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THE IMPACT OF CONFUCIAN VALUES ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PERIOD OF "REFORMS AND OPENNESS"

The article is devoted to identifying the role of the Confucian component in shaping China's foreign policy during the period of "reforms and openness". The author analyzes the Chinese "soft power" model and its differences from the classical one, the theoretical foundations of which were formulated by J. Nye, and discovers the China's "soft power" features in foreign policy and establishes its meaningful connection with Confucian values and concepts. The article provides an overview of "soft power" interpretations in the main works of Chinese scholars, examines the reflection of Confucian "soft power" ideas in the state and party documents and decisions of the period of "reforms and openness", shows the application of Confucian principles in the foreign policy of China.

It is shown that the creation of effective Chinese "soft power" tools is becoming a part of a purposeful and long-term policy of the state. Such tools include the swift reform of leading media, TV and radio companies using modern technologies and focusing on foreign audience abroad, promoting China's traditional and modern culture in foreign cultural markets, increasing China's presence on the world market, spreading and promoting the Chinese language, "Education Export" and widening educational contacts, economic ties development and scientific and technical cooperation, public diplomacy development, support of the compatriots living abroad. Geopolitically, China's soft power strategy is focused on developing relations with its close neighbors and creating a security belt around China.

It has been proved that modern China seeks to proclaim itself as a new "soft power" center, the creation of which is a part of the State purposeful long-term policy. It is accompanied by the active appeal of Chinese ideologists to the country's traditional cultural heritage and basing of this new foreign policy on the conservative values of Confucianism, which is a kind of civilizational code determining all aspects of social life for China.

Keywords: *Chinese foreign policy, period of "reforms and openness", Confucian values, "soft power", export of culture and education.*

Since the transition of the country's leadership to the "reforms and openness" course in 1978, China's global role has been steadily becoming more important and significant. Along with the rapid strengthening of China's economic position, there is a distinguishable China's strengthening in the global politics. Modern China seeks to proclaim itself as a new 'soft power' center, the creation of which is a part of the State purposeful long-term policy.

A notable feature of China's new foreign policy is the country's leadership attempts to extend China's international impact primarily through Chinese cultural influence increase and expanding China's cultural presence on the world market. "Soft power" strengthening in the context of the national culture development has become one of the key tasks in the CPC's policy. All these processes are also accompanied by the active appeal of Chinese ideologists to the country's traditional

cultural heritage and the basing of the new foreign policy on the conservative values of Confucianism, which for China is a kind of civilizational code that determines all aspects of its social life.

The “Soft Power” Concept first formulated by the American political scholar Joseph S. Nye in the late 1980s – early 1990s, it appeals to the opportunities of construction country’s image attractiveness, values, worldview, language, history, and cultural heritage, which contributes to its influencing the other countries. J. Nye defined “soft power” as “the ability to achieve the desired purpose on the basis of voluntary participation of allies, not through compulsion or pittance” [1] or “to compel another power to wish what you wish” [2, p. 167].

The Western “soft power” concept adaptation problems to Chinese realities, the culturally centric development formation of Celestial Empire soft power are thoroughly considered in the works of D. Bell [3], who assesses the practical Confucianism in China as a viable alternative to Western liberalism. The same problems are studying GJ. Gilboy and E. Higginbotham [4]. In comparative analysis of China and India foreign policy strategies they highlight the positive components of the Chinese experience of soft power policy.

The subject of China’s “soft power” specific use in foreign policy has been adequately covered in the works of national sinologists and specialists in world history, international relations, political science, etc. Studies of China’s international relations in the historical context are carried out by V.V. Velychko, A.Z. Goncharuk, I.A. Kiptsar, R.V. Lenivskiy and Y.V. Poita, V.V. Sednev, V.B. Urusov (all – Ukrainian-Chinese relations), I.G. Vyshnevska-Cherkas, M.A. Taran (American-Chinese relations), M. Smotrinskaya (Russian-Chinese relations), S.V. Kapranov (Japanese-Chinese relations and cross-cultural impact), V.A. Musiychuk (Sino-Vietnamese interactions), S.O. Nikishenko (China’s relations with Japan, Korea and Vietnam). Much attention is paid to the policy of China on the international arena by the famous Ukrainian Chinese scholar V.O. Kiktenko, as well as domestic scientists V.V. Velychko, O.O. Koval, V.V. Sednev, M.A. Taran. The works published during the period from 1980 to the present day and reflecting the influence of Confucianism on the formation of China’s foreign policy during the period of “reforms and openness” can be also singled out as an independent line. In particular, Chinese scientists Wang Huning, Guo Xuetang, Guo Zemin, Gao Zhangxiang, San Hong, Xu Fugun, Fan Dongmei, He Lin, Zhang Jie, Zhou Guitian, and Yu Xintian are fruitfully working in this direction.

