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The Revolution of Dignity and instrumentalisation of LGBT rights: How did attitudes towards LGBT people change in Ukraine after Euromaidan?

Introduction

The movement towards Europe was probably the most important objective of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2013–2014. Mass protests, which resulted in the overthrow of the Yanukovich regime, began immediately after the refusal of the Cabinet of Ministers to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union [Shveda & Park, 2016]. The existential need for getting closer to Europe, rather than returning to Russia's orbit, was justified by the fact that Ukrainians share European values [Vorobiova, 2015], as interpreted in the Treaty of Lisbon [European Union, 2007].

This naturally raises the question of whether and to what extent Ukrainian citizens in general, and Euromaidan participants in particular, accept members of the LGBT community (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender people) and are willing to recognise their rights as equal. The next question is whether Ukrainians' attitudes towards LGBT people have really improved since Euromaidan.

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The consensus in literature on this topic engenders some scepticism. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that the legal protection of LGBT rights has somewhat improved since the Revolution of Dignity, and this issue has become more relevant on the political agenda. But on the other hand, quite a few authors claim that these improvements are largely the result of Ukraine's aspirations to sign a number of agreements with the EU, such as on visa-free travel [Bonny, 2018; LeBlanc, 2015; Martsenyuk, 2016; Shevtsova, 2017, 2020; Teteriuk, 2016; Wannebo, 2017]. In their view, support for LGBT rights during Euromaidan was not obvious; moreover, public attitudes towards the LGBT community and their rights have not changed significantly or even deteriorated due to the reaction to their active promotion. In other words, putting LGBT rights onto the agenda (as a necessary condition for Ukraine's integration with the European Union) has not changed public opinion on this issue; instead, it has even become more homophobic or heterosexist¹.

Valid conclusions about changes in public opinion can only be made on the basis of data from representative surveys, which enable tracking attitudes towards LGBT people among the general population of Ukraine. So far, there have been just a few polls of this kind, and they do not provide grounds for any clear-cut statements. This article contributes to the discussion on the above-mentioned issues. It contains the results of a comparative study of attitudes towards the LGBT community before and after Euromaidan. The data from four Ukrainian oblasts and the city of Kyiv were analysed². Although the findings show a predominance of heterosexism, the authors did not find any indication that public attitudes to the LGBT community had worsened; on the contrary, there had been a slight improvement in some aspects. In addition, Euromaidan supporters (as a separate group) displayed, on average, a more positive attitude towards the LGBT community.

A review of the previous studies

European values, Europeanisation and instrumentalisation of LGBT rights

The recognition of human rights for LGBT people is a very important indicator of how European values are understood and acknowledged. Respect for equality and human dignity, as well as the assertion of human rights, including the rights of "persons belonging to minorities" [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1992] — all this should certainly apply to the LGBT community.

It is worth mentioning that as early as 1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed the diagnosis of "homosexuality" from the second edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual [Drescher, 2015]. In 1997, the World Association for Sexual Health recognised that all forms of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) are part of human sexuality and need protection [Kon, 2011; World Association for Sexual Health, 2014]. Though SOGI-based discrimination has not yet been overcome even in Europe, the long-term dynamics of public opinion indicate a noticeable increase in

1 Although *homophobia* as a term remains very common, the concepts of heterosexism, sexual prejudice or homonegativity are considered more scientifically correct (see, e.g. [Herek & McLemore, 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016]).

2 Oblast is a sub-national entity in Ukraine.

tolerance of homosexuality and growing support for LGBT rights such as same-sex marriage [Browne & Nash, 2014; Council of Europe, 2011; Kuyper, Iedema, & Keuzenkamp, 2013]. Nowadays, LGBT rights are in a way at the forefront of the struggle for European values.

Perhaps that is why the decriminalisation of homosexuality and prohibition of SOGI-based discrimination have become an essential component of Europeanisation — a process of EU-driven reshaping of domestic policies and institutions in individual countries [Graziano & Vink, 2013; Slootmaeckers, Touquet, & Vermeersch, 2016]. Similar to Shevtsova [2020], we will regard a demand for improvement of the condition of LGBT people (which is, in turn, a prerequisite for Ukraine's integration with the EU) as “instrumentalisation” of their rights [p. 500], although other researchers may use other terms [Ammaturo, 2015; Husakouskaya, 2019; O'Dwyer & Schwartz, 2010]. The requirement to liberalise LGBT-related legislation in the context of Ukraine's implementation of the Association Agreement could serve as an example of such instrumentalisation.

Euromaidan and support for LGBT rights

The Revolution of Dignity was a turning point in Ukraine's movement towards Europe. As it was mentioned earlier, signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union was one of the key demands put forth by Euromaidan protesters [Shveda & Park, 2016]. This step also implied the liberalisation of legislative framework concerning LGBT rights. However, international observers covering the Revolution of Dignity were not completely sure that those who supported the Association would support LGBT rights as well, and there were several reasons for thinking so.

Firstly, Ukrainian society had not been very tolerant towards LGBT people. For instance, according to the data of a poll carried out by GfK company in April 2013, about 80% of Ukrainians opposed same-sex relationships and only 5% supported the legalisation of same-sex marriage [“A survey shows”, 2013]. Reports prepared by a human rights watchdog Amnesty International [2015, 2016] and LGBT organisations [“Nash Mir” (“Our World”) Centre, 2013; “Nash Svit” (“Our World”) Centre, 2014; Zinchenkov et al., 2011] also pointed out that the attitudes of the general population were mostly homophobic back then; therefore, they had hardly changed by the beginning of Euromaidan.

Secondly, Euromaidan protests were marked by the presence of ultra-nationalists such as the Right Sector. Although these groups were not numerous and their role was often exaggerated [Balynska, 2014], a strong sense of belonging to Ukrainian nation was shared by the overwhelming majority of Euromaidan participants too. It is a well-known fact that there is a negative correlation between right-wing sentiments and acceptance of homosexuality / LGBT rights.

