and home losses, etc.); 2) destruction of infrastructure in occupied regions; 3) works in territories under the RF's control.

The cultural changes, which help Russia in the war confrontation, are emphasized. Firstly, it is the formation of a separate regional identity (prevailing over the state one) in the occupied territories. Secondly, there are strained relations (between Russians and Ukrainians, parishioners of the Moscow and Kiev Patriarchate, age strata, etc.). Thirdly, gradual destruction of "new" Ukrainian heroes' (soldier of Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO)) images is conducted. Fourthly, they consolidate negative images of local population of the 'LPR'-'DPR', who couldn't defend the independence of their region and now make additional budgetary loadings.

Reasons of Russia entry into the war against Ukraine are also analyzed in the article. These reasons are: overdependence of Russian economic system from external world, fatal developmental scientific lag. The author indicates that concentration of social attention on the war let mobilize Russian society to struggle against common enemy, level the aftermath of hydrocarbon era and inevitable social and economic polarization of Russian society.

The following aspects are treated by the author as the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: 1) compensation of total government ownership and encroachment on rights and freedoms of Russian citizens by means of felling like "the great nation" as the result of the of Ukrainian territory seizure (the Crimea); 2) creation of a precedent to reconsider post-World War II agreements.

In the conclusions of the article it is indicated that the most acceptable for the RF variant of further Russian-Ukrainian conflict is its tailing. The existence of the "grey zone" (the 'LPR' and the 'DPR') is advantageous in long-term perspective: to make up economic losses; to draw dividends from the opportunity to influence Ukraine the opportunities to reallocate areas of influence in world politics.

Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid war, conflicts of low intensity, "new war", second front.

The war in Ukraine is our day-to-day life; however it doesn't mask the unusual nature of current military invasion to be observed by everybody. On the one hand, Russia is an aggressive country which disavows this fact and distances from the obligation to be responsible for inobservance of international treaties envisaging various guarantees of the territorial integrity of Ukraine or observance of rights of people living in the occupied territories. On the other hand, Ukraine officially conducts the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), is not at war with the Russian Federation, maintains visa system and has economic relations with the official Moscow.

In connection with this, there is a current need to determine the nature, peculiarities of origin and means of such warfare.

Contemporary political science has several approaches to understanding of the 'modern' (which appeared after the World War II) hot armed conflicts' essence. One of the most popular directions considers modern wars as 'hybrid' ones (S. Datsiuk, Y. Fedorov, G. Pocheptsov, S. Rastorguev) [1, 2, 3, 4]. Careful study of works connected with this topic allows us to agree with the opinion that "the 'hybrid' aspect of the term simply denotes a combination of previously defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political or information ones. Even those who have put forward such a definition must admit that the combination of war across domains is not new, but in fact is as old as warfare itself" [5].

This prerequisite was the reason to pay attention to the works in which modern wars are considered as the product of evolutionary transformation. So, Ch. Tilly in his work 'Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992' (1992) pointed that the landmark transformation led to the formation of different war types: 1) patrimonialism, where the leading forces of war were represented by tribes, feudal assemblies, town people's emergency volunteer corps; 2) brokerage, where wars were conducted by mercenaries; 3) armies of nation states, which were characterized by creation of mass army and navy and inclusion of military forces into the state administrative structures; 4) socialized wars, where military force became a powerful authority, fiscal activity became more and more separated from military one, differentiation of labour between the army and the police increased that, therefore, laid the foundation for formation of the European states [6, p. 60].

But wars are the reason not only to construct the means of coercion in the territories with definitely determined borderlines and have some advantages over all the other organizations which act in the same territories, but also to form the civil state structures aimed at collecting means for army supply and regularly controlling the rest of civilian population [6, p. 47].

In Ch. Tilly's judgment, the strategy of 'modern' wars is determined by the confluence of all historical types of wars. From this perspective, the reason of war is '(narrow-understandable) nationalism' that allows the representatives of one or another nationality, which is not recognized by the official authorities, to trace their chance in these wars. It is very important that the influence of wars on the state development is not always progressive. The wars often cause degradation of the main law-enforcement institutions, as these conflicts can be the display of the external interference that let the regimes of the aggressive countries survive without inner transformations [6, p. 59, 297].

In his work 'War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today's Global Chaos' (1995), A. Toffler specified that modern wars depended on the strategy for conducting warfare which "represented the means to make wealth, however the means to stop warfare must reflect the means to conduct warfare" [7, p. 28].

