

ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ XVIII ΣΤΟΛΙΤΤΥ

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EDWARDS ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREE WILL

Introduction

Suppose that God 2000 years ago had a foreknowledge that I will write today an article about God's foreknowledge. By definition, God is an omniscient being. Hence, his foreknowledge about my current doings is precise and infallible. If so, is it within my power¹ to refrain freely from writing the article, or I am forced (by God's foreknowledge) to write the article about God's foreknowledge? For if I could freely refrain from writing the article, and God had a knowledge that I will write today the article, it follows from my possibility to refrain voluntarily from writing an article that God 2000 years ago had a false foreknowledge. But it is impossible because the knowledge of God, by definition, does not involve false propositions. Hence, the fact that I am writing the article results in the fatalistic argument that this action is not my free choice but divine predestination.

Consider now the argument for theological fatalism developed by famous American theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards [Edwards 1774: 606-607] in his "Freedom of the will". In this book, Edwards raises important questions about the relationship between free will and determinism, divine foreknowledge and voluntary action. Edwards takes a strongly anti-libertarian and deterministic stance regarding the possibility of human free will. He thinks that such a possibility is incompatible with God's foreknowledge. The force of this argument is that: (a) Edwards infers theological fatalism from the argument for logical fatalism, which is based on well-known principles of logic and metaphysics; and (b) Edwards's argument can be considered as the universal basis for contemporary discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists, especially in the context of the most powerful modern argument for fatalism, introduced by Pike [Pike 1965]. Thus, the historico-philosophical value of the article lies in the fact that that the article shows the questionable nature of Edwards' inference from logical to theological fatalism (as will be seen below, the logical validity of the premises of Edwards' argument is doubtful); and the „systematical” value of the article lies in the fact that the article offers new counterarguments against the most fine-grained premises of theological fatalism provided by Edwards and, more recently, by Pike (these principles are widely used in contemporary debates on free will and fatalism).

So, Edwards [Edwards 1774: 606-607] writes:

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¹ For a detailed analysis of the notion „within one's power” see Alston [Alston 1985].

„In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.

1. It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars:

1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are *past*, their past existence is now *necessary*: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed.

2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already *has*, and long ago *had* existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connexion was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence of which is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may *possibly not exist*, notwithstanding that indissoluble connexion of its existence.—Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible, and indissoluble connexion between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that Foreknowledge is dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd“.

The argument of Edwards runs therefore as follows:

(1) Whatever has been the case in the past, has been the case **necessarily**. We know, for instance, that Barack Obama was born in the year 1961. It is not within our power to change (in the year 2020) the fact of the past that Obama was born in the year 1961. As a result, every true proposition about the past is a necessary truth.

(2) Suppose that the foreknowledge of God that I will write an article about God`s foreknowledge existed in the past. Hence, by (1), the foreknowledge of God is a necessary truth.

(3) If God`s foreknowledge that I will write today an article about God`s foreknowledge is a necessary truth, then it follows from God`s foreknowledge that I will write the article **necessarily** (by the principle that what follows from the necessarily true proposition is itself a necessarily true proposition). Call this principle *Necessity Entailment*

(4) The divine foreknowledge exists. Hence, the truth of the statement that it is necessarily the case that I am writing an article about God`s foreknowledge in the year 2020, by (3), is true not in virtue of empirical observation (i.e., in virtue of the fact that I am actually writing this article), but because this proposition is logically entailed by the necessary proposition² that God had a foreknowledge 2000 years ago. Hence, it is not the case that I can refrain from writing the article.

² For a detailed consideration of the notion of necessity in Edwards` argument see Barone [Barone 2020].

Schematically, the argument of Edwards can be summarized as follows:

- (a) God had foreknowledge that A (let A be the fact that today I will write an article) in the past (Assumption)
- (b) It is not the case that God might not have a foreknowledge that A (from the definition of God)
- (c) If God had a foreknowledge that A, then necessarily, God had a foreknowledge that A (from the principle of necessity of the past)
- (d) Necessarily, „God has a knowledge that A" entails "A is true" (from the definition of omniscience; call this principle *Truth-Entailment*)
- (e) "It has been necessarily true 2000 years ago that „A" entails "It is necessarily true (now) that it has been necessarily true 2000 years ago that A" (Closure of the past and Necessity-entailment)
- (f) Hence, it is necessarily the case that A (now) is a necessary truth
- (j) If it is necessarily the case that A is a necessary truth then, necessarily, it is not the case that $\sim A$ (definition of necessity)
- (h) If, necessarily, it is not the case that $\sim A$, then $\sim\Diamond\sim A$. Hence, it is not the case that I can voluntarily choose $\sim A$. As a result, if the foreknowledge of God exists, I have no free will.

