
An Analysis on Democratization and Peace in the Taiwan Strait

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I. Introduction

Two forces have restructured and reshaped the world since the late twentieth century: first is the prevailing wave of economic integration and globalization, reshaping the international economic order; second is the third wave of democratization, redefining the international political order. The former proved the failure of state-planned economies, while the latter accelerated the collapse of one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships. As a consequence, the number of newly democratized countries has boomed since the beginning of the 1990s, and democratization and its consolidation have become major topics of academic research.² This prompts us to ask several questions. Why do representative governmental forms become the political system of choice? Why are such weak and imperfect political entities able to replace other regimes? And, why does the wave of democratization proceed so quickly and extensively? These questions and our answers lead us to view democratization as an important aspect of contemporary globalization.

According to the annual report *Freedom in the World* for 2004-2005, published by Freedom House, although there are 119 electoral democracies, and 89 liberal democracies, about 2.3 billion people (37 percent of the world population) live in 49 countries classified in the report as Not Free.³ China is among those Not Free countries, and China's 1.3 billion people make up substantially more than half (56.5%) of all people who live in the Not Free countries.⁴ Therefore, the question whether a fourth wave of democratization will transform China is a major concern for the rest of the world.⁵ And does the spread of democracy promise exemption from the fear of war? That is, does the spread of democracy promote world peace?

When President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan addressed the Asia-Pacific Democracy Cooperation Forum in August 2002, he said, "after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the Asia-Pacific region has become an important theater of international counter-terrorism activities. There are three major factors which could affect the success of the counter-terrorism activities in this region, including the safety and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the consolidation and expansion of democracy in this region, and regional economic cooperation and development. Safety, democracy and economy may be regarded as three major anchors assuring peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Among them, the consolidation and expansion of democracy is the pivotal factor which could lead to peace and robust economic development in Asia,

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² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 13-26, and Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4 (October 1997), p. 4.

³ Freedom House, "Civic Power and Electoral Politics: A Report from Freedom House," p. 2, [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/essay2005.pdf>>

⁴ Freedom House, "Civic Power and Electoral Politics," p. 3.

⁵ Larry Diamond, "The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth," in Marc F. Plattner and Joao Carlos Espada eds., *The Democratic Invention* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 27-28.

and become a cornerstone of support for the universal values of global freedom and democracy. As the paragon of the third wave of Democratization, Taiwan is willing to cooperate with the advanced democracies, and to work together to strengthen the new democracies in East Asia, and especially to foster China's democratization."

In the present work, we first review the current wave of democratization under globalization. Then we illustrate relations between democracy and the likeliness of war or peace. Thirdly, we narrate the process and experience of Taiwan's democratization. Then we analyze the future prospect of China's democratization and inquire whether Taiwan's experience is an applicable model for China. Finally, we pursue the question whether smooth and successful democratization in China would assure long-term peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait.

II. The Wave of Democratization under Globalization

When we reflect on means to bring about integration of the third wave of democratization, we notice that this global phenomenon bears a relationship with the progress of globalization. There are two schools of methodological thought on the observation and study of this relationship. The first views globalization as the subject of observation and study, while the second school treats globalization as the reference background against which other phenomena and interactions can be observed and studied.⁶ We could say that the first school adopts a stricter, more specific theory of globalization, while the second school embraces a more general theory of globalization. Innumerable aspects of globalization have been studied in detail by others, and it is not the object of the present work to embroider additional details into that body of research. Therefore in the present work, we adopt the approach of the second school, and treat globalization as the background against which to observe and discuss relations between the trends of globalization and democratization.

1. Globalization and Democratization

Since the onset of the twenty-first century, two important trends have received much attention: globalization and democratization. The present trend of globalization has taught us that political history is a process of continuous democratization; that democratization can eliminate violence and inhumanity; and that democratization can eliminate inequalities and social classes. Globalization is an important phase in the development of political history, but what, if anything, does globalization do to lay a foundation for the realization of democracy? Broadly speaking, the following labels are used to identify three different viewpoints on global democratization: (1) liberal-internationalism; (2) radical-republicanism; and (3) cosmopolitan democracy.⁷

Although we treat globalization as reference background, it must be noticed that globalization influences nearly everything in our daily lives. In order to explain the third wave of democratization, we have to clarify the relationship between globalization and democratization. Previous studies have concluded that although globalization and democratization both have long, complicated histories, they do connect, and do reinforce each other. In other words, globalization furthers democratization, and vice versa.⁸ If the world is to be dominated by a single ideology, it might best be globalization, because the Cold War era taught us that when democratization is incomplete, the

⁶ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Glodblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 2-12.

⁷ Held, McGrew, Glodblatt, and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, pp. 447-450.

⁸ Marc F. Plattner, "Globalization and Self-Government," *Journal and Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 3 (July 2002), p. 54.

democratic and non-democratic countries tend to form blocs that actively confront one another. In order for democracy to maintain its relevance, effectiveness, and legitimacy in the future, it is critically important that we learn to deepen and spread democracy without such confrontations.⁹

2. The Third Wave of Democratization

In *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Samuel P. Huntington pointed out three waves of democratization. The first wave occurred between 1800 and 1930. After WWI, democratic systems spread extensively. There were about 32 liberal democracies in 1922. But twenty years later, due to the rise of fascism, only twelve democracies survived. The second wave of democratization appeared following the end of WWII. This wave reached an apex in the 1950s, and declined during the 1970s. We are now seeing the third wave of democratization.¹⁰ The following tables, based on the annual reports of Freedom House, provide the data and we use the design of Larry Diamond¹¹ to demonstrate progress of the third wave of democratization.