It should be noted, however, that domestic works on the Confucian component of China’s foreign policy during the period of “reforms and openness” in 1978-2013 in fact are absent. This fact determined the choice of the problem under study.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to identify the role of the Confucian component in shaping China’s foreign policy during the period of “reforms and openness”. This goal determines the solution of a number of problems. In particular: to identify the features of China’s use of “soft power” in foreign policy; to analyze

the Chinese model of “soft power” and to establish its meaningful connection with Confucian values and concepts; to provide an overview of “soft power” interpretation in the main works of Chinese scientists; to study the reflection of the “soft power” Confucian ideas development in the state and party documents and decisions during the period of “reforms and openness”; to reflect the Confucian principles use in the practical actions of China on the foreign policy arena.

In recent decades, the “soft power” aspect has been increasingly included in the foreign policy strategies of the world countries. However, China has become a powerful pioneer among the Asian countries in this regard. Taking J. Nye’s concept as a starting point, the Chinese scholars and ideologists have significantly transformed it, filling it with authentic cultural and value components and thus defining cultural centrality not less (apparently, even more important provision) than it is now in the basic EU documents (in particular, in the Lisbon Treaty). In the light of globalization challenges, culture is becoming one of the most important factors that unite society and contribute to socio-economic development and strengthening the power of the state.

The new “soft power” components, through which China now claims the role of a new center of power, are drawn from the cultural and historical heritage of China and reach their origins in the Confucian 7-6 centuries B.C. treatises. The idea of “soft power” as a way to establish interpersonal communication contacts and gain a dominant position in communication is deeply inherent in the Chinese mentality and is ingrained in China’s cultural heritage. The very idea of using the “soft power” to establish influence over other states and gain power is found in the texts of ancient Chinese philosophers. In particular, one of the most significant thinkers of ancient China Lao Tzu, who is considered the author of the philosophical treatise “Tao De Jing”, noted: “The best ties are those that are not held by anything material, they cannot be broken” [5, c. 18]. Lao Tzu also has a saying that is a vivid demonstration of the Chinese “soft power” features: “In the celestial the softest prevails over the hardest” [6, c. 15-21].

The founder of China’s military strategy, Sun Tzu, claimed that “true victory is won without a fight”, and a wise strategist should hate the war and should use weapons only as a last resort, because any confrontation is counterproductive and “destructive to both sides”. According to one of China’s ancient political and military theorists, Sun Bin, who explained Sun Tzu’s position, war is waged for the survival of the state, but “he who loves war will perish” [7, c. 116]. Another source states: “There is nothing softer and weaker in the whole world than water, but water overcomes what is strong and solid. ... The whole world knows that the weak will overcome the strong, and the soft will overcome the hard ...” [8, c. 37].

Confucian texts have been and remain now the quintessence of such a worldview. Focused on the ideal social order establishment, Confucius left virtually no statements concerning the foreign policy of the state, but his instructions and maxims, designed for “domestic use” and individual self-improvement, can be applied in this

area. Applied in this way, they form the basis of what can be called a “soft power” with Chinese features. Let us recall the well-known statement of Confucius (consistent with the Kant categorical imperative, but expressed over 2,000 years earlier): “Do *not* treat others in ways that you would *not* like to be treated”. One can also mention the no less famous Confucian saying: “Governing by the power of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star, which remains fixed in place while all the other **stars** orbit respectfully around it”.

No wonder the researcher of this issue E.E. Kudryashova concludes: “The great reformer Deng Xiaoping in his foreign policy advocated a Confucianism peaceful position” [9].