Thirdly, opponents of Ukraine's accession to the European Union have been long trying to manipulate the feelings and expectations of pro-European Ukrainians; for instance, by presenting a distorted view of the EU's policy concerning LGBT rights. Condemning same-sex marriage and “gay parades”, portraying Europe as a hotbed of depravity, inventing derogatory neologisms like “Gayropa” or “homodictatorship” — these are some of the means that pro-Russian media have resorted to [Riabov & Riabova, 2014]. On the other hand, homophobic rhetoric has widely been used by

far-right groups (e. g. the above-mentioned Right Sector), famous for their active participation in the Revolution of Dignity [Shestakovskiy, Trofymenko, Kasianczuk, & Voznesenskiy, 2016; Shevtsova, 2020].

It is worth noting that LGBT organisations decided not to articulate LGBT rights during Maidan. Instead, they thought it would be more reasonable to postpone this question until better times came along. Some researchers saw this step as a concession to the majority [Martsenyuk, 2016; Shevtsova, 2017]. However, proponents of the Revolution of Dignity interpreted this situation as an indicator of unity among the participants, when radical nationalists and LGBT activists could jointly and, for some time, peacefully fight for Ukraine's future [Kvit, 2014].

Some critical remarks about the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights

The Revolution of Dignity succeeded, the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was signed, and visa-free travel was granted to Ukrainian citizens (without legal recognition of same-sex couples). So, has the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights been effective? Has the overall condition of LGBT people in Ukraine improved since Euromaidan?

A number of authors point out that laws regarding the LGBT community have been liberalised, but only to some extent [Shevtsova, 2017; Wannebo, 2017]. In November 2015, Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) passed an amendment to the Labour Code, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity [The Law of Ukraine № 785-VIII, 2015]. Furthermore, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted a decree concerning the National Human Rights Strategy [The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 1393-r, 2015], which explicitly indicated the need for preventing and combating SOGI-based discrimination. Still, the government probably took these steps owing to pressure from the EU and civil society organisations, rather than with a view to protecting human rights [Bonny, 2018; Wannebo, 2017]. Pride marches for LGBT rights are now held in a relatively safe environment [Bonny, 2018], and they started to take place in non-capital cities such as Odesa [Tsiktor, 2019], but this would scarcely have been possible without the effective assistance of the police.

The LGBT community has become more visible, publicly active in standing up for their rights and better organised. Yet, the general condition of LGBT people in Ukraine is far from turning the corner. Most politicians remain biased against LGBT individuals. Not a few see same-sex unions as a demographic threat to Ukraine and even believe that campaigning for LGBT rights is an attempt to “legalise perversions”. As a result, many LGBT initiatives encounter opposition [Martsenyuk, 2016; Shevtsova, 2017, 2020; Wannebo, 2017].

The above-cited remarks may cast doubt on the effectiveness of measures connected to the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights in Ukraine. It can be inferred that liberalisation of LGBT-related laws (which was done in exchange for signing the Association Agreement) has not substantially improved the condition of these people. As Shevtsova [2020] puts it, “quick and visible results ... are rarely followed by change of values and attitudes or policy implementation” [p. 508]. In addition, reactions from many religious organisations, radical nationalists and advocates for traditional values suggest that the LGBT community is even worse off than before Euromaidan — thereby

indicating that the active promotion of LGBT rights has led to backlash against them [Bonny, 2018; Shevtsova, 2017, 2020; Wannebo, 2017].

Nevertheless, there is another point that should be taken into consideration: Ukrainian LGBT organisations do not seem to exert a strong influence on society. They are not widely known either. Thus, the mere presence of these organisations cannot be regarded as being able to change public opinion on LGBT issues.

Prior statistics of hate crimes and opinion surveys

Many of the above-cited authors studied the condition of LGBT individuals in Ukraine (or trends in public attitudes towards them) by conducting in-depth interviews with LGBT and civil society activists, as well as analysing social media and hate crime statistics. However, the findings from these studies, despite highlighting multiple challenges faced by LGBT people, are not enough to conclude that the overall situation of the LGBT community has changed. For one thing, data collected by means of an in-depth interview cannot be generalised to a wider group, let alone the entire population of Ukraine, because this method lacks representativeness.

Neither can hate crime statistics serve as clear evidence that public attitudes to LGBT individuals have worsened. In 2017, 226 cases were documented — far more than in previous years [Kravchuk, 2018: p. 21], but this could be a consequence of the expansion of monitoring networks¹. Besides, “Nash Mir” Centre recorded fewer cases in 2018 and 2019 — 114 and 123 respectively [“Nash Mir” Centre, 2019, 2020]. Lastly, the monitoring of hate crimes does not allow making extrapolations to the attitudes towards LGBT people in society.

A survey carried out among LGBT people in 2017² [Hrybanov & Kravchuk, 2018] did not reveal any dramatic deterioration in this sphere either. Although the majority of respondents said that their quality of life was worse than that of most Ukrainian citizens, they were also certain that the general situation of LGBT individuals had either improved since the Revolution of Dignity or remained unchanged [Hrybanov & Kravchuk, 2018: pp. 165-166]. Strictly speaking, the data of this survey are not representative of the LGBT community as a whole (the same goes for any other survey of this community). Nonetheless, this evidence is at least as methodologically sound as in-depth interviews with LGBT activists and hate crime statistics.

It is nationally representative surveys that can shed light on the prevalence and dynamics of homonegative attitudes among Ukraine’s population. To date, we have come across only four survey projects that used comparable sample design and question wording, had at least two survey rounds, and whose results are publicly available³. Only two of them cover the period before and after Euromaidan. Each survey is de-

1 See International Renaissance Foundation [2017] and Galay [2019] for examples of recent developments.

2 This is an online survey of the LGBT community conducted in September–October 2017. In the survey, 1501 cisgender men, 773 cisgender women, 85 transgender men, 116 transgender women and 141 non-binary persons took part [Hrybanov & Kravchuk, 2018].