Table 1: Rise of Electoral Democracies (1974, 1990-2005)

Year	Number of Democratic Countries	Total Number of Countries in the World	Percentage of Democracies	Increasing Rate of Democracies
1974	39	142	27.5%	n/a
1990	76	165	46.1%	n/a
1991	91	183	49.7%	19.7%
1992	99	186	53.2%	8.1%
1993	108	190	56.8%	8.3%
1994	114	191	59.7%	5.3%
1995	117	191	61.3%	2.6%
1996	118	191	61.8%	0.9%
1997	117	191	61.3%	-0.9%
1998	117	191	61.3%	0.0%
1999	120	192	62.5%	2.5%
2000	120	192	62.5%	0.0%
2001	121	192	63.0%	0.8%
2002	121	192	63.0%	0.0%
2003	121	192	63.0%	0.0%
2004	117	192	61.0%	-3.3%
2005	119	192	62.0%	1.7%

Source: 1. Raymond D. Gastil ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1988-89* (New York: Freedom House, 1989); 2. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1990-2005* (New York: Freedom House, 1991-2005); 3. Adrian Karatnycky, "Muslim Countries and the Democracy Gap," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 99-112; 4. Adrian Karatnycky, "The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty's Advances in a Troubled World," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 100-113; 5. Larry Diamond, "The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth," in Marc F. Plattner and Joao Carlos Espada eds., *The Democratic Invention* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 13-33; and 6. The statistical number of electoral democracies in 1974 was estimated by Larry Diamond.

⁹ David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 359-360.

¹⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 13-30.

¹¹ Diamond, "The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth," pp. 14-18.

Table 2: Global Trend Toward Freedom (1972-2004)

Year	Free (%)	Partly Free (%)	Not Free (%)	Total
1972	42 (29.0%)	36 (24.8%)	67 (46.2%)	145
1980	52 (31.9%)	52 (31.9%)	59 (36.2%)	163
1985	56 (33.5%)	56 (33.5%)	55 (32.9%)	167
1990	65 (39.4%)	50 (30.3%)	50 (30.3%)	165
1991	76 (41.5%)	65 (35.5%)	42 (22.9%)	183
1992	75 (40.3%)	73 (39.2%)	38 (20.4%)	186
1993	72 (37.9%)	63 (33.2%)	55 (28.9%)	190
1994	76 (39.8%)	61 (31.9%)	54 (28.3%)	191
1995	76 (39.8%)	62 (32.5%)	53 (27.7%)	191
1996	79 (41.4%)	59 (31.1%)	53 (27.7%)	191
1997	81 (42.4%)	57 (29.8%)	53 (27.2%)	191
1998	88 (46.1%)	53 (27.2%)	50 (26.2%)	191
1999	85 (44.3%)	59 (30.7%)	48 (25.0%)	192
2000	85 (44.3%)	60 (31.3%)	47 (24.4%)	192
2001	86 (44.7%)	57 (29.8%)	49 (25.5%)	192
2002	89 (46.4%)	56 (29.2%)	47 (24.4%)	192
2003	89 (46.4%)	55 (28.6%)	48 (25.0%)	192
2004	88 (45.8%)	55 (28.6%)	49 (25.5%)	192
2005	89 (46.4%)	54 (28.1%)	49 (25.5%)	192

Source: See Table 1.

The Spanish Revolution of 1974 commenced the third wave of democratization. At that time, there were only 39 “electoral democracies” in the world, accounting for just 27.5% of the world’s 142 countries. By 1990, the number of electoral democracies had rapidly increased to 76, accounting for 46.1% of the 165 countries in the world. As to liberal democracies, although scholars have applied different statistical measures, the number of “liberal democracies” increased from 42 (29.0%) in 1972 to 65 (39.4%) in 1990. Like the electoral democracies, the number of liberal democracies also increased quite rapidly (see Table 1 and Table 2).

In 1990 the number of liberal democracies accounted for 39.4% of all electoral democracies. Then there was a relative stagnation of liberal democracies in the early 1990s in which the number of electoral democracies increased but the number of liberal democracies did not.¹² The picture changed after 1996. In 1996, the number of liberal democracies accounted for 67.0% of 118 electoral democracies. In the following years, the number of electoral democracies showed a small increase to 120 or 121. But the number of liberal democracies decreased over the same period to 85 or 86. In 2002, although the number of electoral democracies remained unchanged, and the number of liberal democracies increased to 89 (3.4% growth), it appeared that the third wave of democratization was reaching its end (see Table 3). Scholars have recently begun to focus their watch for signs of increasing democracy¹³ on the Islamic Arabian countries and China, to see whether they can discern the beginnings of a fourth wave of democratization.¹⁴

¹² Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” p. 19.

¹³ Aleksander Smolar, “History and Memory: The Revolution of 1989-91,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 12, no. 1 (January 2001), p. 5; and Yeau-tarn Lee, “Can the Fourth Wave of Democratization Happen in China?” *Policy News Forum*, no. 25 (April 19, 2002), [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <http://www.socialsciences.nccu.edu.tw/society/composition/020419/pol_g_020419_b.htm>

¹⁴ Diamond, “The End of the Third Wave and the Start of the Fourth,” pp. 24, 28; Adrian Karatnycky, “Muslim Countries and the Democracy Gap,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 99-112; and Adrian Karatnycky, “The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty’s Advances in a Troubled World,” *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no. 1 (January 2003), pp. 100-113.

Table 3: Electoral Democracies and Liberal Democracies (1990-2005)

Year	Electoral Democracies (N, %)	Liberal Democracies (N, %)	Percentage of Liberal Democracies in Electoral Democracies (%)	Total
1990	76 (46.1%)	65 (39.4%)	85.5%	165
1991	91 (49.7%)	76 (41.5%)	83.5%	183
1992	99 (53.2%)	75 (40.3%)	75.8%	186
1993	108 (56.8%)	72 (37.9%)	66.7%	190
1994	114 (59.7%)	76 (39.8%)	66.7%	191
1995	117 (61.3%)	76 (39.8%)	65.0%	191
1996	118 (61.8%)	79 (41.4%)	67.0%	191
1997	117 (61.3%)	81 (42.4%)	69.2%	191
1998	117 (61.3%)	88 (46.1%)	75.2%	191
1999	120 (62.5%)	85 (44.3%)	70.8%	192
2000	120 (62.5%)	85 (44.3%)	70.8%	192
2001	121 (63.0%)	86 (44.7%)	71.1%	192
2002	121 (63.0%)	89 (46.4%)	73.6%	192
2003	121 (63.0%)	89 (46.3%)	73.6%	192
2004	117 (60.9%)	88 (45.8%)	75.2%	192
2005	119 (62.0%)	89 (46.3%)	74.8%	192

Source: See Table 1.