In A. Toffler's opinion, the distinctive features of the military involvements in the 21st century are determined by the two points. Firstly, the parties to these involvements are the states of the First (agrarian), the Second (industrial), and the Third (informational) waves which have their own interests, warring élites, crises, and needs [7, p. 46, 321]. Secondly, the equivalent warring parties are agents that might not be the whole nations (in the modern sense of the word) but represent all the types of the ethnic communities – from a federation of tribes to a city-state of the Third Wave, i.e. the postnational state having indistinct borders [7, p. 352, 353].

A. Toffler claimed that there was the tendency for old diplomatic means to be generally lost and for many international organizations to particularly disappear. That carried important consequences under which "the UN itself might partially be the club of the former or false nations, that is the political units which could be masked as the nations" [7, p. 309, 353].

M. van Creveld in his 'The Transformation of War' (2008) proposed to regard military involvements, that had appeared after the World War II, as the 'involvements of low intensity' which strategic peculiarities were determined by the following: 1) warring parties resembled tribes; 2) fanaticism, not professionalism, was the prevailing motivation; 3) there was no separation line between the battlefield and home front (between those who fought and those who observed the war, paid bills, and suffered); 4) the aim was to lower the threshold of 'political significance' and move it from the state level to the level of organizations, groups, and private persons representing the state; 5) presence of expensive modern (nuclear) weapons was not an advantage; 6) rebels always gained victory over professional forces [8, p. 46, 48, 280, 281, 287].

All these circumstances, in M. van Creveld's opinion, lead to erosion of the modern state institutions because of destruction of the state's privilege for violence. That results in disappearance of distinction between the authorities, the army, and the people and could trigger the change of the national states for military states of different types in future [8, p. 266].

M. van Creveld believed that process to have gradual, irregular and zigzag nature, as the sovereignty was undermined both by the international organizations and by the "powerful centrifugal force" and "memories of the former political independence and greatness" within the system [8, p. 270, 271].

For many reasons, in terms of the soldiering evolution, the 'involvements of low intensity' are degradation. On the one hand, this is an inability to use expensive systems by rebels who are an ignorant, untrained crowd [8, p. 289]. On the other hand, the use of high-tech weapons by professional forces is complicated by the great deconcentration of enemy forces or by the fact that such enemy forces are not separated from civilians [8, p. 288]. At the same time, the use of extremely simple weapons during such involvements coexists with the up-to-date developments in tracking and subversive activities, as the usual place to conduct such warfare is represented by severe surroundings created by the nature or a human being [8, p. 294, 292].

It is not less important that the 'involvements of low intensity' tend towards the degradation of self-reproduction. So, military confrontation that began 'in order' to achieve one or another aim could rapidly transform into the game with the highest stakes (into the relegation battle) that does not only serve the power but is the power itself [8, p. 301]. At times, personal fame, profits and spoils taken away from civilians stop being additional trophies and become valid aims of warfare [8, p. 297, 298, 299].

M. Kaldor in 'New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era' (2012) connects the changes in warfare of the last decades of the 20th century with the consequences of the formation of the new type of organized global violence causing degradation/erosion of an autonomous state [9, p. 29, 36].

In M. Kaldor's opinion, the legitimacy of the organized violence is lost because of the following: 1) transformation of the armed forces that started during two world wars and was institutionalized as the system of geopolitical blocks during the Cold War; 2) existence of a great number of transnational connections between the armed forces that were formed during the post-war period; 3) appearance of private paramilitary units [9, p. 37].

After the manner of M. Creveld, M. Kaldor emphasizes the high self-reproductive potential of such military involvements, as they are catalyzed by the intersystem processes, e.g. deceleration of economic activity, high level of unemployment; increase in the crime rate and corrupt practices; state inefficiency; aggravation of local identities; dependence on foreign resources [9, p. 39, 41, 45].

M. Kaldor regards globalization to be the reason for new wars where new technologies influence the speed of social mobilization and the latter, in its turn, changes the way to conduct warfare. Absorption of the territory using defence technologies is the prevailing military

strategy represented by the combination of experience of the partisan operations and warfare of professional forces [9, p. 42].

During such a war, those who have been against the system aim mobilising extremism by means of indiscriminate killings and forcible migration in order to gain control over the territory. Consequently, professional forces avoid battles and gain control over the territory by political means.

The use of violence against civilian peaceful population by both parties leads to expansion in the number of refugees, adoption of the professional forces' technologies by rebels, and vice-versa [9, p. 44, 43]. All these processes may bring to the following results: 1) elimination of distinctions between the combatants, as the legal users of weapons, and non-combatants, i.e. between the soldiers (policemen) and criminals; 2) formation of new types of forces which are decentralized and divided into many various groups (e.g., paramilitary secessionist units, local warlords' troops, mercenaries, and permanent armies) [9, p. 38].