Thus, J. Nye’s concept of the “soft” over “hard” primacy was consistent with the Chinese national worldview, based on the Confucianism philosophy; it resonates with the Chinese mentality features. However, in the Chinese version, “soft power” has become a persuasion art, the use of intangible cultural resources and political ideals to influence people in other countries. Moreover, even Deng Xiaoping’s military strategy was fundamentally focused not only on the military protection of national interests, but also on the prevention of military conflicts: “A critical function of military strategy”, – Lee Chipping Wei wrote in his study of the military doctrine of policy-making openness – “is not only the planning of wars, but also the containment of wars. ... If the economic benefits of using violent conflict are less than the cost of the conflict, the best way is to avoid conflict as soon as possible and look for other better ways to resolve the dispute” [10].

The “soft power” ideas transcribed through China’s cultural heritage, received a new interpretation and spread in the Chinese science in the late 1990s, in the mid-2000s the “soft power” topic as a “humanistic” way to gain the authority in the world received the widest possible discussion in scientific and political circles. In total, from 1997 to 2007, more than 500 scientific studies were published in China, with the “soft power” key word in the title of which. Five years later their number reached more than 2,000 publications [11].

The first scientific work devoted specifically to this problem was the article by Professor Wang Hongying “Culture is the ‘soft power’ of the state power” [12], which was published in 1993. The scholar points out that unlike the “hard power”, which can be used only under certain political conditions, “soft power”, based on a socio-cultural values system, is constantly supported and disseminated by the international community, representing the potential energy of the world culture. Besides, the Chinese “soft power” concept, in contrast to the American one, is built around the “traditional culture” concepts, ‘economic development’ model, “national unity”, “social justice”, “political reform”, “moral norms”, “corruption combating” etc., while the American “soft power” model appeals to the political and legal advantages of its leader, including human rights [13, p. 10].

Gao Zhangxiang in *The Power of Culture* [14] emphasizes that it is the “cultural power” that stimulates the development of the economy and policy, and the cultural

revival is a necessary condition for the nation revival. It is also worth noting Guo Zemin's work "The soft power of Culture Blue Book": a study report on the soft power of Chinese culture" [15], where the author proves that the core of culture is its value system, which, although capable of adaptation, however, plays a restrictive and motivating role in the society and is a kind of code that underlies not only all cultural manifestations, but also other components of public life, including foreign policy.

Lu Gang and Guo Xuethan in their work "Interpretation of the Chinese Threat" (this is a version of the title in foreign translations, the original says: Who's Threatened by China: An Interpretation of "China's Threat Theory") emphasize the need for a new theory of international relations based on traditional Chinese values [16, p. 418-419], among which there are those which coincide with the Indo-European world (both ancient and modern India and Europe): the "unity in diversity" ideas, peace and humanity (love for people). Diverse variations of these ideas incarnations are found in the famous book of Lun-yu, where Confucius teaches that "it is valuable to achieve unity through disagreement". And even the strategy in case of war or military conflict means not to fight "against", but to fight "for": to change the enemy's worldview, its value system, which can be achieved without armed struggle. Therefore, great attention is paid to diplomatic maneuvering, not military confrontation.

The cultural "soft power" concept based on the Confucian principles has gained widespread recognition in China, as a part of the leading party ideology adopted in the official documents of China. Special research centers and institutions were created for its theoretical substantiation. Thus, in 2012, the Guang Dong Southern Soft Power Research Institute was established in Guangzhou. In 2013, the Joint Soft Power Research State Innovation Center for Chinese culture was established on the basis of Wuhan University. The main theoretical studies of the Center's staff are published in the annual publication "Report on the Development of the 'Soft Power' of Chinese Culture" ("中国文化软实力发展报告").

It should be noted that as early as 1954, on the joint initiative of China, India and Burma, five principles of peaceful coexistence were proclaimed (in India they were called "Panch Shila" principles), which became fundamental to China's foreign policy soon after the crucial 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPC of the 11th convocation, which took place in December 1978 and started an era of "reforms and openness". These principles are: respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. It is also worth mentioning that these five principles of peaceful coexistence briefly and accurately reflect the goals and principles of the UN Charter. Today, the five principles of peaceful coexistence proclaimed more than 60 years ago have become a norm of international law, characterized by openness and tolerance, and in a concentrated form have united the concepts of sovereignty, justice, democracy and the rule of law. During the period of "reforms and openness" China openly and clearly proclaimed these principles as its guidelines.