Table 4 compares the years 1972 and 1975 by regional analyses of countries in different categories as to freedom. As the table shows, the percentage of free countries in the Americas increased by 18.6%; the percentage of free countries in the Western Europe increased by 24.0%; the percentage of free countries in Asia Pacific increased by 18.6%; the percentage of free countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union increased by 44.4%; the percentage of free countries in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 17.8%; and the percentage of free countries in Middle East and North Africa decreased by 4.9%. The percentage of free countries in the whole world increased by 17.6%. As Huntington argued in his comparative studies of democratization, democratic ideology has spread to different countries, regions, and cultural groups. The spread of democratization may be seen as the result of influence transmitted from one political system to another.¹⁵ This prompts us to argue that the wave of democratization is an important aspect of globalization, and the progress of globalization also promotes the spread of democratization.

Table 4: Freedom by Region (1972 and 2005)

Country Status/ Year	Free		Partly Free		Not Free	
	1972	2005	1972	2005	1972	2005
Region						
Whole World	28.7%	46.3%	25.3%	28.1%	46.0%	25.5%
The Americas	50.0%	68.6%	34.6%	25.7%	15.4%	5.7%
Western Europe	72.0%	96.0%	16.0%	4.0%	12.0%	0.0%
Asia Pacific	25.0%	43.6%	46.0%	28.2%	34.4%	28.2%
CEE and FSU	0.0%	44.4%	0.0%	25.9%	100.0%	29.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	5.1%	22.9%	23.1%	43.8%	71.8%	33.3%
Middle East and North Africa	10.5%	5.6%	15.8%	27.8%	73.7%	66.7%

Source: Adrian Karatnycky, "The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey: Liberty's Advances in a Troubled World," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.1 (January 2003), p.104; and Freedom House "Freedom in the World 2005: Selective Data from Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties," [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/charts2005.pdf>>

¹⁵ Held, McGrew, Glodblatt, and Perraton, *Global Transformations*, p. 451, and Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, p. 218.

III. Democracy, Democratization, War, and Peace

One of the most important contributions of modern social science is the finding that democracies do not fight with one another.¹⁶ The relations between democracy and peace have been studied mainly by scholars of international relations. Subsequent to the third wave of democratization, researchers in the fields of comparative politics and international politics have also given more attention to the relations among democratization, war, and peace.¹⁷

Democracy and Peace

The theoretical foundation predicting that democracy leads to peace is attributed Immanuel Kant. In his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace,” Kant argued that countries have the natural inclination to become liberal republics. Such regimes not only provide political leaders with legitimacy, but also foster unified citizen support in the face of foreign threats. Democratic governments are controlled by their citizens, and so are disinclined to engage in conflicts that will lead to civilian injuries and death. Once the liberal republican democracies are in place, the state of peace follows.¹⁸ Kant pointed out that peace among democracies has three main foundations: first, democracies have the culture to solve disputes peacefully; secondly, democracies share the same moral foundation; and thirdly, the economic cooperation among democracies moves toward mutual benefit.¹⁹ (See Figure 1)

Although experience teaches us that democracies have the same inclination toward war as is found among other regime types, experience also teaches us that democracies will not fight with each other.²⁰ Moreover, the fact that there have been no wars among democracies also points to some defining features of democracy.²¹ The liberal thought that characterizes liberal democracies certainly discourages them from war, but it also leads democracies to fight with non-democratic regimes. Liberal ideologies do not only assure individual freedoms, but also promote government operations and foreign policies that are conducive to peace. Due to their common ideology, liberal democracies tend to trust each other and believe that their differences can be resolved without war. However, they sometimes do have to confront non-democracies militarily.²² Democracies seldom start invasive wars. On the other hand, most democracies

¹⁶ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 5.

¹⁷ Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 93-120; William R. Thompson, and Richard Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 41, No. 3 (June 1997), pp. 428-451; Michael D. Ward, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, “Democratizing for Peace,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 41, No. 3 (March 1998), p. 52.

¹⁸ Reiss Hans ed., *Kant: Political Writing* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 100.

¹⁹ Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 95-96, 114-115.

²⁰ See Melvin Small, and David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69; Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall...Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617-648; Nils P. Gleditsch and Havard Herge, “Peace and Democracy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 41, no. 2 (April 1997), p. 305; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, no. 3 (September 1993), p. 624; and Arvid Raknerud and Havard Herge, “The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 34, no. 4 (November 1997), p. 385.

²¹ See John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.

²² Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace;” John MacMillan, “Liberalism and the Democratic Peace,” *Review of International Studies*, no. 30 (2004), pp. 179-200; and Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 4 (1986), p. 1161.

give much attention to their own national interests, and also try to maintain consistency and balance with other each other. Although democratic governments are not generally pacifistic, we expect the world to become more peaceful as the number of democracies increases.²³

Figure 1: Kant’s Three Elements for Democratic Alliance

<p>The First Element The democratic norm to solve conflicts peacefully.</p>
<p>The Second Element Democracies share the same morality.</p>
<p>The Third Element The economic cooperation among democracies: relations of interdependence.</p>

Source: Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 95-96.