3 Hrybanov and Kravchuk [2018] have given an overview on most of the available surveys on public attitudes towards LGBT people. Their analysis is not confined to the survey we mention here.

scribed below. The data are compared considering confidence intervals (CIs) around point estimates (which arise due to a sampling error)¹.

First, it is worth mentioning a three-wave survey conducted by Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation together with Kyiv International Institute of Sociology [2016]. In 1991, 2006 and 2016 (thus, both before and after Euromaidan), respondents were asked to indicate (on a 5-point scale) how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statement that society should treat homosexualists [sic] like everyone else. The results show that Ukrainians’ attitudes towards the LGBT community somewhat improved in 2006 compared to 1991, but then deteriorated again (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. The answers given by respondents to the question: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that society should treat homosexualists like everyone else?”, % (N = 2040)²

Source: [Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation & KIIS, 2016: p. 10].

The next series of surveys contained a question about public views on LGBT rights. Data were collected by “Taylor Nelson Sofres Ukraine” in 2002, 2007 and 2011 [Zinchenkov et al., 2011: pp. 39–43], and by KIIS in 2016 [KIIS, 2016]. As can be seen in Figure 2, a rise in unfavourable attitudes towards the LGBT community was recorded in 2007, but there have been no significant changes in public opinion on this issue since then.

1 We calculated CIs according to a sample size. A standard formula for proportions in a single-stage random sample was used. The design effect of the surveys was unknown and therefore not taken into account. However, as Paniotto, Maksymenko, and Kharchenko [2004] observed, usually the design effect only increases CI. CIs are indicated in brackets in the text and with error bars on the graphs.

2 In this and subsequent diagrams, as well as tables, all the values are rounded. For this reason, the sum of percentages may not add up to exactly 100.

A two-wave study¹ focusing on awareness of human rights [Pechonchyk, Kolyshko, Parashchevin, & Yavorskyi, 2018] had a question asking whether the rights of “homosexuals, gays, lesbians and transgender persons” [sic] should be limited. In 2016, about 46% (CI is 44-48%) of respondents thought that the rights of these people ought to be restricted, either unconditionally or under certain circumstances. In 2018, 47% (CI is 45-49%) were likely to support these measures [Pechonchyk et al., 2018: p. 44]. In other words, no significant change occurred.




Figure 2. The answers given by respondents to the question: “Do you think Ukraine’s residents with a homosexual orientation should have the same rights as the other citizens of our country?”, % (for the years 2002, 2007 and 2011 N = 1200; for the year 2016 N = 2020).

Sources: [Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2016: p. 10; Zinchenkov et al., 2011: p. 40]

There is another way to determine a person’s attitude towards stigmatised groups (such as the LGBT community): an interviewer can present a list of different people to a respondent and ask him/her to mark which of them he/she would not like to have as neighbours. That was one of the questions for the National Civic Engagement Poll commissioned by Pact². The poll was conducted by GfK Ukraine several times be-

1 About 2000 respondents participated in each survey.

2 Pact is an international development nonprofit that works on the ground in nearly 40 countries to end poverty and marginalisation.

tween 2015 and 2018¹ [Pact in Ukraine, 2017, 2019]. In November 2015, 45% (CI is 43-47%) of respondents said that they would not like homosexuals to be their neighbours; in September 2017, this figure was even higher — 47% (CI is 45-49%) [Pact in Ukraine, 2017: p. 132]. In November 2018, though, Ukrainians seemed to be a little more tolerant towards LGBT people: only 40% of those surveyed were not willing to accept an LGBT person as a neighbour (CI is 38-42%). Note that there was a clarification in the 2018 question that it was asked about both homosexual men and women [Pact in Ukraine, 2019]. This could slightly reduce the share of those who did not want to have these people as neighbours.

All things considered, a significant part of Ukraine's population has negative attitudes to the LGBT community and believes that the rights of these people ought to be limited. Yet, this is the only conclusion we can safely draw from the available, albeit scarce data. They do not confirm the assumption that public attitudes towards LGBT persons in Ukraine have worsened since Euromaidan and liberalisation of LGBT-related laws. A certain deterioration was indeed observed in 2007 (far before Euromaidan) and in the year 2006 compared to 2016 (a period of time during which a lot of changes occurred — both before and after the Revolution of Dignity). Furthermore, according to the findings from Pact surveys [Pact in Ukraine, 2017, 2019], a survey into the condition of the LGBT community [Hrybanov & Kravchuk, 2018] and hate crime statistics [“Nash Mir” Centre, 2019, 2020], public perception of LGBT people seems to have become a little more positive.

The results of all the above-described surveys reflect the views of Ukraine's population as a whole. We are unaware of quantitative surveys of the Euromaidan participants *per se* or in comparison with the rest of the population, which would describe their attitudes to the LGBT community. Our study gives special attention to this matter as well.

A comparative study on changes in public opinion on LGBT rights before and after Euromaidan

Research questions and hypotheses

Within the study, three research questions have been posed. First, have Ukrainians' attitudes towards the LGBT community changed since Euromaidan? The second question is as follows: how different (e. g. positive) were the attitudes towards LGBT people among Euromaidan supporters? Finally, have the events that happened after the Revolution of Dignity, such as Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, been able to affect attitudes towards LGBT rights? According to these questions, we put forward the following hypotheses:

1. *Attitudes to the LGBT community and their rights have not changed noticeably since Euromaidan.* The hypothesis is based on the public opinion polls reviewed above. They do not provide consistent evidence to assume that tangible changes have taken place.