At first sight, military events in Ukraine, which began in 2014 and are going on now, include all the types to conduct warfare, the presence of the foreign interested player, the change of role of the peaceful civilians and their transformation into full participants of the military confrontation. So, military events in Ukraine fall under understanding of the modern military involvements.

However, in our opinion, an important nuance of the actual Russian-Ukrainian war is the use of a different strategy to destroy the Ukrainian statehood by the Russian Federation which participates in the war both from without and within the country. So, from the very beginning of actual military involvement, not only individuals but the whole groups, organizations and structures openly came down to the enemy's side. Those facts helped to clear up that the key positions in the state structures and in the non-governmental influential organizations (such as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) were controlled by the Russian Federation long before the warfare (e.g., the Main Office of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea almost completely came down to the aggressor's side during the annexation of the Crimean peninsula). Just as importantly that the illegal occupation of Crimea was supported by most of the people to be retired servicemen: they changed their citizenship in order to live in Crimea and agreed to serve the RF.

That was the fact to allow considering the annexation of the Crimean peninsula as its integration into Russia on the basis of the results of the referendum granting the right to self-determination to the nation represented by the population to be absolutely unfriendly to the Ukrainian state.

By taking this into account, Russia does not only neglect the international norms of warfare, principles of defence of the civilian peaceful population, and terms of custody of the prisoners of war, but also turns Ukraine from the victim into the country transferring funds to the population being de facto occupied (in order to pay for social services, e.g. to pay pensions, to indemnify for lost accommodation, etc.).

These circumstances make us carefully study the reasons which have steered Russia as the subject of international relations to enter into such a war and, what is more, to have been preparing for it for several decades.

In our opinion, this format of warfare may be treated as the natural result of the establishment of the authoritarian hierarchical state system in the Russian Federation. Within such a system, the business is deeply incorporated into the integrated economy where there is no competition but all the funds and resources are disposed between the stakeholders according to the degree of loyalty the authorities display to them. Beside that, the power is concentrated into the hands of the former USSR servicemen who completely control the economy, redistribute social products and keep political leadership. So, the successful development of this

system is contingent on solving the local tasks. In other words, the simplest way to overcome the crisis phenomena that can indicate the loss of viability of such a system is to misappropriate resources of the neighbouring states.

This is the reason for conducting the Russian-Ukrainian war. The RF flings its insults at the Ukrainian statehood, as the political front is the most important one and all the democratic procedures and institutions could be the means to destruct the Ukrainian statehood.

The means of influence were employed by the subjects of the early elections and might be employed during the elections in the occupied territories situated along the borderline with the RF if the Ukrainian authorities accept them. In case the elections in the East of Ukraine are carried out, the RF could obtain loyal authoritative elements to be easily incorporated into the Ukrainian political field. By enjoying political immunities, such elements would gain an opportunity to influence the formation of the domestic policy of Ukraine. The process of decentralization is no less destructive, as it leads to the increase in inner political subjects to be oriented at the interests of the external political system.

The economic front is also important. Destruction of the Ukrainian statehood is stimulated by the following phenomena: 1) gradual slowdown in the rates of economic growth to be the result of warfare; 2) permanent necessity to get tranches and, thus, to carry out requirements of the IMF; 3) rapid implementation of the market rules to form utility payments that leads to their inevitable rise; 4) aggravation of class controversy caused by the increase in the number of people living on the social assistance. Another specific threat is posed by actions of the Ukrainian ruling class to be interested in war. It is represented by the oligarchs who satisfy their business interests by using money as the political instrument that grants them control over budgetary flows and allows exploring monopolisation of the market and poverty of the population as a major asset for their survival.

Criminalisation to be gradually ruining all the stable existential rules is inevitable at the time of the hot conflict and, therefore, stimulates destruction of the Ukrainian statehood. Criminal structures and connections are used to enforce and physically suppress both the critics of the Ukrainian authorities and those people who sympathize with them. The 'infiltration' of the gun-toting elements into the territory of Ukraine in order to carry out one-time, sporadic actions is helping to plunge the country in chaos and destabilize it.

We are of the opinion that the changes in people's identity pose a great threat to all the society, as help to form a kind of regional identity in the occupied territories which prevails over the national one in view of its monopoly on truth, media, and formation of the public conscience. So, the annexation of Crimea, numerous attempts to join the territories of the so-called 'Luhansk People's Republic' and 'Donetsk People's Republic' to the RF by means of administrative mechanisms, fiscal norms, court proceedings, special services, and educational institutions against a background of the 'bloodshed' can provide a basis for cultural 'alienation' of people, i.e. for their "separation from 'native software' and secession from collective life where to be 'Somebody Else' means to feel the lack of belonging to the definite 'We'" [10, p. 39]. In future, this could result in formation of such a "type of behaviour that deviates from the normal one and is defined as the absence of reconciliation between the human yearnings and social standards to fulfil them" [11, p. 27].