The fatalistic argument of Edwards has been developed further by Nelson Pike [Pike 1965]. Pike's argument, very briefly, can be described as follows:

- (I) Suppose that A (now)
- (II) If, at t2 (now), A, then God at t1 (2000 years ago) had a knowledge that A
- (III) If God has knowledge that A, then $\sim\Diamond\sim A$. If God has a knowledge that A, then A is true.
- (IV) If God exists in t1, it follows that if, at t2, A, God at t1 had knowledge that, at t2, A
- (V) It is not the case that the contradiction is possible. Hence, it is not the case that $\Diamond(A\&\sim A)$, it is not the case that it is possible that God had and hadn't a knowledge that A, and it is not the case that it is possible that God existed and not existed at t1.
- (VI) Hence, if God had an existence at t1, and, at t1, God had a knowledge that, at t2, A, then it follows from the assumption that I could have had a free will (i.e., to choose between A and the refraining from A) that:
 - (A) If at t2, I can freely choose $\sim A$, then it would follow from my voluntary decision to choose $\sim A$ that God had a false foreknowledge at t1
 - (B) If, at t2, I can freely choose $\sim A$, then God who had a knowledge that A at t1, would not have knowledge at t1 that A, or God who had a knowledge that A would have had a knowledge that, at t2, (A& $\sim A$)
 - (C) If, at t2, I can freely choose $\sim A$, then God who existed at t1 and had, at t1, knowledge that, at t2, A, would have been nonexistent at t1.

Since none of these alternatives is acceptable, the argument seems to establish that free will is an illusion, and there is no way to avoid fatalism. Fatalism is not possible if there are contingent things and events; however, according to Fisk, Edwards denies the ontological status of contingency [Fisk 2016: 340]. Fisk correctly notes that Edwards deduces the necessity of certain things (for example, future events) from consequential necessity – if two things are in an "infallible connection", then the necessity of the second thing follows logically from the necessity of the first one. If A implies B, then B follows from A and therefore B is necessary. Let A be a fact of the past, and therefore a necessary fact (as Edwards believes). Now, if A and B are related in such a way that A is the cause of B or B follows logically from A, then B is necessary; B is necessary not by virtue of its own nature, but because B is

entailed by A. However, according to Fisk, in fact Edwards deduces the necessity of B not from consequential necessity, but from the necessity of a consequent, i.e. "philosophical necessity". Let me give a little example. Suppose I am married to Mary. If I am married to Mary, then I am Mary's husband. The proposition "I am Mary's husband" logically follows from the fact that I am married to Mary. But if I am married to Mary, then it is not true that I am not married to her; therefore it is impossible that the proposition *I am not Mary's husband* would follow from the fact that I am married to Mary. Thus, as Fisk notes, a consequential necessity (the impossibility for me not to be Mary's husband if I am married to Mary) would be legitimate in the structure of Edwards's argument only if it were impossible for me not to be Mary's husband (i.e. the necessity to be her husband) logically followed from the fact that I am actually Mary's husband [Fisk 2016: 340]. But in fact, the necessity for me to be Mary's husband does not follow from the fact of my marriage to Mary. Likewise, the fact of my marriage to Mary is not a consequential necessity, so Edwards cannot prove that the necessity of B follows from the infallible logical connection between A and B, and is not in fact a property of B. Fisk is certainly right that Edwards's argument is flawed and the (necessary) truth of B does not follow from the consequential necessity. However, Fisk paid little attention to the question of why we should assume that A is not a necessary truth. The observation of Fisk gives us a little reason to disprove the (*Necessity of Past*). Finally, Fisk's argument works successfully against naturalistic fatalism (if A is understood as a natural event, thing, or property), but has significant argumentative difficulties against theological fatalism (if B is caused or entailed by God. Barone depicted this issue in [Barone 2020]). We will demonstrate (in the last section of this article) that Edwards's fatalistic argument is not only formally incorrect (as Fisk correctly observed), but even if it were correct, Edwards's fatalism would be self-contradictory. Fisk provided no argument that Edwards's fatalism is inconsistent and self-contradictory.

