

критичність, автономність, відкритість, толерантність, об'єктивність, інтегрованість світогляду віруючого²⁰.

Таким чином, індивідуальна релігійність православного віруючого може вважатися конструктивною за кількох умов:

- соціальна поведінка особи вмотивовується релігійними інтересами, віра постає самоцінністю, нерелігійні потреби підпорядковуються релігійним нормам та приписам;

- індивіду властива «орієнтація пошуку», зацікавленість вищими екзистенційними питаннями поєднана із скептицизмом щодо окремих відповідей на них;

- толерантність в індивідуальній релігійності виявляється через неупередженість щодо різноманіття життя, багатства інтересів, цінностей, коли значущість різних релігій важлива за своєю суттю;

- оптимістичний підхід до життя підкреслює його повноту, розповсюджується на всі цінності та смисли, де зло виключається чи забувається як дещо ірреальне, а домінуючою емоцією виступає довіра;

- має спільнотний характер, виявляється через долучення до Євхаристії, значно актуалізує поняття любові, «духовної вбогості», аскетизму.

4.3 «Russian world» – theological doctrine and religious ideology that ruin the humanity (*Anatoliy Kolodnyy, Liudmyla Fylypovych*)

The XXth century has provided numerous examples of different forms of religious extremism, in particular the Orthodox Christian extremism. XXIth century demonstrates an explosion of neo-pagan and Orthodox extremist views in Russia grounded on syncretic theory of «Russian World».

Used as ideology and mass manipulation tool Russian Orthodoxy becomes a form of totalitarisation of all life's spheres, a threat to civil society. This fundamentalist system is currently been implemented in political life of Russia and neighboring countries.

Religion-based «Russian World» does raise national pride, promotes national and religious identification of Russians, but for other peoples, even those of Orthodox faiths, it has become potentially conflicting because it:

- considers Russian Orthodoxy superior to others religions and its believers having special right for ultimate truth
- persecutes other religions by legislative prohibition, seizure of churches, physical destruction of clergy and believers.

The most expressive manifestations of today's Orthodox extremism are the justified-by-religion crimes in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.

²⁰ Там само.

Orthodox church-Russian state doctrine «Russian World» has become the ideology of modern Russian neo-imperialism used to re-conquer countries liberated from the Soviets in 1991. The heart of «Russian World» is national Orthodox Christianity. In 2014 the Russian People's Council adopted the «Russian identity Declaration» which states: "every Russian shall be an Orthodox", thus violating human rights and freedoms.

«Russian World is there, where Russians are!» – This geopolitical justification was used during annexation of Crimea and Donbas, where Moscow «protected» Russians as Orthodoxes, and can be used in any country. Separatist regions of Donbas have declared Russian Orthodoxy as their «state religion». Other religions are prohibited, their believers – persecuted and discriminated. Donbas gang «Russian Orthodox Army» systematically closes non-Orthodox churches. This social experiment creates Russian national and religious dictatorship in the conquered region – an occurrence Europe has not seen for centuries. World awaits for new «initiatives» from the Orthodox president.

1. The forerunner of today's «Russian World» was the XVth century Orthodox Christian ideology of «Moscow – the Third Rome». Its goal was legitimization of claims to the Byzantine legacy justified via concept of special spiritual mission of Moscovia.

With the rise of Moscow Patriarchate in 1589 the concept became a guiding ideology of national policy (later implemented in the imperial credo of «Orthodoxy – Autocracy – Nation»), and its hostility to Catholicism and other denominations.

After the collapse of USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church found itself to be the only Russian institution that had maintained and controlled the entire space of the former tsarist and Soviet empires.

Justifying its actions with legacy of «historical Rus'», Moscow Patriarchy actively, often aggressively, spreads and imposes the «Russian World» to all peoples which have been involved in the history of Russia, including other religions' believers.

The goal of «Russian World» is the return of imperial grandeur.