2. Euromaidan supporters had on average more positive attitudes to the LGBT community than the general population of Ukraine did. Euromaidan protesters primarily demanded democratisation, the rule of law, civil liberties and a social order re-

1 2139, 2168, 2134 and 2073 people were surveyed in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 respectively.

sembling that of Western Europe, which distinguished them from the rest of Ukraine's population [Onuch, 2014; Zelinska, 2015]. A survey of values that was conducted in Kyiv's Independent Square in early December 2013 showed that value priorities of Maidan participants (following Schwartz's approach [Schwartz, 1992]) were closer to those of Western Europeans than to those of the general population of Ukraine [Shestakovskii, 2015; Sviatnenko & Vinogradov, 2014]. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Euromaidan participants' attitudes towards LGBT people were more liberal too. In addition, "Euromaidaners" were on average younger and lived almost exclusively in cities [Ilko Kucheriv "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation, 2013]. These factors should also correlate with a more positive perception of LGBT people [Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Baunach, 2012].

3. Experiencing the impact of an armed conflict in the Donbas is linked with negative attitudes to the LGBT community and their rights. As of the end of October 2016, about 1.7 million people were internally displaced due to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, which broke out shortly after the end of the Maidan protests [Foundation. 101, 2016]. Many of them had faced hostility or witnessed violence in their homeland, and had often found themselves in dangerous situations. Such circumstances may well activate needs to reduce uncertainty and threat, thereby providing fertile ground for right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Adorno and his colleagues conceived of authoritarianism as a stable personality trait [Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950], some present-day researchers associate authoritarian attitudes with "needs for order and closure" [Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003] and argue that authoritarianism (RWA in particular) is strongly related to homophobia [Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger, 1996; Wilkinson, 2004]. Besides, as Shaffer and Duckitt [2013] put it, "threat and fear underlie right-wing authoritarianism, and many empirical findings have been consistent with this proposition" [p. 6]. Therefore, homophobia and heterosexism are likely to rise in situations that constitute a threat to people, and the Donbas conflict is a case in point.

Data and methods

The data were collected via two cross-sectional face-to-face surveys from September to November 2013 and from August to September 2016. For each survey, eight Ukrainian sub-national entities were selected, and 800 respondents (100 per oblast or city) took part. The sample was representative of the urban-rural population ratio in each oblast. The 2013 survey covered Odesa, Lviv, Donetsk, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Kyiv and the city of Sevastopol. The 2016 survey was conducted in Dnipro, Lviv, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Kharkiv, Cherkasy and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as in the city of Kyiv. For comparative analysis of the respondents' attitudes to the LGBT community before and after Euromaidan, we used the data from the city of Kyiv and four oblasts such as Odesa, Lviv, Cherkasy and Chernihiv (as they were included in both surveys). In order to compare Euromaidan participants / those affected by the armed conflict in the Donbas with the rest of Ukraine's population (as to their perception of LGBT people), we drew upon the full sample of the 2016 survey.

Both studies were carried out by the Centre of Social Expertise (CSE), a subsidiary of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and are

thoroughly described in the corresponding analytical reports [Pryvalov, Trofymenko, Rokytska, & Kasianczuk, 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

Two questions were built to determine a respondent's general attitude towards the LGBT community. For the first one, a 4-point scale (with the response categories ranging from "favourable" to "unfavourable") was used. The respondent was asked to rate his/her attitude to each LGBT subgroup such as gays, lesbians, bisexual men, bisexual women and transgender people. The second question was a slightly altered version of the Bogardus social distance scale [Panina, 2003] that measures varying degrees of closeness in people towards other members of diverse social, ethnic, etc. groups.

The following four questions were designed to ascertain a person's attitude towards specific LGBT rights:

1. Do you agree that gays and lesbians should have the same rights in Ukraine as the other citizens?
2. Would you support or oppose a law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and bans incitement to hatred against gays and lesbians?
3. Do you agree that homosexual couples (both male and female) should enjoy the right to register their relationship, just like an ordinary couple?
4. Do you agree that homosexual citizens should enjoy the right to raise and/or adopt children?

To separate Maidan participants from the rest of the sample, we asked a respondent whether he/she had taken part in Euromaidan. This question had three answer options: "Yes, personally", "Yes, in virtual space", "No". The first two were regarded as an indicator of participation.

The last question was intended for the respondents affected by the armed conflict in the Donbas. It had two answer options: "Yes" and "No". We explained to the respondents that "being affected" did not necessarily mean a person's direct participation in combat. If someone suffered from these events, for example became a displaced person, they were also considered "affected".

Results

As for the *socio-demographic characteristics* of the respondents, men accounted for about two thirds of the sample in both surveys. The mean age of the respondents was 41.2 and 41.4 years in 2013 and 2016 respectively, with a standard deviation of 14.8 and 14.9; the median age was 39 years. In both samples, 40% had a vocational degree, while another 33% (in the 2013 survey) and 38% (in 2016) were university graduates. Over half of the respondents were officially married at the time of research (58% in 2013 and 54% in 2016), 35% and 42% had children. The vast majority (90% in 2013 and 77% in 2016) belonged to a particular denomination (mostly Orthodox). Two thirds described their financial situation as satisfactory.

In the 2016 survey, 14% of respondents said they had participated in Euromaidan (8% physically and 6% virtually); 6% reported being affected by the armed conflict in the Donbas.

Attitudes towards LGBT people among the general population in 2013 and 2016. There was a statistically significant improvement in public attitudes to the LGBT community in 2016. The portion of respondents who expressed a positive / somewhat positive attitude towards LGBT people increased by 8–11% (see Table 1), whereas

perceived social distance to them was somewhat reduced (see Table 2). The number of those willing to accept an LGBT person as a family member remained the same. However, the overall proportion of respondents who would not mind having LGBT people as friends, neighbours or co-workers grew by 8–11%, and of those who would accept them as Ukraine’s residents — by 4–8%.

Table 1

The answers given by respondents to the question:
 “Please rate your attitude towards the following LGBT individuals”, %

Attitude towards...	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016
Favorable	3	2	5	2	3	3	6	3	4	1
Somewhat favorable	8	17	9	20	8	19	8	20	6	17
Somewhat unfavorable	32	25	29	25	32	27	30	28	29	27
Unfavorable	57	56	57	53	57	51	56	49	61	55
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001	

Sources: [Pryvalov et al., 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016: p. 42¹].