1. Democratization and War

Since 1995, scholars have made much use of statistical methods to analyze the relations among democratization, war, and peace, and have achieved some insights worthy of further study. Examples of such studies are:

- (1) Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder coauthored a 1995 essay titled “Democratization and the Danger of War.”²⁴ They argued that countries would never achieve mature democracy. On the contrary, when countries are in the phase of democratic transition, they are more inclined to wage wars than other advanced democracies or stable autocratic governments. According to their argument, countries experiencing democratic reverses are more dangerous than countries without democracy.²⁵ Based on a tabulation of data for all wars over the period from 1811 to 1980, Mansfield and Snyder argued that it is difficult to promote peace by expanding democracy. International society should not emphasize democratization alone. It is rather more important to help other countries to find better ways to transform their non-democratic regimes smoothly. For any country in the process of democratic transition, it is most critical to promote a free and competitive market, so that different opinions may be expressed without oppression. The international environment is also an important factor. Only in a liberal international atmosphere can democratizing countries successfully complete the transition.²⁶
- (2) Nils Peter Gleditsch and Harvard Herge used three levels of relationship (between two countries, among countries, and international system) to statistically analyze the relations between democracy and peace over the period from 1816 to 1994. They argued that deeper democratization could lower the probability of war. Although participation in wars might weaken the foundation of democracy in the short term, it could encourage establishment of more democracies in the long run, and ultimately assure the prospect of democratic peace. Of course, if warfare were the main

²³ Dina A. Zinnes used propositional calculus to provide a logical construction to explain the empirical result why two democracies do not to go to war. See Dina A. Zinnes, “Constructing Political Logic: the Democratic Peace Puzzle,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48, no. 3 (June 2004), pp. 430-454.

²⁴ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5-38.

²⁵ See Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” p. 6.

²⁶ Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” pp. 36-38.

strategy for advancing democratization, a temporary turbulent period would be unavoidable.²⁷

- (3) In a 1998 study, Micheal D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch compared many country samples and examined the relations between democratization and international wars. They found that arduous and unstable democratic transition increases the probability of war, but democratic transition itself is not the reason for war.²⁸ In other words, although stable and secure democracies will not fight with each other, the possibility of war increases when the process of democratic transition is not smooth and when reverses occur.²⁹
- (4) Based on their own quantitative studies and the prior literature of democratization, Mark J.C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline discussed relations among the ratio of democracies, democratization, and war. They pointed out that when compared with the whole of international society, the number of democracies in a given region is insufficient, then there is positive relation between democratization and war in that region. In other words, although there is a relationship among democracy, democratization, and war, each region has its own uniqueness. More region-specific studies are needed in order to better understand the relationship.³⁰
- (5) Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder coauthored an essay in 2002, entitled "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War."³¹ They first argued that the 1990s was a period full of confrontations between democratization and nationalism. This kind of confrontation could be seen not only within countries undergoing democratic transition, but also between those countries. The authors argued that new democracies are neither free nor peaceful. The former Yugoslavia, Caucasia, and Indonesia are the examples. Their transformations from autocratic regimes were not peaceful. On the contrary, there were nationalist movements seeking independence, which ultimately evolved into international affairs. And there were military conflicts between such countries. The boundary war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the period 1998 to 2000 provides an example. The elected governments of India and Pakistan warred with each other in 1999 over the disputed Kashmir region. Another example is provided by the 1999 territorial conflicts between Peru and Ecuador, which began their democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. Mansfield and Snyder concluded that "those countries experiencing democratic transition in fact are more inclined to wage wars with their neighbor countries than those autocratic countries."³² Generally speaking, this is because elites in those countries often try to acquire public support and avoid political accountability, by resorting to nationalism.³³ The authors suggest that in order to contain such tendencies of politicians and other actors, it is necessary to enhance central government power during democratic

²⁷ Gleditsch and Herge, "Peace and Democracy," pp. 283-310.

²⁸ Ward, and Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," p. 53; and Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, p. 218..

²⁹ Ward, and Gleditsch, "Democratizing for Peace," pp. 53, 60.

³⁰ Mark J.C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline, "Ripples from the Waves? A Systemic, Time-Series Analysis of Democracy, Democratization, and Interstate War," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1999), pp. 75-94.

³¹ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," *International Organization*, vol. 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 297-337.

³² Bill Kissane, "Democratization, State Formation, And Civil War in Finland and Ireland: A Reflection on the Democratic Peace Hypothesis," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 37, no. 8 (October 2004), pp. 969-985.

³³ Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," pp. 297-298.

transitions. Before asking those countries to hold fair and competitive national elections, international society should encourage and help those countries to establish rule of law, a just legal system, an election committee, professional and independent media, and a capable and well-trained civil service system.³⁴

These studies indicate that the theoretical democratic peace will prevail only when countries in democratic transition advance into the stage of democratic consolidation. The earlier stages of democratization will not necessarily lead to wars, but an unstable transition surely increases the possibility of war. Consolidated democracies are unlikely to fight with one another, but the chance of war increases when there is any setback or reverse during a democratic transition. All democratic countries, as a community of international society, share the obligation to provide the resources and assistance needed by those countries undergoing democratic transition, in order minimize reverses and resulting hostile outbreaks.

IV. The Processes and Experience of Taiwan's Democratization

According to Freedom House, Taiwan has made significant strides in political and civil liberties in the past thirty years. In 1972 Taiwan was rated as undemocratic, with political rights scored as 6 on a scale of 7 in which a score of 1 was most democratic; civil liberties in Taiwan were scored as 5. Taiwan was considered "partly free" by Freedom House for the first time in its 1976 survey, with a political rights score of 5. During the subsequent years, political liberalism in Taiwan was advanced by a series of opening up and liberalizing measures including the grant of very broad press freedom, the right to form opposition political parties, and allowing travel to Mainland China for family visits. In the 1990 Freedom House survey, Taiwan's ratings for political rights and civil liberties both rose to a score of 3, but Taiwan was still categorized as "partly free." Taiwan's first direct presidential election, in March 1996, marked a giant leap for its democracy. Open and fair elections being held regularly at all levels of government, and people's political rights being well protected, Taiwan was then listed by Freedom House among the countries practicing both electoral and liberal democracy.

The essence of democratic politics is that people have the right to elect their leaders in regular, public, fair, and free national elections. The 1996 presidential election was thus the key to Taiwan's democratization, and also a milestone in Taiwan's democratic politics.³⁵ After Taiwan's second direct presidential election, in 2000, Taiwan peacefully passed from government by an entrenched quasi-Leninist party-state system over to government by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, a party widely perceived as pursuing a new identity and a new direction for the future. Taiwan not only surpassed Russia, Brazil, and other "electoral democracies" in the progress of democratization, according to the Freedom House survey, but Taiwan was recognized together with Japan as the most liberal country in Asia (average score was 1.5), surpassing South Korea and the Philippines, both of which started democratization earlier than Taiwan.³⁶ In the 2002 report of Freedom House, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand not only have had remarkable economic development, but these three countries also broadened

³⁴ Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," p. 334.