The forerunner of today's "Russian World" concept was the XVth century idea of «Moscow – the Third Rome». It had its roots in early-tsarist Russia and was proposed as an ideology for newly created Muscovy Empire. The purpose of the «Third Rome» idea was to legitimize Moscow's claims for the Byzantine heritage and to justify special historical mission of «God-chosen Muscovy realm» in the Christian world. In this concept Moscow was presented as a successor to two historic Romes. After the first Rome fell under the onslaught of the Germans (476 C.E.), and the second – Constantinople – was conquered by the Muslim Turks (1453), their role, according to Pskov monastery abbot Philopheus, moved to Moscow as the last pillar of Orthodox Christianity on earth – the «Third Rome». In his epistle to Prince Ivan III (1504–1505) the monk wrote: «Two Romes have fallen, the third stays, and the fourth can never come into being». Philopheus's concept became popular in times of tsar Ivan IV.

The theory of «Third Rome» was materialized officially in 1589. The document named «Ulozhennaya gramota» stated the rise of Moscow Patriarchy as allegedly the only true Christian Church. It has been re-implemented under the rule of tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and Patriarch Nikon in 1654 after the joining of Ukraine to Muscovy and the appropriation of Kyiv's Christianity history by Moscow Patriarchy. The theory of «Third Rome» became a guide of imperial policy, defining it as hostile to other Orthodox Churches and to Roman Catholicism.

2. Peter-time ideologeme «Moscow – guardian of Orthodoxy» received its continuation and development in doctrine «Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationhood» shaped by count S.Uvarov. By the will of Peter from that time Muscovy had to be called «Russia», Peter – the Emperor of the whole Russia, centuries of Kyivan Rus Christianity history – to be considered belonging to the history of Moscow Orthodoxy. By this manoeuvre Russia tried to defraud Europe, forming the view that it was not Muscovy who conquered Ukraine, but rather that Muscovy and Ukrainian peoples had a common history and were the same people. That had become the beginning of Muscovy's stealing Ukrainian history that Putin continues today. First, the Fuhrer of today's Russia decided to «annex» Volodymyr the Baptist for himself, declaring that «the foresight of the Prince and his actions became a source for creation of single Russia (???) as a unique state». This logic states that the prince allegedly «initiated the creation of a unified Russian nation». Declaring Volodymyr to be the founder Russia, Putin thus tries to legitimize his claims not only for Ukraine's South-East, but for the whole territory of Ukraine, the cradle of which is the Kyivan Rus. In this way Putin shows that he has monopolized the right to protect the Orthodox «Mother Russia» established by Volodymyr from Western aggression and their mean plans to separate the single Russian people. Putin ignores the fact that thanks to the baptism of Rus Volodymyr forged links with Christian Europe and defined the European vector for Ukraine.

Because of the presumed baptism of Prince Volodymyr in currently annexed Crimea Putin announced the peninsula to be a «sacred source of Russian nation – many-faced, but monolithic, and of centralized Russian autocracy». The idea of «orthodoxy, autocracy, nationhood» is revitalized by weekly processions bearing icons of last Russian tsar Nicholas II and his sainted family all over the country. A single glance into the calendar of holidays of Moscow Orthodox Church shows its efforts to revive the idea of return to the sacred Russian autocracy. Patriarch Kirill claims to be the single and sole spiritual patron of the territories of former Russian empire. Meanwhile many Russians demonstrate their desire to sacralize Vladimir Putin as a gatherer of former empire's lands.

3. Since 1991, Russia has been living under constant fear of Ukrainian Orthodoxy winning its autocephaly and, thus, loss of Kyiv Metropolia as part of the Moscow Patriarchy. Its greatest fear is not the loss of parishes, property, or finances, but the loss of stolen and appropriated Ukrainian Orthodox history,

with its roots in St. Andrew, the «first-called» Apostle, and, thus a title of apostolic mother-church with all the honors it provides. Muscovy received Orthodox faith from the hands of Kyiv, which by that time had spent 700 years (since 988 C.E.) under the jurisdiction of Constantinople Patriarchy. Therefore, not the Moscow is a mother church for Ukraine, but Byzantium-Constantinople, from which Ukraine received its baptism. The first chronicle mentions of Moscow go only as far as 1147, while Kyiv Rus had been «officially» baptized two centuries before, with the archaeological evidences of Christianity presence rooting back to II-III C.E. As a state-like principality Muscovy emerged only in 1277 under the order of the Mongol Khan Mengu-Timur as an ordinary ulus of the Golden Horde. Kyiv Metropolia has been the oldest metropolitan cathedra in Eastern Europe, it served as a mother church for all Slavic East, including Russia.