Table 2

Social distance at which respondents would accept LGBT persons in 2013 and 2016, %

I agree to accept...	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016	2013	2016
Family members	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Close friends	2	3	3	5	3	3	3	5	1	3
Neighbors	2	8	4	8	2	8	3	9	1	7
Colleagues	4	5	3	5	3	6	3	6	3	5
Residents of Ukraine	25	29	25	30	25	33	24	32	26	30
Visitors of Ukraine, tourists	28	20	26	20	30	21	29	20	30	25
I would not allow them to enter Ukraine	38	34	39	31	36	29	37	28	38	31
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001	

Sources: [Pryvalov et al., 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016: p. 43].

The study did not reveal, though, any significant change in public views on LGBT rights in 2016 compared to 2013. These views, for example, include a respondent’s approval or disapproval of the idea that gays and lesbians should enjoy the same rights as the other citizens (see Figure 3), his/her support for (or opposition to) a law eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (see Figure 4), as well as the opinion that same-sex couples should have the right to marry and raise or adopt children (see Table 3).

It should be noted that the more specific the question was, the less support it gained. For instance, in 2016, 60% of respondents believed (including 22% of those who fully agreed) that gays and lesbians should enjoy the same rights in Ukraine as the other citizens, but at the same time only 37% thought that homosexual couples

1 N = 800 for both surveys.

should be allowed to register their relationship — always (14%) or in exceptional cases (23%). Even fewer (9%) took the view that same-sex couples should have the right to raise/adopt children; 19% said that “exceptions are possible”. Apparently, a certain portion of the population, despite presumably having favourable attitudes towards LGBT individuals, does not consider the right to marry and found a family necessary for human equality.

Table 3

The answers given by respondents to the question about some individual rights that homosexual people should have, %

Do you agree that...	Homosexual couples should have the right to register their relationship		Homosexual citizens have the right to raise and / or adopt children	
	2013	2016	2013	2016
Yes	14	14	10	9
As an exception	18	23	16	19
No	68	63	74	72
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	0.098		0.420	

Sources: [Pryvalov et al., 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016: p. 43].




Figure 3. The answers given by respondents to the question: “Do you agree that gays and lesbians should enjoy the same rights in Ukraine as the other citizens?” in 2013 and 2016, %

The difference is not statistically significant (χ^2 test *p*-value = 0.054).

Sources: [Pryvalov et al., 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016: p. 44].

Attitudes to the LGBT community and their rights among Euromaidan supporters. According to the 2016 survey data, there is a link between physical or virtual participation in the Revolution of Dignity and more positive attitudes towards LGBT individuals. For instance, 31% and 35% of Euromaidan participants (versus 18% and 20% of the rest of the sample) gave favourable marks to gays and lesbians respectively. The difference in attitudes towards transgender persons is not statistically significant (see

Table 4); however, this could be owing to the relatively small size of the subsample of Euromaidan supporters. The latter were more ready to have LGBT people as family members, friends, neighbours or co-workers (see Table 5). For example, 29%, 33% and 29% of Euromaidan participants were willing to accept gays, lesbians and transgender persons respectively in the above-mentioned capacities (whereas only 12%, 14% and 9% of non-participants said they would do that). Still, the majority of Euromaidaners displayed rather negative attitudes towards LGBT individuals.




Figure 4. The answers given by respondents to the question: “Would you support or oppose a law that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and bans incitement to hatred against gays and lesbians?” in 2013 and 2016, %
The difference is not statistically significant (χ^2 test p -value = 0.377).

Sources: [Pryvalov et al., 2013; Shestakovskiy et al., 2016: p. 45]

Table 4

The answers given by Euromaidan participants and non-participants to the question: “Please rate your attitude towards the following LGBT individuals”, %

Attitude towards...	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did you participate in the EuroMaidan?										
Favorable / somewhat favorable	31	18	35	20	34	19	36	20	22	16
Unfavorable / somewhat unfavorable	69	82	65	80	66	81	64	80	78	84
Fisher's exact test p -value	0.004		0.002		0.001		0.001		0.184	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

Table 5

Social distance at which Euromaidan participants and non-participants would accept LGBT persons, %

<i>I agree to accept...</i>	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did you participate in the EuroMaidan?										
Family members / close friends / neighbors / colleagues	29	12	33	14	32	12	35	14	29	9
Residents of Ukraine	30	31	33	32	36	33	34	34	32	30
Visitors of Ukraine, tourists	20	21	20	20	17	23	16	22	22	26
I would not allow them to enter Ukraine	22	36	14	34	15	32	14	32	17	34
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

The relationship between a respondent’s participation in Euromaidan and his/her support for same-sex marriage and LGBT adopters is less consistent. On the one hand, Euromaidan proponents more often approved of the idea that same-sex couples should have the right to register their relationship — 28% (versus 10% of those who did not took part in the Revolution of Dignity). On the other hand, Euromaidaners’ views on LGBT fostering and/or adoption do not significantly differ from those of non-participants (see Table 6).

Table 6

The answers given by Euromaidan participants and non-participants to the question about some individual rights that homosexual people should have, %

<i>Do you agree that...</i>	Homosexual couples should have the right to register their relationship		Homosexual people should have the right to raise and / or adopt children	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did you participate in the EuroMaidan?				
Yes	28	10	13	9
As an exception	17	25	21	19
No	55	65	66	72
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	< 0.001		0.500	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

Attitudes towards LGBT individuals among the respondents affected by the armed conflict in the Donbas. Contrary to expectations, experiencing the consequences of war in the Donbas turned out to be associated with relatively more positive perception of LGBT people. Those directly affected by the Donbas events displayed favourable / somewhat favourable attitudes towards the LGBT community significantly more often than the rest of the respondents (see Table 7). For instance, 36% and 37% from this subsample rated gays and lesbians favourably. The corresponding figures for the respondents not affected by the Donbas conflict were 19% and 21% respectively. Besides, a significantly larger number of those affected by the Donbas conflict would accept LGBT individuals as family members, friends, neighbours or co-workers (see

Table 8). Half as many people from this category expressed willingness to ban LGBT people from entering Ukraine.