³⁵ Adrian Karatnycky, "Freedom on the March," *Freedom Review*, vol. 28, no. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 6-8; Yeau-tarn Lee, "Toward Consolidated Democracy: Taiwan Case," *Journal of Social Science*, vol. 5, no. 2 (June 1997), p. 171; and Yeau-tarn Lee, "Explaining the Experience of Taiwan's Democratic Transition from the Related Concepts of Democratization," *Chinese Political Science Review*, no. 29 (December 1997), pp. 160-168.


³⁶ Adrian Karatnycky, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 2002), pp. 108-109.

the scope of their people's political rights and civil liberties. This result challenged the concept of so-called "Asian Values," which holds that economic development in Asia must link up with authoritarian regimes.³⁷

1. The Phases of Taiwan's Democratic Transition

Dankwart A. Rustow in 1970 proposed a model to explain the phases of democratic transition, and Georg Sorensen modified it in 1998, to illustrate the factors leading to each phase of democratization (See Figure 2).³⁸ This model starts with a single background condition, national unity, and postulates a sequence of three phases that non-democratic systems undergo during transition to democracy. In the real world, the enumerated phases usually overlap one another. The first phase of democratic transition is a "preparatory phase," a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle leading to the collapse of a non-democratic regime. The second phase is a "decision phase" in which a decision to establish a democratic order emerges and is implemented. The third phase is a "consolidation phase" in which the new democracy undergoes further development, and democratic habits become ingrained in the political culture.³⁹

Figure 2: Model of Democratic Transition



Time

Source: Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), p. 40.

In the ongoing process of Taiwan's political development, liberalization and democratization are two different but closely linked phases.⁴⁰ The gradual progress of economic and political liberalization brings about democratization, and this liberaliza-

³⁷ Adrian Karatnycky, *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties* (New York: Freedom House, 2003), p. 103. Also, Taiwan has completed its political progress with admirable economic growth. See Adrian Karatnycky, "The 2003 Freedom House Survey: National Income and Liberty," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 1 (January 2004), p. 85.

³⁸ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3 (April 1970), pp. 350-361; and Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, p. 40.

³⁹ Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 40, 45.

⁴⁰ See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 1-78; and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative issues," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela ed., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 298.

tion also calls for deeper democratization, which encourages the growth of democratic politics.⁴¹ For this reason, if we apply Rustow's model to explain Taiwan's progress, we can readily see that Taiwan began its liberalization with the establishment of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party in 1986, or the abolition of *Martial Law* in 1987, by declaration of then President Chiang Ching-Kuo. Then Taiwan had comprehensive elections for its national legislature in 1991 and 1992, which linked the process of democratization, and a direct popular presidential election in 1996, which realized democratization. Taiwan not only successfully completed the task of democratic transition by these events, but then in the 2000 election turned over government power, from the fifty-year KMT regime, to the former opposition Democratic Progressive Party. Although Taiwan has completed the preparatory and decision phases, and has stepped into the early stages of its consolidation phase, full consolidation is not yet achieved: democratic regulations, norms, and habits have not yet fully integrated into each stratum of Taiwan society.⁴²

2. The Achievements of Taiwan's Democratic Transition

The onset of Taiwan's democratic transition was marked by the collapse of authoritarianism and the rise of a democratic wave. Although the democratic transition did not lead to a sudden crash of the former authoritarian regime, it is fortunate that the change also did not produce serious economic recession, social turmoil, or political struggle. The process of Taiwan's democratic transition could be seen as a "peaceful revolution."⁴³ We summarize distinctive characteristics of Taiwan's democratization as follows: (1) Taiwan's process of democratic transition was not a typical democratic metamorphosis; (2) Taiwan's democratic transition was not the transformation from a military government to a democratic one – the former regime was a one-party state; (3) there were no serious economic or political crises during Taiwan's democratic transition, and neither were there any popular movements for economic and political reform; (4) there were cleavages and conflicts between different clans urging different political localization; (5) the public questioned the government's legality and legitimacy during the democratic transition; (6) reform advocates within the former ruling party took the initiative to negotiate with the moderate faction of the rising opposition party, which provided a negotiation channel for democratization.⁴⁴ The resulting relatively rational and nonviolent negotiation was a particularly remarkable feature of Taiwan's democratic transition.

According to Larry Diamond, among some one hundred countries that have begun democratic transitions, less than 20 have succeeded.⁴⁵ Among the successes, Taiwan

⁴¹ Mahmood Monshipouri, *Democratization, Liberalization & Human Rights in the Third World* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 16.

⁴² See Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 157-158. Also see Yeau-tarn Lee and Hsiao-ping Chang, "The Analysis of Taiwan's Democratization: Rustow's and Huntington's Models Applied," *Journal of Social Science*, vol. 10, no. 2 (December 2002), p. 68.

⁴³ Ming Rang, *Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd, 2000), pp. 30-33.

⁴⁴ There are three types of democratization: transformation (started by ruling elites), replacement (started by opposition forces which causes the collapse of existed authoritarian regime), and transplacement (government cooperates with opposition forces). See Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 114-163. Also see Yeau-tarn Lee, "Explaining the Experience of Taiwan's Democratic Transition from the Related Concepts of Democratization," *Chinese Political Science Review*, no. 29, p. 175.