At the 12th CPC Congress (September 1982), Deng Xiaoping proclaimed three main principles of China's foreign policy: independence, autonomy, and self-reliance. Hu Yaoban's report at the same congress emphasized: "Revolution cannot be exported", so China adheres to the five principles of peaceful coexistence [17, c. 4-5, 9-14, 34-38, 60-69]. "The nowadays world is the world of broad relations", Deng Xiaoping said in one of his speeches in 1984. "China was backward in the past precisely because of its isolation". After establishing the People's Republic of China, we were blocked, but to some extent we kept ourselves closed ... The experience gained during 30 years shows that it is impossible to improve the country behind closed doors – you will not achieve development" [18, c. 71]. Thus, the country's "openness" in its foreign policy (as well as economic and social) dimension has become a kind of guarantee of its modernization and successful progress through reforms, ensuring the country's participation in global processes.

The 13th CPC Congress (October 25 – November 1, 1987) proclaimed the protection of peace and the promotion of development as the main goals of China's foreign policy and the "main problems of the modern world" [19, c. 5, 10-16, 151-155], the 14th Congress (October 12-18, 1992), noting (and in fact recognizing) the world's not only cultural but also socio-economic and political diversity and legitimizing by this recognition the numerous differences between the states. It introduced an important provision in the foreign policy doctrine of China: the people of this or that country have the right to choose the social system and the path of development that correspond to the specific situation in a particular country. Thus the words of Confucius "The noble man seeks harmony, but not similarity; a small-minded man seeks monotony, but not harmony" ("Lun Yu", chapter "Zi Lu") acquired a new meaning. We also can agree with O.M. Borokh and O.V. Lomanov, who conclude from this: "Beijing has declared itself as the ideal heir, according to whom the exalted and educated Confucian "noble man" seeks harmonious relations with others and does not want to achieve similarity either by imposing their values on others or by accepting the values of others. The second part of the quote became a description of the Western policy, which, like "small-minded people", neglects harmony and wants to make the world the same in accordance with their vision" [20].

The 15th CPC Congress (September 12-18, 1997) rejected the idea of the world war inevitability in its foreign policy, stating the opposite: namely, the modern world dominant trend is peace and development.

Active work on the foreign policy development and its theoretical support began with Hu Jintao leadership (2002). Initially, it was a matter of opposing foreign concepts, which foretold the inevitable collapse of Chinese reforms and the growth of "Chinese threat". However, in the mid-2000s, the necessity of increasing China's own "soft power" and conducting cultural competition with other countries was announced. At the 16th CPC Congress (November 18-24, 2002), the China's entire foreign policy doctrine acquired complete and conceptual form. The Congress set the

priorities of China's foreign policy: developed countries, neighboring countries, third world countries.

The 17th CPC Congress (October 15-21, 2007) emphasized China's commitment to strengthening peace and stability. In the report by General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Chinese President Hu Jintao, the congress called for the state's cultural "soft power" increase to create a "harmonious society" inside China and a "harmonious world" outside it [21], where the main resource for it was the traditional Chinese culture based on Confucian values. Thus, the foreign policy course received a domestic political explication: the task of strengthening and spreading Confucian values within the Chinese society.

Therefore, having reached a high level of economic power, the country has consciously followed the path of forming its positive image in the eyes of foreign countries through culture and other tools to influence the public opinion of the population and elites of the world. Since the inclusion of the "soft power" concept in the Communist Party program materials, China has begun to purposefully "export" its culture not only to neighboring countries in the region, but also around the world. At the 6th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 17th convocation in October 2011, the program document "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Some Important Issues of Deepening the Reform of the Cultural System, Promoting the Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture" was adopted, which emphasized that "culture plays an increasingly important role in the rivalry between countries, great powers purposefully use the 'soft power' to increase their international competitiveness" [22]. The documents emphasizes the need to implement a strategy of culture, increase its international influence, promote the international influence of Chinese culture, show the world a new image of China's reforms and openness, and formulate the task of broad coverage of "basic national features, values, ways of China's domestic and foreign policy development. It stressed the importance of creating the "world-class media", which, based on the innovative methods of foreign propaganda, are designed to strengthen China's "voice" on the international arena which will allow to influence the world public opinion.