Muller agrees with Fisk: „Edwards appears, therefore, to confuse necessity of the consequence with necessity of the consequent, assuming that a necessity of the consequence entails an „infallible connection with [some] Thing foregoing“ [Muller 2014: 273]. As a result, Muller does not accept Edwards's understanding of contingency; for Muller, Edwards's concept of contingency is not „genuine“ [Muller 2017] – if Q follows from P then, by Edwards, it is not the case that Q could be not necessary or P could not be nonexistent. Barone [Barone 2020], however, objects to Muller. One of the most important Barone's arguments is as follows. Edwards argues that necessity is a *connection* of things and not an intrinsic property of the thing itself. If B follows from A, B is necessary because the truth of A implies the truth of B, but B is not necessary by itself. Take, for example, a certain fact of future C. It is necessarily true that the occurrence of C is entailed by the fact of the present (say A), but C is not necessary. If C were necessary, then it would be actual one. But according to our assumption, C is a fact of the future; therefore, the existence of C refers to a fact of the future. Thus, although C is necessary due to the connection between A and C, the existence of C is contingent, and therefore it is not true that Edwards denies the ontological role of contingency. Barone's argument doesn't look convincing. C would be contingent if and only if C could lack its intrinsic truth-value (that is, if C could have been true not necessarily and thus could have been nonexistent). Hence if C is necessarily true because C is connected with A, then C necessarily will be existent in future; and if C were contingent, it *might not exist at all* (regardless of a specific time). But C, of course, *will be* existent, if necessary, and thus $\sim C$ will be necessarily nonexistent, and the contingency of C definitely depends on whether $\sim C$ could have occurred. Barone tries to summarize his argument as follows:

...to say that, for Edwards, this infallible connection corresponds to an absolute and intrinsic necessity, then the claim is mistaken. We have clearly seen that Edwards does not mean that such an infallible connection of things and future events has its grounds and principles in the nature of the things and future events in themselves, as when, for instance, adding four to three is followed by seven because of the very intrinsic nature of four and three“ [Barone 2020: 16]

I do not think that this remark is helpful for the purposes of clarifying whether Edwards’s argument contains a logical mistake (that is, confusion between consequential necessity and necessity of the consequent). Barone argues that it would be mistaken to think that if C follows from the necessity of A, then C is intrinsically necessary. He says that, by Edwards, it is not the case that A could have had such an intrinsic value as necessity, only God has it. Thus, A is not necessary, but A is necessary being entailed by God, and so we can conclude that C is necessarily the case not in virtue of A’s necessity, but because it follows from God’s necessity³. I think that Barone’s argument is formally true; but even if this argument is true, it is not helpful for the purposes of understanding Edwards’s consequential necessity. Instead of this we could say that everything is necessary, because everything is entailed by God, but this entailment, of course, is not a source of the consequential necessity. Even if the argument of Barone is correct, and B is itself a kind of contingency, it would lead to some unacceptable consequences (as we will see in the last section of this article).

Symbolization⁴

P, Q, R, A...	variables
&, v, →, ↔, ~	logical connectives
()	parentheses
∀	quantifier
□, ◇	modal operators
K	epistemic operator
t1, t2	„in the remote past”, “now”
P(t1), P(t2)	P is the case at t1 / t2
G	God
Kgp	God knows that P
Kg(t1)P(t2)	at t1, God knows that P will be the case at t2

³ Helm [Helm 2014: 161-182] says that, by Edwards, there are two different sets of necessary condition for contingency, namely divine willing and human willing, and Muller rejects this point of view in [Muller 2014: 275].