Table 7

The answers given by the respondents affected / not affected by the Donbas conflict to the question: “Please rate your attitude towards the following LGBT individuals”, %

Attitude towards...	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did the military events in Donbas affect you personally?										
Favorable / somewhat favorable	36	19	37	21	38	20	40	22	29	16
Unfavorable / somewhat unfavorable	64	81	63	79	62	80	60	78	71	84
Fisher's exact test <i>p</i> -value	0.009		0.02		0.01		0.007		0.05	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

Table 8

Social distance at which respondents affected and not affected by the Donbas war would accept LGBT persons, %

I agree to accept...	Gay		Lesbian		Bisexual man		Bisexual woman		Transgender people	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did the military events in Donbas affect you personally?										
Family members / close friends / neighbors / colleagues	39	13	39	15	41	13	41	15	37	10
Residents of Ukraine	33	31	35	32	30	34	30	33	33	31
Visitors of Ukraine, tourists	11	22	13	21	13	23	15	21	15	26
I would not allow them to enter Ukraine	17	34	13	32	15	30	13	30	15	33
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001		< 0.001	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

Table 9

The answers given by the respondents affected / not affected by the Donbas conflict to the question about some individual rights that homosexual people should have, %

Do you agree that...	Homosexual couples should have the right to register their relationship		Homosexual people should have the right to raise and / or adopt children	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Did the military events in Donbas affect you personally?				
Yes	25	12	13	10
As an exception	36	23	36	19
No	39	65	51	72
χ^2 test <i>p</i> -value	0.002		0.009	

Source: [Shestakovskiy et al., 2016].

As for the right of LGBT people to start a family, those experiencing the impact of the Donbas conflict were more inclined to favour same-sex marriage — 25% (versus

12% of the rest of the sample). 36% of this subsample said that “exceptions are possible”. However, only 13% of those affected by the Donbas events thought that homosexual citizens should be allowed to raise/adopt children. The corresponding figure for the rest of the respondents was 10%. Thus, in both subgroups the majority of respondents opposed the idea of equal rights for LGBT people.

These results are similar to those obtained from Euromaidan participants. Additional analysis has shown that a significant share of those affected by the Donbas conflict were Euromaidan supporters, which explains the similarity of their responses¹. Unfortunately, it is not possible to disentangle these effects due to the small size of the subsamples.

Discussion

Our study suggests that public perception of the LGBT community improved in the three years after Euromaidan, but this improvement was not dramatic. Negative attitudes continued to prevail, although the percentage of respondents with positive attitudes slightly increased. The number of those who would accept LGBT people as Ukraine’s residents, as well as friends, neighbours or co-workers grew too. Furthermore, this concerns all the LGBT identities included in the questionnaire, namely gays, lesbians, bisexual men, bisexual women and transgender people.

However, the improvement in general attitudes towards LGBT people was not accompanied by a significant change in the attitudes to their rights. Perhaps it is easier to start being tolerant towards the LGBT community in general than to admit the fact that these people are discriminated, or even to express support for the right to same-sex marriage, which requires some courage and consistency from a person. Still, it could be the first step on the path to recognising LGBT rights.

The main limitation of our survey is that the sample is not nationally representative; therefore, the results cannot be extrapolated to the general population of Ukraine. But at the same time, the survey covered oblasts from different macro-regions of Ukraine (West, South, North and Centre), as well as its capital. An identical sample design in 2013 and 2016 allows us to hope that the data reflect the real dynamics of public attitudes towards the LGBT community over these three years.

Moreover, our results do not contradict the nationwide surveys described in the review of the previous studies, although the comparison can only be qualitative owing to the different sample design and question wordings. The poll conducted by “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation and KIIS in 2016 showed deterioration in Ukrainians’ attitudes towards LGBT people between 2006 and 2016, but this deterioration could have occurred between 2006 and 2013. By 2016, these attitudes could have improved somewhat, still remaining worse than in 2006. The surveys concerning public views on LGBT rights [KIIS, 2016; Zinchenkov et al., 2011] did not reveal any significant changes in public opinion in this regard from 2007 to 2016, and our study indicated the same. It is also consistent with the findings from a survey of the LGBT community, where the majority of respondents said that their general situation had ei-

1 In our survey, 41% of those having personally experienced the consequences of the events in the Donbas, were also Euromaidan participants — in comparison with only 12% of those among the rest of the respondents. The difference is significant at $p < 0.001$ according to χ^2 statistic.

ther improved since the Revolution of Dignity or remained unchanged [Hrybanov & Kravchuk, 2018].

Given the lack of nationally representative data, we believe that our study will contribute to the discussion on this topic, especially regarding bisexual and transgender people, attitudes to whom have rarely been studied.

Our results are at variance with the gloomy conclusions of the studies based on the information about homophobic attacks and far-right groups' activity, or on interviews with Ukrainian politicians and with LGBT activists, who, inter alia, claimed that hate crimes against the LGBT community were even on the rise [Bonny, 2018; Shevtsova, 2020; Wannebo, 2017]. In our opinion, this fact highlights shortcomings of the above-mentioned methods if they are aimed at studying trends in ordinary citizens' attitudes to the LGBT community; so these methods should be used very carefully for such purposes.

In the context of the European Union's policy on the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights, our findings do not support a critical attitude to the outcomes of this policy in Ukraine. Neither our survey nor other relevant polls confirm the statement that there has been a backlash among Ukraine's general population against the LGBT community. Yet, it is true that there has been no considerable improvement either. At least two explanations of this phenomenon can be given. First, the effects of the aforesaid policy (as well as of the activities of radical nationalists and religious conservatives) could be negligible. Second, any substantial change in public attitudes takes a great deal of time and effort. The instrumentalisation policy certainly deserves criticism, which, however, ought to be more evidence-based, should be attentive to both the ordinary citizens' attitudes and a wider (non-activist) group of LGBT people, as well as consider the time and resources necessary to bring about changes.