⁴⁵ Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 7, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 20-37.

is the only one in East Asia. Compared with the Philippines and South Korea, Taiwan's democratization progressed much more rapidly. Although there were challenges during the democratic transitions in all three of these countries, they all strived and overcame the challenges, and finally become models of democratic transition.⁴⁶ In Taiwan, the second turnover of the "two turnover test," ultimately demonstrating smooth operation of the democratic system, still lies ahead. It is the second turnover that finally imprints democracy into the consciousness of the electorate.⁴⁷ In Diamond's view, Taiwan is equally as free as the advanced democracies in Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and Italy. Nonetheless, Taiwan's major challenge in moving toward an advanced democracy at this time is learning how to jump start its consolidation phase.⁴⁸

V. The Prospect of China's Democratization

When we describe the phenomenon that is the global spread of democracy, it is important to notice the following questions: How do we explain the possibility and probability of democratization? How are democratic regimes established and maintained? Is there any objective prerequisite for democratization? As to countries in the third wave of democratization, why did these previously authoritarian countries transform at last into democracies?⁴⁹ Huntington sees the number of newly established democracies in the third wave of democratization as being unprecedented in world history.⁵⁰ His comparative analysis of global democratization tries to explain why and how these countries chose democratization. Huntington's studies might provide useful guidance when we seek to estimate the probability of democratization in China.

1. Causes of the Wave of Democratization

Huntington proposed five factors as particular inducements to democratization: (1) the legitimacy crises of authoritarian regimes, which often exhibit a long, gradual onset; (2) substantial economic development, particularly with high economic growth rates during the 1960s; (3) religious or cultural transitions, such as the notable changes of activities and creeds in western Catholicism, as well as departures from the traditional norms of eastern Confucian society; (4) influence from external forces, such as policy changes in important other countries; (5) the snowballing effect of successful examples of democratic transitions in other countries.⁵¹

Huntington regarded legitimacy crises as an "ambiguous concept that political analysts want to avoid; but it is absolutely necessary for understanding the problems that authoritarian regimes have to face in the end of 20th century." On one hand, Huntington asserted that there is no consequential relation between economic development and democratization, but on the other hand, he also seems to recognize that the two bear at least a temporal relationship: the power of an authoritarian regime will be diminished during periods of fast economic growth or periods of economic recession.⁵²

Huntington argued that some 75 percent of the democracies newly established in the

⁴⁶ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 5-21.

⁴⁷ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 266-267.

⁴⁸ Yeau-tarn Lee, "Toward Consolidated Democracy: Taiwan Case," pp. 43-65.

⁴⁹ Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost: Dependency to Democracy," *World Politics*, no. 2 (April 1988), pp. 377-394; and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁵⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 26.

⁵¹ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 45-46.

⁵² Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 59.

third wave of democratization in the 1990s were Catholic countries, and he attributed that fact to pro-democracy pressure exerted by the Church upon the former authoritarian regimes.⁵³ He pointed out that each major culture, including Asian Confucianism, has some elements congruent with democracy. Although “Confucian democracy” might sound like a paradoxical phrase, democracy could reasonably thrive within a Confucian society.⁵⁴ Huntington also noticed that establishment of the EU, the policies adopted by the Carter and Reagan administrations, and the economic liberalization and political reform policies adopted by Gorbachev all might have contributed to the emergence of democratization.⁵⁵ Huntington observed that the attention of the global media produced a vast and far-reaching demonstration effect. This demonstration effect was most powerful in countries neighboring the new democracies or having similar cultures.⁵⁶ Thus it is clear that democratization does not a result from one single factor. Notwithstanding that qualitative global research is subject to some analytical restraints, it does point out some useful directions that we could follow in a search for indications of a prospective democratization in China.⁵⁷

The following viewpoints on the prospect or foreseeable possibility of democratization in China are motivated by the above reasoning and the five factors in Huntington’s theory on the third wave of democratization:

- (1) In the aspect of economic development, Catholicism, and Confucianism: Rapid economic growth inevitably challenges China’s authoritarian regime, but it is equally certain that such growth not assure the establishment of democratic system. On the contrary, it is likely that Chinese leaders would root out emerging opposition factions in order to strengthen the Communist position. China has never been occupied or colonized by the United States, and Christianity has no strong power, not to mention that the Catholic power hardly exists in China. However, the religious issue which is worthy of our attention is the issue of Falun Gong. Although the traditional culture within the Confucian society will be preserved, and democratic thought from Western society will have some influence, it is the belief of China’s current leaders that authoritarianism is the highest guiding principle if China wants to obtain a balance between the pursuit of economic growth and the avoidance of disorderliness.
- (2) In the aspect of policies adopted by foreign countries, and the demonstration effect: the United States is devoted to advocating democratic systems, but its effort has been criticized by an authoritarian China. China has argued that the US not only interference in its internal affairs, but also intends an imperialist invasion. Although there is not enough evidence to make a proof of the matter, we believe that the examples of the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986 and the democracy advocacy of Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan in South Korea during the same year did have a demonstration effect that encouraged the democratic movements in China during the autumn of 1986.
- (3) In the aspect of legitimacy crisis: The Chinese Communist Party has advocated for authoritarianism by proletarian class, and despised the Western type of liberal democracy. The CCP argues that this type of democracy is capitalist class democracy. To be more specific, there is no democratic element in China’s totalitarian ideology and it is also proclaimed in its constitution that the CCP leads and rules China. Therefore, if China wants to adopt a democratic system, the one-party dictatorship should be first

⁵³ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 76, 79-85.

⁵⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 310.

⁵⁵ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 85-100.

⁵⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 101-106.

⁵⁷ Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics*, pp. 146-147.

abolished. But Chinese Communist leaders firmly deny any decline of legitimacy of their regime, and any legitimacy challenge by the people is met with force and violence. This kind of crises always happens when there are changes in the leading cadres. The Tiananmen Massacre of June 4, 1989 provides the best example.⁵⁸

China's communist leadership believe that if they have consensus on means for controlling the populace, then they can maintain control in spite of any crisis of legitimacy. Such control of the populace inhibits and possibly precludes any democratization, even in the face of a legitimacy crisis or regime crisis in China.