⁴ Our argumentation is based on normal modal logic (S5). We presuppose the following sentences as axioms: (PL) All theorems of propositional logic and every substitution instance of a tautology of the classical propositional calculus

- (K) $\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (\Box P \rightarrow \Box Q)$
- (M) $\Box P \rightarrow P$
- (4) $\Box P \rightarrow \Box \Box P$
- (5) $\Diamond P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond P$
- (5*) $\Box P \rightarrow \Diamond P$
- (B) $P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond P$

Divine Foreknowledge and Modal Fallacy

From the principle of divine omniscience advocated by Edwards follows that God knows every true proposition. This principle can be read as "If God knows the proposition p, p is true" ($\forall p (K_{gp} \rightarrow p)$), as well as "If the proposition p is true, God knows p" ($\forall p (p \rightarrow K_{gp})$). Since God's knowledge is infallible, we can necessitate the first reading of the principle of foreknowledge ($\forall p \Box (K_{gp} \rightarrow p)$). Let p be any contingent proposition (for instance, „Obama exists"). Then, by (*Necessity Entailment*), $K_{gp} \rightarrow \Box p$. By the principle of Divine Omniscience, we can guarantee that $K_{gp} \rightarrow \Box K_{gp}$; additionally, this inference is guaranteed by Edwards's assumptions (1) and (2), since God's foreknowledge about p is a fact of the past. As a result, we get an inference:

(Inf) Necessarily, if God knows that Obama exists, then Obama necessarily exists.

Is it however the case that Obama exists necessarily? No. Obama is a contingent, but not a necessary being. Hence, **(Inf)** contains a modal fallacy. Consider, again, the revised argument for (1) and (2):

- (5) If God knows that p, then God necessarily knows that p.
- (6) If God necessarily knows that p, then p.
- (7) Hence, if God knows that p, then p.

But, as it follows from Edwards's argument, K_{gp} entails not only p, but also $\Box p$. In order to derive a necessitation of p from the fact of God's omniscience, Edwards and Pike conclude as follows:

- | | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| (8) K_{gp} | (Assumption) |
| (8*) $P(t1)$ | (Assumption) |
| (9) $P(t2) \rightarrow K_{g(t1)P(t2)}$ | (Omniscience) |
| (10) $P(t1) \rightarrow \Box P(t1)$ | (Necessity of the past) |
| (10*) $\Box P(t1)$ | (10), (8*), <i>Modus ponens</i> |
| (11) $\Box P(t1) \rightarrow \Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)}$ | (Infallibility of God's Knowledge) |
| (11*) $\Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)}$ | (11), (10*), <i>Modus ponens</i> |
| (12) $\Box (K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow P(t2))$ | (Truth-Entailment) |
| (12*) $\Box (K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow P(t2) \ \& \ \Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)})$ | (12), (11*), Conjunction |
| (13) $\Box ((P \rightarrow Q) \ \& \ \Box P) \rightarrow \Box Q$ | (Necessity Entailment) |
| (14) $\Box (K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow P(t2) \ \& \ \Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)}) \rightarrow \Box P(t2)$ | (13), (12*), <i>Modus ponens</i> |
| (15) $\Box P(t2)$ | (14), (12*), <i>Modus ponens</i> |

Thus, if we derive $\Box P(t2)$, we must accept the validity of fatalism. In the case of the argument of Edwards-Pike, the principle of fatalism can be derived from the basic metaphysical principles of Edwards – one from (*Omniscience*), and the second from (*Necessity of the Past*) (*Omniscience*) Assume that $P(t2)$. Thus, if $P(t2)$, then, by (*Omniscience*), $K_{g(t1)P(t2)}$. Another application of (*Omniscience*) of the form ($\forall p \Box (K_{gp} \rightarrow p)$) gives us $\Box (K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow P(t2))$. Also we have from (*Infallibility*) that if God knows something, he knows it necessarily, and thus $K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow \Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)}$. Hence, if $\Box (K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow P(t2))$, then necessarily, $(\Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)} \rightarrow \Box P(t2))$, and together with $(\Box K_{g(t1)P(t2)})$ we have by (*Modus Ponens*) that $\Box P(t2)$, and thus if P will be the case at t2, then P will be the case at t2 necessarily:

(16) $P(t2) \rightarrow \Box P(t2)$

(*Necessity of the Past*) Another form of the derivation of (16) from the argument of Edwards-Pike follows directly from the (*Necessity of the past*). Assume (10) and $P(t1)$. We have then $\Box P(t1)$. Assume $P(t2)$. From (*Omniscience*), (11*), and the fact that $P(t2)$ we have that it is necessarily the case that God at $t1$ knows that P at $t2$ will be the case. Hence, at ($t1$), the proposition that $Kg(t1)P(t2)$ is true, and thus by *Iterability Principle* (i.e. the principle that if P is A in circumstance C in circumstance C^* , then P is A in circumstance C) and *Truth Entailment* (if God knows that P is the case, P is the case) $P(t2)$ is true at $t1$. Yet another application of (*Iterability*) gives us that P at $t2$ is true at $t1$ only if P is true at $t1$.