At the 18th CPC Congress (November 2012), Hu Jintao singled out the task of "strengthening the role of culture as a 'soft power' of the state" among the tasks of building the xiao kang society and "comprehensive deepening of reforms and openness". Complementary to the "xiao kan" idea is the Confucian "datong" idea – "great unity", which is also widely used for reasoning the CPC goals, in foreign policy it means the value harmonization of diverse cultures. Hu Jintao's report underlined the need to raise the cultural level of citizens and the society civility, and emphasized the need to actively promote Chinese culture abroad [23, C. 38].

According to international experts, in recent years China has been among the top three in terms of soft power policy spending, second only to the United States and the European Union. The researchers highlight the promotion of traditional and modern culture, including the language spread and promotion, widening of educational

contacts, developing of economic ties, scientific and technological cooperation, promoting of international development, deepening of public diplomacy, supporting of compatriots living abroad among the main China's "soft power" policy directions.

The China's "soft power" strategy is focused geopolitically on developing relations with its close neighbors, creating a kind of security belt around China. In particular, strengthening of China's position in the Asia-Pacific region through APEC and in Southeast Asia through ASEAN is the priority. The other international platforms, such as the SCO (co-founded by China), and the BRICS, also pursue this purpose. It is from the standpoint of the "soft power" component that one can assess China's colossal diplomatic, information and economic efforts since 2013 to promote the idea of creating a new Great Way ("one belt - one road" or "Economic Silk Road" and "The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road"), whose extra goal is peaceful unification of the developed and developing countries (more than 60 countries of the world), under the socio-cultural and economic auspices of China. It is planned to spend \$ 1 trillion to fulfill this idea.

Since the middle of the 2000s, China has been actively working to adapt the Confucian heritage to the challenges of contemporary national and foreign policy. China's growing economic power, coupled with China's growing openness to the outside world and the soft expansion of Chinese culture, has allowed it to hold key positions at the G20, G7, and UN Security Council Summits. According to Chinese experts, the main purpose of conducting Chinese foreign policy through the cultural expansion doesn't mean to convince the world of the moral superiority of China's development path, but of the universality of China's proposed moral values and to reconcile the world community with the inevitability of China's rise.

One of the manifestations of China's "soft power" in international relations is its active participation in peacekeeping missions. Among the UN Security Council permanent members China ranks second (after France) in the number of peacekeepers sent to the "hot spots" of the world. China's humanitarian aid to countries in need is diverse and large-scale. Over the last 40 years, more than 2,000 Chinese doctors have been sent to Yemen to provide medical care to the local population (it should be noted that in response, China has gained access to Yemeni energy resources) [24]. From the beginning of the period of "reforms and openness" to the end of the first decade of the new century, more than 15 thousand doctors provided care to about 180 million patients in almost 50 African countries [24].

For China, the creation of a positive foreign policy image is becoming more relevant every year. Just after the Sixth Plenum the CPC Central Committee of the 17th convocation, the Chinese leadership began to implement tasks to improve the country's image on the international arena, to promote Chinese ideas and traditional values, including by increasing the share of cultural industry in GDP, ensuring the cultural security of the country from the expansion of the soft power of other actors and to expand the cultural influence on other countries.

In this context, the use of national media and global communications to promote Chinese culture, values and achievements is of great importance. The Chinese leadership is taking powerful steps to create new channels for broadcasting abroad and global media corporations, to develop a powerful film industry and promote national cinema in the cultural world as a new element of soft power policy. Promoting China's contemporary cultural achievements through television, radio, media, as well as the world demanded and competitive cinema is one of the ways to implement soft power policy. To fulfill these ambitious plans of national media and cinema system rapid development, China has succeeded in creating a modern media industry capable of being a real alternative and competitor to Western global media in the global information space.