Exacerbation of actual differences existing between the Russians and Ukrainians, parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow and Kyiv patriarchates, representatives of different age groups, etc. would be dangerous. Besides that, gradual destruction of images of the 'new' Ukrainian heroes represented by the Anti-Terrorist Operation soldiers (e.g., formation of the general opinion on the enemy features to be inherent to Nadiia Savchenko) might also be subversive.

We can't but mention the identification difficulties experienced by the great number of inhabitants (about 2 million people) who moved from the occupied territories. Some negative features of people previously residing in the 'LPR' and the 'DPR' are often generalized that turns internally displaced persons into social outsiders or an additional 'budgetary load'. In this respect, demographic waves may be used by the RF as a 'weapon of mass destruction' to allow raising permanent claims to the Ukrainian authorities and planting Russian moles under the guise of settlers.

Identification processes may cause undue alarm amongst people who live in Crimea, the 'LPR' and the 'DPR'. As a result, they are afraid of returning to Ukraine and remain in the occupied territories for different reasons (these processes are notably painful for people employed in the social sphere, e.g. teachers, health workers and public servants).

As we can see, increase in the number of challenges to be faced by the Ukrainian state system inevitably brings up an issue on its effectiveness. This fact could let the RF afford proofs of the inferiority of the Ukrainian statehood, as Russia considers the war against Ukraine as not only the symbol of return to the achievements of the Soviet or imperial past, but also as the evidence of effectiveness of its state machine.

Warfare in Ukraine allowed concealing negative aspects of the Russian economic system to be overdependent on the external world and confirming fatal scientific and technical backlog. The Russian society is completely focusing on the warfare and, therefore, mobilising against the 'common enemy'. That helps the Kremlin to level consequences of the end of the hydrocarbon era and inevitable social and economic polarization of the Russian society.

In its turn, renewal of the feeling of the 'great nation' by means of annexation of foreign territories (e.g., the Crimean peninsula) can justify the partial rebirth of the RF imperial features that come into sharp focus in the state building and assault on rights and freedoms of the Russian citizens.

The above-mentioned strategy of the Russian-Ukrainian war provides for definite bonuses at the international level. So, the annexation of Crimea by the RF establishes a precedent for reconsidering the agreements concluded after the World War II and catalyzes the process of redistributing the areas of influence. Russia had certain advantages in the Crimean territory, as in summer of 2016 more than 24 thousand Russian servicemen, 613 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 162 artillery mounts, about 100 combat aircrafts, 56 helicopters, 16 coastal missile systems, and 30 surface warships and submarines were located in the peninsula [12]. The Russian military presence in the 'LPR'-'DPR' region is evidenced by the dislocation of 36 thousand servicemen. These forces are represented by 70 per cent of the RF citizens (45 per cent of them are career soldiers and 25 per cent of servicemen are mercenaries) and 30 per cent of the locals [12]. It is necessary to take into consideration that all these troops have experience in combat operations conducted under the conditions to resemble the European ones and are deployed near the borderlines of NATO Member States.

All these factors afford Russia an opportunity to threaten the countries situated along its borderline with the invasion and place pressure on the official Kyiv in order to put into operation its peace-keeping forces in the East of Ukraine. Such processes could threaten the European countries with the prolonged migration from the territory of Ukraine. However, participation in the negotiations in Minsk allows the RF to have an early edge in them, as its role of the 'peacemaker' and 'mediator' during the inland conflicts puts a 'halo of irreplaceability' over this aggressor.

As one can see, warfare against Ukraine conducted at several fronts (i.e. in the territory of Ukraine and abroad) opens Russia the prospects to use both the hard and soft means of influence. As regards the future of this military involvement, the most acceptable option for the RF is to procrastinate it because the existence of the 'LPR'-'DPR' gray zone can be considered

as its long-term benefits (taking into account the economic needs appeared against a background of the punitive sanctions) to be gained while exerting influence on the Ukrainian state. In the event the RF recognizes itself to be a party to the conflict, it would be forced to take the responsibility for war crimes.

Russia considers the war against Ukraine as an ideal way to overcome the disfunctionality of its own state system, as the relatively cheap means and relatively little losses do not only provide its survival, but also give it the opportunity to influence the other geopolitical players and exert an impact on the trends in the world geopolitical environment. This war establishes a precedent for the Russian survival at the expense of the outer resources. In the short term, the RF will stabilize its inner state but, in the long term, it will have a chance to reshape the world order.

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