Our study also analysed the attitudes of Euromaidan participants towards the LGBT community. On average, they displayed significantly more positive attitudes than those who did not take part in Euromaidan. They were also more supportive of same-sex unions. Nevertheless, the majority of Euromaidan proponents had homonegative attitudes.

This once again demonstrates that the Revolution of Dignity was in no way a gay pride. As it was mentioned earlier, protection of LGBT rights was not on the agenda during Euromaidan. Instead, the future of Ukraine as a democratic country and a member state of the European Union was in the foreground. This would also imply better prospects for LGBT people (including support for pride marches), although not all participants might have been aware of it. However, our results show that Euro-maidaners expressed support for LGBT rights relatively more often.

Attitudes to LGBT people and their rights were also relatively more favourable among those directly affected by the armed conflict in the Donbas, which contradicts our hypothesis. The answers given by this subgroup of respondents and by Euromaidan participants are similar. Perhaps in our sample, many of those having experienced the consequences of war in the Donbas were Euromaidan supporters — but how well do our results reflect opinions of the overall population of those who were affected, and then moved from the Donbas? On the one hand, sampling bias might have occurred: thousands of Ukrainians affected by the Donbas conflict may not be Euromaidan proponents. On the other hand, being a Euromaidan supporter could

serve as an additional motive for fleeing the Donbas and thus becoming an internally displaced person, which means being affected by the Donbas events anyway.

Conclusions

A comparative analysis of two surveys conducted in 2013 and 2016 shows that there were modest, albeit statistically significant positive changes in Ukrainians' attitudes to the members of LGBT community in the three years after Euromaidan (including gays, lesbians, bisexual men, bisexual women and transgender persons). However, practically no change in terms of support for LGBT rights was recorded. The analysis covers only four Ukrainian oblasts and the city of Kyiv; nonetheless, its results are consistent with the well-known nationally representative surveys conducted by other researchers.

Our data do not indicate any deterioration in attitudes towards LGBT people among the general population of Ukraine, which means that the EU's policy on the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights has not had a negative effect on public perception of the LGBT community. The effectiveness of this policy can be questioned, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, the criticism levelled at these measures (as allegedly having resulted in a backlash against LGBT people) needs to be better grounded.

By and large, Euromaidan participants held more positive views on the LGBT community and same-sex marriage than those who did not take part in the Revolution of Dignity. Although not all Euromaidan supporters shared this set of European values, pro-European choice, which was fiercely defended during the Revolution of Dignity, and favourable attitudes to LGBT individuals proved to be significantly associated.

The relationship between the armed conflict in the Donbas, which erupted shortly after Euromaidan, and attitudes towards LGBT people is ambiguous. Those having experienced the impact of the Donbas war perceived LGBT individuals more positively than the rest of the respondents; in addition, the former were more inclined to express support for LGBT people's right to marry and adopt children. Yet, this could stem from a significant share of Euromaidan participants among the respondents affected by the Donbas conflict. It is unclear whether this pattern holds outside our sample.

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ОЛЕКСІЙ ШЕСТАКОВСЬКИЙ, МАКСИМ КАСЯНЧУК, ОЛЕСЯ ТРОФИМЕНКО

Революція Гідності та інструменталізація прав ЛГБТ: Як змінилося ставлення до ЛГБТ в Україні після Євромайдану?

Революція Гідності з її декларованою прихильністю до європейських цінностей, а також підписані угоди про асоціацію й безвізовий режим з ЄС викликали низку критичних зауважень серед дослідниць і дослідників ЛГБТ-проблематики. Суперечність полягає між необхідністю недискримінації й захисту прав ЛГБТ як прояву європейських норм і переважно гомофобним суспільством, яким залишається Україна, що має призводити лише до поверхових змін у становищі ЛГБТ під тиском ЄС. Існує також точка зору, що політика ЄС з інструменталізації прав ЛГБТ — вимога законодавчих змін, які стосуються ЛГБТ, в контексті виконання Україною Порядку денного асоціації з Європейським Союзом — мала зворотний ефект і призвела до погіршення становища спільноти. При цьому динаміка сприйняття ЛГБТ загальним населенням після Євромайдану залишається на диво недослідженою. Наша робота пропонує заповнити цей пробіл за допомогою порівняльного аналізу двох крос-секційних опитувань громадської думки стосовно прав ЛГБТ в Україні, проведених до події Революції Гідності (2013) та після них (2016) в кількох областях України. Ми задалися трьома дослідницькими питаннями: (1) чи змінилося ставлення українських громадян до представників ЛГБТ-спільноти та їхніх прав після Євромайдану? (2) Наскільки позитивним було ставлення до ЛГБТ учасників Євромайдану? (3) Наскільки зміни, що відбулися після Революції Гідності, такі як гібридна війна з боку Росії, могли вплинути на ставлення до ЛГБТ? Результати показали, що після Євромайдану відбулися невеликі, але статистично значущі позитивні зміни у ставленні до

ЛГБТ-спільноти, проте не відбулось змін у підтримці їхніх прав, що узгоджується з іншими релевантними репрезентативними опитуваннями. Наявні зміни громадської думки стосовно ЛГБТ свідчать про відсутність негативного зворотного ефекту від політики інструменталізації прав ЛГБТ, принаймні для загального населення. Хоча підтвердилося, що далеко не всі прихильники Революції Гідності позитивно ставилися до ЛГБТ-спільноти, але в середньому учасники Євромайдану краще ставилися до її представників і представниць і до легалізації одностатевих союзів. Респонденти, яких безпосередньо торкнувся конфлікт на Донбасі (як приклад постмайданних подій), також виявили порівняно кращі ставлення до представників ЛГБТ та їхніх прав. Проте ці результати можуть бути пов'язані з помітною часткою учасників Євромайдану серед них.