2. Taiwan Model

Whether China will be democratized in the future is now an issue of concern for many scholars. Is there any lesson that Taiwan can offer toward that end? What and how can China learn from Taiwan's experience? We analyze these questions from three aspects:

(1) The system and nature of a party-state regime:

Among countries democratized during the historical three waves of democratization, the former regimes are of three typical authoritarian types: one-party system, military-dominated system, and dictatorship.⁵⁹ During the early stages of Taiwan's former rule by the Kuomintang party-state, all levels of government were controlled by party organizations; the military was controlled by political work sections dominated by the party; no social organization could avoid being monitored by party members; and any opposition party had to support the ruling party. The Kuomintang applied the varnish of "democratic constitutionalism" simply to maintain some legitimacy, and its relations with the United States.

Moreover, the nature of the quasi-Leninist Kuomintang regime was different from the Leninist party-state system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).⁶⁰ The Kuomintang did not embrace dictatorship of the proletariat and did not purport to maintain exclusive political power forever. Kuomintang ideology held that Taiwan should ultimately transform from civil dictatorship to democracy, and all ruling behaviors were to be accordingly limited in scope. On the contrary, the CCP not only decided the nature and goals of the country by following its ideology, but also regarded democratic parties that opposed communism as disloyal rebels. The CCP controlled every aspect of people's lives, and completely abided by the course of the dictatorship of proletariat and socialism.

The CCP decided in its Sixteenth National People's Congress, in 2002, to accept capitalist class members, and boldly announced that the old Chinese Communist Party based on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism had been replaced by a new CCP that bore increased resemblance with the Social Democratic Party or People's Party.⁶¹ This was a CCP effort to solve a legitimacy crisis, but in fact, the nature of its one-party authoritarian system did not change, and it did not allow for any challenge from any quarter.

(2) Local autonomy and elections:

⁵⁸ The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 16. *Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History*, [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/>>

⁵⁹ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 110-113.

⁶⁰ Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Taiwan in Transition," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 64-65; and Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative perspectives," in Tun-Jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, *Political Change in Taiwan* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 6-7.

⁶¹ Hsin-Li Chiang, "Comments on China's Sixteenth National People's Congress," paper presented in the **International Conference of Assessment on China's Domestic and International Environment after the Sixteenth National People's Congress** held by National Chengchi University (December 18, 1992), pp. 1-9.

Although Taiwan did not have any practical experience of democratic systems in its central government, election of local officials had long been usual procedure. The experience of such local autonomy and regular elections not only laid the foundation for Taiwan's democratization, it also accelerated the progress of democratization once it began in the 1980s.⁶² Open and competitive elections provided opportunity for opposition parties to grow in strength, and also allowed for perfection of election systems and procedures. As the populace increasingly saw itself as an electorate, open elections became the source of government legitimacy as well as the most efficient means for realizing democratic politics.

Although Taiwan's early local elections, held in the 1950s, were conceived by the Kuomintang as a means for reinforcing its legitimacy, the Kuomintang began to think over the issue of political democratization after the Kaohsiung Incident in 1978, when several candidates who had been imprisoned in the Kaohsiung Incident won election as representatives in the central government. Consequently, then president Chiang Ching-kuo declared the abolition of *Martial Law* and lifted prohibitions against political parties and newspapers. The subsequent president, Lee Teng-hui, then planned and implemented regular, open, fair, and free national elections.⁶³

On the other hand, the CCP only allows grass roots autonomy in rural regions, and holds elections in some villages. In fact, the village elections are elections in name only and they would not proceed except for pressure from higher authorities.⁶⁴ Due to the lack of real local autonomy, and inexperience with election systems, Chinese leaders have no basis of experience for understanding the value of free democracy in government. From Mao Zedong to Jiang Zemin, CCP leaders have been unwilling to think about political democratization.⁶⁵

(3) Economic development and political leadership:

Huntington argued that "economic development would lead to democracy; political leadership realizes democracy." Political elites in a prospective democracy must have the faith that democracy is not the worst form of governance.⁶⁶ Political leaders try to establish democracy because they believe that democracy itself is not only the final goal, but also the means to achieve other goals.

With regard to economic development, many foreign scholars viewed Taiwan's performance as an "economic miracle." Taiwan's government not only led its people to overcome the oil crisis and global economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s, but Taiwan's economic development continued apace.⁶⁷ The Kuomintang government

⁶² Hung-mao Tien, "The Prospect of Taiwan's Democratic Consolidation," in Hung-mao Tien, Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds., *Opportunities and Challenges to Newly Democracies* (Taipei, Yehchang Publisher, 1997), pp. 266-268.

⁶³ Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan: Divided Country and Democratization* (Taipei: Third Nature Publishing Co., Ltd., 1994), pp. 25-126, 179-182, 210-204. (Translated by Chin-Chu Horng and Pei-Hsien Xu)

⁶⁴ Ming-xin Pei, "China's Creeping Democratization," in Hung-mao Tien, Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds., *Opportunities and Challenges to Newly Democracies* (Taipei, Yehchang Publisher, 1997), pp. 386-394; and Zeqi Qiu, "Institutional Factors and China's Political-Democratic Development," in Zeqi Qiu and Chia-lung Lin eds., *Party-State System in China and Taiwan: Dialogue between Eastern and Western Scholars in Harvard University* (Taipei: Third Nature Publishing Co., Ltd., 1999), pp. 291-293.

⁶⁵ On October 17, 2002, scholars participating in the "Forum on China's Political Situation and Observation and Prediction of 16th National Congress" held by Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation proposed this suggestion, [Online, cited 18 August 2005]. Available from <<http://www.future-china.org.tw/csipf/activity/mt911017.htm>>

⁶⁶ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 315-316.

⁶⁷ Masahiro, *Taiwan: Divided Country and Democratization*, pp. 148-153.

boasted that Taiwan's experience could be seen as an example for developing countries including China.

In order to deal with some external crises (loss of UN membership and loss of diplomatic relations with the United States) and strengthen citizen confidence in Taiwan's future, the central government initiated many large-scale public works and investments in heavy industry. Subsequently, because economic development had reached a point where people began to ask for more political participation, the government was forced to seek a path toward liberal democratization. On the contrary, the Chinese Communist Party adopted socialism, which emphasized public ownership. However, in order to make a shift from military strategy to economic strategy, China had to open its market to the world. Although economic development in China holds much promise, rapid economic growth also leads to tensions and instability, and it results that some domestic social groups advocate more rapid reform in the political system. These are challenges that Chinese leaders have to face.⁶⁸ According to Huntington's theory, even given success in its economic development, China's progress toward democratization would still depend on "political leadership."