One of the real implementations of the cultural expansion policy was the opening in 2004 of the Confucius Institutes around the world; they created a network of specialized educational institutions established in different countries of the world. The official website of this organization defines the goal of the Confucius Institutes as the spread of the Chinese language and culture around the world, promotion of multiculturalism and building a harmonious world [25].

The Confucius Institutes world network dates back to 1987. At that time, the Council for the International Dissemination of the Chinese Language was formed at the governmental level, which included the heads of 12 Chinese ministries and departments. The Council permanent working body is the Office (abbr. - Hanban), which is a specialized body and non-governmental organization under the Ministry of Education of the PRC. However, the real opening of Confucius Institutes started in 2004 (South Korea).

The Confucius Institute Offices are being created in different countries on the basis of higher education institutions. An absolute condition for the establishment of such an office is the presence of a partner-University from the Chinese side. Chinese side specialists provide methodological, organizational, personnel assistance to spread the Chinese language and culture in the office location region. But the Hanban financial assistance is considered to be the main contribution. The content of the Confucius Institutes activity is similar to the German Goethe Institute, the Spanish Cervantes Institute or the British Council activities. However, from the organizational part, the Chinese side has found its way, abandoning to create and register the Chinese language center branches in foreign countries. Instead the Confucius Institutes appear directly within existing foreign educational institutions, where one of the Chinese universities is a partner. Foreigners provide premises, Chinese – teachers and teaching materials. There are direct links between Chinese and foreign universities. At the same time, Confucius classes are created on the basis of secondary schools.

It should be noted that as of the end of 2018, 548 Confucius Institutes were established in 154 countries, 1,87 million people study there, and the number of teaching staff is 46.7 thousand people [26]. 1193 Confucius classes have also been

opened in 83 countries. The Confucius Institutes are located across the continents as follows: 126 offices in 34 Asian countries, 59 – in 43 countries in Africa, 182 – in 41 European countries, 160 – in 24 countries of America, 21 – in 5 countries of Oceania.

This way of promoting culture and its values in the scientific literature was called “export of education” [27]. One more example is the involvement of foreign students in education (training, internships) in China. The idea is to provide quality education in comfortable environment for foreigners, to form their positive memories and feelings about the host country, to lay the foundation for future friendly relations with the foreign countries’ residents and institutions. That is why international educational exchange programs, which aim not only to develop cooperation between states but also to improve mutual understanding between peoples and demonstrate national achievements through education, are welcomed at the State level and receive comprehensive State support from the Chinese state.

The creation of effective China’s soft power tools is becoming part of the state’s purposeful and long-term policy. It should be noted that China regulates various areas of “soft power” policy. Such normative and legal regulators include Party Program documents (Congress and Plenum of the CPC Central Committee resolutions), legislative acts are laws that contain China's foreign relations provisions. For example, a separate section of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Education regulates foreign exchanges and international cooperation in the field of education; in turn, the laws are detailed by bylaws of state institutions responsible for a specific area.

Therefore, the changes in China’s foreign policy are connected with the transition to “soft power” policy based on Confucian postulates and maxims, thus they can be grouped in the following areas. First of all, it is the security policy aimed at preventing the international situation deterioration: in full accordance with the Confucian position of the best victory without war. China stays apart from any military conflict if it does not directly affect its territorial interests (like Taiwan, the islands in the South China Sea) and wide participation in peacekeeping missions. Secondly, it is the humanitarian activity including the assistance to other countries that is not connected with political conditions or ideological issues. The vivid example of such assistance is China’s current response to the needs of the EU and the post-Soviet countries during the coronavirus pandemic. Finally, the third area is the cultural expansion itself, both through the creation of its own positive image by the media, using cultural products, and through “the export of education”.

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Метельова Т.О., Чжен В.А. Вплив конфуціанських цінностей на зовнішню політику Китаю періоду «реформ і відкритості».