Ключові слова: Євромайдан, ЛГБТ в Україні, інструменталізація прав ЛГБТ, гомонегативність, зміна ставлення до ЛГБТ

**АЛЕКСЕЙ ШЕСТАКОВСКИЙ, МАКСИМ КАСЯНЧУК,
ОЛЕСЯ ТРОФИМЕНКО**

Революция Достоинства и инструментализация прав ЛГБТ: Как изменилось отношение к ЛГБТ в Украине после Евромайдана?

Революция Достоинства с ее декларируемой приверженностью к европейским ценностям, а также подписанные соглашения об ассоциации и безвизовом режиме с ЕС вызвали ряд критических замечаний среди исследовательниц и исследователей ЛГБТ-проблематики. Противоречие заключается между необходимостью недискриминации и защиты прав ЛГБТ как проявления европейских норм и преимущественно гомофобным обществом, которым остается Украина, что должно приводить лишь к поверхностным изменениям в положении ЛГБТ под давлением ЕС. Существует также точка зрения, что политика ЕС по инструментализации прав ЛГБТ — требование законодательных изменений, касающихся ЛГБТ, в контексте выполнения Украиной Повестки дня ассоциации с Европейским Союзом — имела обратный эффект и привела к ухудшению положения сообщества. При этом динамика восприятия ЛГБТ общим населением после Евромайдана остается удивительно неисследованной. Наша работа предлагает восполнить этот пробел с помощью сравнительного анализа двух кросс-секционных опросов общественного мнения по правам ЛГБТ в Украине, проведенных к событиям Революции Достоинства (2013) и после них (2016) в нескольких областях Украины. Мы задались тремя исследовательскими вопросами: (1) изменилось ли отношение украинских граждан к представителям ЛГБТ-сообщества и их прав после Евромайдана? (2) Насколько положительным было отношение к ЛГБТ участников Евромайдана? (3) Насколько изменения, произошедшие после Революции Достоинства, такие как гибридная война со стороны России, могли повлиять на отношение к ЛГБТ? Результаты показали, что после Евромайдана произошли небольшие, но статистически значимые положительные изменения в отношении к ЛГБТ-сообществу, однако не состоялись изменений в поддержке их прав, сочетается с другими релевантными репрезентативными опросами. Имеющиеся изменения общественного мнения относительно ЛГБТ свидетельствуют об отсутствии негативного обратного эффекта от политики инструментализации прав ЛГБТ, по крайней мере для общего населения. Хотя подтвердилось, что далеко не все сторонники Революции Достоинства положительно относились к ЛГБТ-сообществу, но в среднем участники Евромайдана лучше относились к ее представителям и представительницам и к легализации однополых союзов. Респонденты, которых непосредственно коснулся конфликт на Донбассе (как пример постмайданных событий), также обнаружили сравнительно лучшее отношение к представителям ЛГБТ и их правам. Однако эти результаты могут быть связаны с заметной долей участников Евромайдана среди них.

Ключевые слова: Евромайдан, ЛГБТ в Украине, инструментализация прав ЛГБТ, гомонегативность, изменение отношения к ЛГБТ

OLEKSII SHESTAKOVSKYI, MAKSYM KASIANCZUK, OLESIA TROFYMENKO

The Revolution of Dignity and Instrumentalization of LGBT Rights: How did attitudes towards LGBT people change in Ukraine after Euromaidan?

The aftermath of Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity provoked a lot of criticism among the students of LGBT topics. The principles of non-discrimination and protection of LGBT rights are an exemplary manifestation of European values to which Euromaidan declared adherence. The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, which was signed after the Revolution, as well as visa-free travel, which was granted to Ukrainian citizens, obliged this country to liberalise LGBT-related laws due to the EU's policy on the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights. However, there is a view that this step may cause conflicts in Ukrainian society, which is still predominantly homophobic, and only lead to a superficial change in the condition of LGBT people owing to pressure from the European Union. Some scholars (e.g. Shevtsova [2020], Wannebo [2017]) claim that the instrumentalisation policy has even resulted in a backlash against the LGBT community and worsened the overall situation for them. But has this backlash (if it really happened) entailed a corresponding change in public opinion on LGBT issues? Surprisingly, the dynamics of public attitudes towards the LGBT community and their rights remain unexplored. The paper proposes to fill this gap by a comparative analysis of two cross-sectional surveys on this topic, which were conducted before (in 2013) and after (in 2016) the Revolution of Dignity in several regions of Ukraine. Within the framework of the study, three research questions have been posed: 1. Have Ukrainians' attitudes towards the LGBT community changed since Euromaidan? 2. How different (e. g. positive) were the attitudes towards LGBT people among Euromaidan supporters? 3. Have the events that happened after the Revolution of Dignity, such as Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, been able to affect attitudes towards LGBT rights? The results show that there have been modest, albeit statistically significant positive changes in Ukrainians' attitudes towards the LGBT community since Euromaidan. However, practically no change in terms of support for LGBT rights has been recorded. Our findings are consistent with other relevant nationally representative surveys according to which public perception of LGBT individuals has not worsened. This fact suggests that the instrumentalisation of LGBT rights has not faced any backlash, at least from the general population. Other data in our study indicate that not all proponents of the Revolution of Dignity displayed favourable attitudes towards LGBT people; nevertheless, they held more positive views on the LGBT community and same-sex marriage than those who did not take part in Euromaidan. The respondents who have experienced the impact of the Donbas conflict also demonstrated relatively better attitudes to LGBT individuals and expressed support for their rights. Still, this may be linked to a significant percentage of Euromaidan participants among them.

Keywords: Euromaidan, LGBT people in Ukraine, Europeanisation, instrumentalisation of LGBT rights, homonegativity, change in attitudes towards the LGBT community