Although China has been willing to open its markets to the world, its closed political system sooner or later will lead to severe contradictions and conflicts. Although Taiwan has become a paragon of the third wave of democratization, so long as China's ideology of authoritarianism remains unchanged there is little that Taiwan can do to foster democratization in China; Huntington's arguments suggest that Taiwan can only hope and wait for that democratization. The unchanging preoccupation of Chinese leaders with maintenance of the Communist autocracy, and their predisposition to use force in dealing with reform movements among intellectuals and students, as well as the middle class, indicate that the prospect of China's democratization is still bleak.⁶⁹

Bruce Gilley, who lived in China and Hong Kong for more than a decade, predicts that an elite-led transformation rather than a popularly led overthrow will take place in China. However, he also found that it is impossible to predict when such progress toward democratization will happen.⁷⁰ For intellectuals in China, the question whether to pursue democratization is not as urgent as the matter of reckoning with the dangers that would inhere in the process of democratization.

For Chinese scholars, democratization is desirable, but also risky.⁷¹ Even if China were to progress toward democracy, it is unlikely that a newly democratic China could develop and maintain successfully. Reverses could lead to regional wars.⁷² Democratization in China would be risky, rugged, and circuitous.

VI. Conclusion: The Prospect of Peace in the Taiwan Strait

The most influential and inspirational trend in this age of globalization is the wave

⁶⁸ Yin-Yi Chien, "The Institutional Foundations of the Transition of China's Marketization," *China's Future Direction* (Zhejiang, China: Zhejiang People, 2000), pp. 166-198.

⁶⁹ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 266-267.

⁷⁰ Bruce Gilley, *China's Democratic Future* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

⁷¹ Szu-chien Hsu, "Taiwan's Experience and Mainland China's Democratization," *East Asia's Liberalization, Democratization and Regional Peace* (Taipei: Tanshan Publisher, 2003), pp. 92-93.

⁷² Bin-Shien Hsieh, "China's Democratization and the Future of the Regional Peace in East Asia," *East Asia's Liberalization, Democratization and Regional Peace* (Taipei: Tanshan Publisher, 2003), p.239.

of democratization. The issues of democratization are subjects of hot debate among political scientists. While the global wave of democratization holds much hope, it is still too soon to discern whether cross-strait relations will lead to peace or war. We can analyze this issue from two standpoints:

1. Having successfully completed the transformation from an authoritarian regime to a stable democratic system, Taiwan is already regarded as a liberal democracy. As a democracy, it is not impossible that Taiwan, would make war against non-democracies, but war against other democracies is most unlikely. In fact, there is a complementation effect between democracy and peace, and historical experience bears out the proposition that war between democracies is unlikely.⁷³ Barring a future reverse or collapse of democracy in Taiwan, it is most unlikely that Taiwan would wage war against other countries. A stable and consolidated democracy has little probability of attacking other countries.
2. On the contrary, according to criteria adopted by Freedom House to judge the extent of democratization, the PRC government does not have the legitimacy that is provided by free and open elections. Freedom House regards China as a “Not Free” country which provides no guarantee or protection for people’s fundamental political rights or basic civil liberties. There is no sign of democratization in China.⁷⁴ The authoritarian Beijing regime not only suppresses all opposition voices by violent means, it also rejects free news media and an independent legal system. All manners of repression are used to control the populace. This causes some worry and concern among China’s neighboring countries, including the fear of war in East Asia. If China begins to move toward democratization, it is not unlikely that there will be instability and power struggles during the process. Such instability and tensions during transition between different political regimes, together with the probable mobilization of nationalism, increase the probability of China making war against other countries.

Two important observations may be drawn from the present work. Firstly, countries experiencing democratic transition are more likely even than authoritarian countries to make war against their neighbors. The theory of democratic peace only applies when democratizing countries reach the phase of democratic consolidation. Secondly, the process of democratization does not unavoidably cause wars, but the chance of hostile outbreaks increases if the democratization process is unsteady. Countries which have stable and consolidated democratic systems will not fight with each other.

The prospect for peaceful relations across the Taiwan Strait not only depends on Taiwan’s determination to maintain its democratic system and move steadily toward democratic consolidation, it also depends on China’s willingness to begin the process of democratization and to move steadily toward democratic consolidation with help from the international community. It is obvious that such moves are not contemplated by China’s political leadership, and therefore the possibility of war across the Taiwan Strait remains unchanged, and is unlikely to change any time soon.

Some scholars argue that so long as China remains engaged in doing business with Western democracies, China’s democratization will happen naturally. Prosperous and stable economic relations might provide the inducement for the start of democratization in China, and in the long term, that would increase the prospect of peace. But the international community should do more to decrease the probability of reverses and crises during China’s future democratic transition. Beginning the so-called fourth wave of

⁷³ Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, pp. 97-101.

⁷⁴ Yeau-tarn Lee, “Toward Advanced Democracy: The Prospect of Taiwan’s Democratization in the 21st Century,” pp. 54-56.

democratization in China, following its rapid economic development, is an imperative and a test for all Chinese people.

Taiwan has now only passed the first half of the “two-turnover test” and has not yet completed its democratic consolidation stage. Taiwan is therefore not yet counted as an advanced democracy. If Taiwan were to consolidate its democracy and become more liberal, many Western countries would more carefully scrutinize China’s policies regarding the “Taiwan issue.” As regards the question whether Taiwan would unify with China, neither the United States nor China has the authority to decide. Only the 23 million people of Taiwan may make that decision, and their will should be respected. Only democracy can protect the freedom and human rights of the people of Taiwan. Security in East Asia will be assured only after China begins its democratization. Lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait will be realized only when China’s democratization proceeds steadily and smoothly. The international community should therefore be attentive and ready to provide all necessary help to realize the initiation and steady progress of China’s democratization.