Статтю присвячено виявленню ролі конфуціанського складника у формуванні зовнішньої політики КНР у період «реформ і відкритості». Автор аналізує китайську модель «м'якої сили» та її відмінності від класичної, теоретичні засади якої сформульовано Дж. Наєм, розкриває особливості застосування Китаєм «м'якої сили» у зовнішньополітичній діяльності та встановлює її змістовний зв'язок з конфуціанськими цінностями й концептами. У статті надано огляд тлумачень «м'якої сили» в основних працях китайських учених, досліджено відображення розвитку конфуціанських ідей «м'якої сили» в партійних і державних документах та рішеннях періоду «реформ і відкритості», відображено застосування конфуціанських принципів у практичних діях Китаю на зовнішньополітичній арені.

Показано, що створення ефективних інструментів «м'якої сили» Китаю стає частиною цілеспрямованої і довгострокової політики держави. До таких інструментів належать прискорене реформування провідних ЗМІ, теле- і радіокомпаній із застосуванням найсучасніших технологій і орієнтацією на зовнішнього споживача, просування традиційної та сучасної культури Китаю на зовнішні ринки культурної продукції, збільшення форм присутності культурної продукції Китаю на світовому ринку, поширення та популяризація китайської мови, «експорт освіти» й розширення освітніх контактів, розвиток економічних зв'язків і науково-технічне співробітництво, розвиток громадської дипломатії, підтримка співвітчизників, які проживають за кордоном. Геополітично ж китайська стратегія «м'якої сили» зорієнтована на розвиток відносин зі своїми найближчими сусідами та створення навколо Китаю своєрідного поясу безпеки.

Доведено, що сучасний Китай прагне заявити про себе як новий центр «м'якої сили», створення якої є частиною цілеспрямованої довгострокової політики держави. Це

супроводжуються активним зверненням ідеологів КНР до традиційної культурної спадщини країни та опертям нового зовнішньополітичного курсу на консервативні цінності конфуціанства, яке для Китаю є своєрідним цивілізаційним кодом, що детермінує всі сторони соціального життя.

Ключові слова: зовнішня політика Китаю, період «реформ і відкритості», конфуціанські цінності, «м'яка сила», експорт культури і освіти.

Метелёва Т.А., Чжен В.А. Влияние конфуцианских ценностей на внешнюю политику Китая периода «реформ и открытости»

Статья посвящена выявлению роли конфуцианской составляющей в формировании внешней политики КНР в период «реформ и открытости». Автор анализирует китайскую модель «мягкой силы» и ее отличия от классической, теоретические основы которой сформулированы Дж. Наем, раскрывает особенности применения Китаем «мягкой силы» во внешнеполитической деятельности и устанавливает ее содержательную связь с конфуцианскими ценностями и концептами. В статье дан обзор толкований «мягкой силы» в основных трудах китайских ученых, исследовано отображения развития конфуцианских идей «мягкой силы» в партийных и государственных документах и решениях периода «реформ и открытости», отражено применение конфуцианских принципов в практических действиях Китая на внешнеполитической арене.

Показано, что создание эффективных инструментов «мягкой силы» Китая становится частью целенаправленной и долгосрочной политикой государства. К таким инструментам относятся ускоренное реформирование ведущих СМИ, теле- и радиокomпаний с применением самых современных технологий и ориентацией на внешнего потребителя, продвижение традиционной и современной культуры Китая на внешние рынки культурной продукции, увеличение форм присутствия культурной продукции Китая на мировом рынке, распространение и популяризация китайского языка, «экспорт образования», расширение образовательных контактов, развитие экономических связей и научно-техническое сотрудничество, развитие общественной дипломатии, поддержка соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом. Геополитически же китайская стратегия «мягкой силы» ориентирована на развитие отношений со своими ближайшими соседями и создание вокруг Китая своеобразного пояса безопасности.

Доказано, что современный Китай стремится заявить о себе как новый центр «мягкой силы», создание которой является частью целенаправленной долгосрочной политики государства. Это сопровождается активным обращением идеологов КНР к традиционному культурному наследию страны и опорой нового внешнеполитического курса на консервативные ценности конфуцианства, которое для Китая является своеобразным цивилизационным кодом, детерминирующим все стороны социальной жизни.

Ключевые слова: внешняя политика Китая, период «реформ и открытости», конфуцианские ценности, «мягкая сила», экспорт культуры и образования.