Today's annexation of Crimea has given Moscow a cause for a new religious history falsification by designing the concept of «Crymo-pravoslaviye». From this point Kyiv's font is shown in Russian propaganda as having same importance and status as Novgorod's, Suzdal's, and Moscow's fonts. The emphasize is put on the assumption that Volodymyr received his baptism not in Kyiv or Vasylev, but in Chersonese, therefore baptism of Rus has been launched not from Kyiv, but from Crimea, which Russian Federation has announced as its own territory. According to this logic Russia had been baptized before Ukraine was.

4. In order to justify his ward over geographical area and support the legality of the claims for restoration and preservation of the so-called «historical Russia», Patriarch Kirill actively implants the confessional aspect of «Russian World» concept, while its ethnic aspect is ruled by Putin himself. For Kirill «Russian world» is a time-space relationship, life and consciousness of peoples (including Ukrainians), which have historically been involved in the long history of the Orthodox Russia, and of territories that had served as provinces in Russia's tsarist or Soviet empires. Increasing its forms of intervention into various aspects of social life in the countries of its spread, Kirill's Russian Orthodox Church (ROCh) persistently, often aggressively imposes the ideology of «Russian World» onto all, including believers of other faiths who reside in the so-called «Moscow-Orthodox canonical territory». Even more – ROCh extends to other countries which are home to some Russian population in alleged need for spiritual alimentation by Moscow Church. The concept of «Russian World» is thus focused on returning Russia to its former power and imperial grandeur. «Church boundaries of Russian World» according to Kirill, do not coincide with Russia's state boundaries: they extend to those countries where the Moscow Orthodox Church has influence, providing alleged lawful excuse for Russia's interference into these countries' social processes, determination of their historical destiny. Today there's another «motive» for protection of «Russian World» in Ukraine for Russia and its Church: the salvation of Orthodox believers from «infidels» – fascist Greek Catholics and

Orthodox followers of Ukrainian Patriarch Filaret. In this way, Russia reserves a semi-legal possibility of crusade into Ukraine. A real reason for intervention in this case is not necessary. Inspired letters with prayers «Putin, come and save the Orthodoxes» is enough. The motiv for intervention can even sound like «voluntary transitions of church communities from Moscow Patriarchy jurisdiction to Kyiv Patriarchy, or protection of Orthodox Christian sacred places in Crimea against Muslims and infidels. All this reminds to great extend motivation of bloody Crusades, conducted against the infidels who crucified Jesus Christ and appropriated the «holy land».

5. The ethnic dimension of the «Russian World» concept is actively defended by Putin, who arbitrarily manipulates facts of religious history for the sake of satisfying his imperial ambitions. Repeating the Soviet Empire mantra: «Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians – one people» with same history and religion, Putin thus tries to «justify» his right to intervene, even in military way, into the lives of neighboring countries, including Ukraine. In fact, the identification of Ukrainians as Russians is obvious fake. The mentality is different. For example, most Russians are extroverts, inclined to collectivism; Ukrainians are very individualistic and mostly introverts. Political traditions are also different: tsarist – in Russians, and Cossack – in Ukrainians. Ukrainians have nothing to do with Moscow Orthodoxy. Kyiv Metropolia as an autonomous entity within the structure of the Constantinople Patriarchy existed until 1686, when it was in brutally non-canonical way absorbed by the Moscow Patriarchy. After this acquisition, Muscovy had immediately begun the destruction of Ukrainian Orthodox identity features such as conciliarism, democracy, evangelism, openness, etc. The emergence of Autocephalous Orthodox Churches in Ukraine in XXth century was an attempt to restore the native Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Now this trend is spearheaded by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy. Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy in cooperation with Moscow seeks to destroy this Church in various ways. Their ideological background is the same concept of «Russian World», according to which no autocephalous churches should be created on the territories that Moscow Orthodoxy considers to be its own.

Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy (which has near 12,000 parishes in Ukraine) actively works to ensure that Ukrainians perceive extraneous Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis for their national identity, and ultimately through the perception of «Russian World» and «historical Rus» ideas should return to the new state union with Russia. Russia itself wants to be big and powerful and spread fear among all neighbors. This mentality will work until Russia retrieves from its artificial «Russian World» to the size of Muscovy, which will come soon after the next collapse of its colonial empire. Meanwhile, in a speech given couple years ago in Gorlivka, Patriarch Kirill said: «Here, in the sacred land of Donbass, I cannot do but speak about the relations between Russia and Ukraine. This is a single whole space of Holy Rus, same as Belarus... We are one nation, which came out of Kyiv's font of baptism». These words do

not differ from the fascist speeches of Russian President Putin. For the Christian believers in Ukraine the only effective imperative remains the slogan proclaimed by Mykola Khvylyovyi: «Away from Moscow!»

4.4 Церковний чинник в патріотичному вихованні українців: потенції, проблеми, перспективи (Ольга Недавня)

Актуальність і дослідженість теми. В сучасних умовах важкого опору українців російській агресії, котра здійснюється, окрім військових, ще й інформаційними та економічними методами, а тепер і шляхом неоголошеного «гібридного» протистояння, дуже важливо належно оцінювати і відповідну роль в цій борні релігійно-церковного чинника. «Русский мир» – не менш ефективна зброя Московської Церкви у війні з Україною, ніж збройна допомога Російської держави сепаратистам.. Релігійні спільноти мають свій потенціал у вихованні громадян – патріотами своєї Батьківщини, а чи іншої. Різні аспекти проблематики ролі релігійно-церковних чинників у патріотичному вихованні українців давно перебувають в зоні виправданої уваги вітчизняних світських науковців та представників Церков, серед релігієзнавців це: А. Колодний, Л. Филипович, В. Шевченко, П. Павленко, О. Саган, С. Здіорук, М. Черенков, О. Туєшин та ін. Певну увагу РКЦ та протестантським Церквам у цьому плані приділив П. Л. Яроцький¹. Аналізувала проблему й автор статті, розглядаючи у різних контекстах відповідний зріз буття християнських конфесій в Україні. Природно, активізувались такі дослідження після останнього Майдану. Зокрема, у таких виданнях, як «Майдан і Церква»², «Боже, спаси Україну...»³, «Церковь на Майдане»⁴, тема тієї чи іншої участі церковних чинників у формуванні патріотизму, в конкретних вчинках, співпраці, допомозі тощо розкривається на промовистих прикладах. Однак наразі лише почались ґрунтовні фахові рефлексії, теоретичний аналіз відповідної діяльності, що відбувається на наших очах. Зокрема, вартує дослідити, які потенції мають у справі патріотичного виховання Церкви та релігійні організації, що діють в Україні, з якими специфічними проблемами у цій справі вони стикаються у своєму конфесійному ареалі та в ширшому колі співгромадян і які відповідні перспективи при цьому вони можуть мати.

Пристаюючи до такого аналізу, слід зазначити, що в даній царині досі побутують застарілі чи нав'язані колоніальним спадком стереотипи,

¹ Яроцький П.. Римо-католицизм в Україні // Українське релігієзнавство. – 2008. – № 46. – С. 238-259; П. Яроцький. Стан пізньопротестантських конфесій // Українське релігієзнавство. – 2008. – № 46. – С. 326.

² Майдан і Церква: хроніка подій та експертна оцінка. За заг.ред. д.філос.н. Филипович Л. О. і к.філос.н. Горкуші О. В. – К.: Самміт-Книга, 2014. – 656 с.

³ Єпископ Станіслав Широкоградюк. Боже, спаси Україну. – Луцьк, 2014. – 236 с.

⁴ Гордеев Алексей. Церковь на Майдане. – К.: Книгоноша, 2015. – 304 с.