Hence, P is true at $t1$. Assume now the (*Necessity Entailment*). From the (*Necessity of the past*) we have that $P(t1) \rightarrow \Box P(t1)$, and thus P is necessarily true at $t1$. Thus, at $t1$, God necessarily knows that P will be the case at $t2$, and now we have from (*Iterability*) that P (such that P will be the case at $t2$) is true at $t1$. Thus P (from *Iterability*) could be true at $t2$ only if P were true at $t1$. Thus necessarily, the truth of P at $t2$ is entailed by the truth of P at $t1$. But P at $t1$, by (*Necessity of the past*), is necessarily true. So, by the (*Necessity Entailment*) $P(t2)$ is also a necessary truth, and thus it is not the case that $\sim P$ could be true at $t2$.

However, we are suspicious of (10). In order to derive (15) we should presuppose that, by Edwards' principle (1), every proposition about the fact necessarily has a modal profile. If it is so, then the consequent of the inference $P \rightarrow \Box P^5$ should be read as *de re* modality. Does Edwards's inference satisfy this requirement? No. Presupposing the principle that the fact of the past is a kind of necessity (because it is not within our power to change this fact), we presuppose, equivalently, the following principle:

(NP) Necessarily, if something has been the case, then it is impossible that something has been not the case.

By substitution

(NPA) Necessarily, if p is a fact of the past, then it is not the case that $\sim p$ could be the fact of the past. Hence, it is impossible that $\sim p$.

Hence, we can reconstruct the argument of Edwards for the (*Necessity of the Past*) as follows:

- (17) P is a fact of the past
- (18) If p , then impossible that $\sim p$
- (19) If it is impossible that $\sim p$, then necessarily, p (from the principle $\sim \Diamond \sim p \leftrightarrow \Box p$)
- (20) Hence, if p , then p is necessary.

But the inference from (17) and (18) to (19) is dubious. If p is true (by the principle of fixity of the past), then, of course, $\sim p$ is untrue. However, (17) says nothing about the necessity of p . For if p is true in virtue of (17), the correct inference from (17) should be as follows:

- (18*) If p , then impossible that $p \& \sim p$

⁵One of the most relevant arguments against the possibility of inference like $KgA \rightarrow \Box A$ is to argue that KgA is so-called „soft fact“ about the past, contrary to „hard facts“ (see an example from (1)). This argument is known as „Ockhamist Solution“ (OS). According to (OS), some facts of the past are **soft**, and thus not necessary. See Plantinga [Plantinga 1998] and Widerker [Widerker 2015] for detailed development of this line of reasoning. See also Hoffman and Rosenkrantz [Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1984], Hasker [Hasker 1988], and Adams [Adams 1967]. Fischer [Fischer 1983] gives an argument against (OS), and Zemach and Widerker reply in „Fact, Freedom, and Foreknowledge“ [Zemach & Widerker 1987].

From the proposition (18*), in turn, we can infer (21):

(21) If it is impossible that $p \& \sim p$, then necessarily, if p , then p ($\sim \diamond (p \& \sim p)$) is equivalent to ($\Box (p \rightarrow p)$)).

By the distribution of necessity:

(22) If it is necessarily the case that if p , then p , then if necessarily p , then necessarily p .

Are we able now to derive from (22) that „if necessarily p , then necessarily p ” entails “ p is necessary”? We can build up this inference as follows. Firstly, (18*) and (22) entail that if p , then necessarily, $p \rightarrow p$. By (19), secondly, from the impossibility of $\sim p$ follows the necessity of p . Hence, if it is necessarily the case, that $p \rightarrow p$, and $\Box p$, then $p \rightarrow \Box p$. However, we cannot make this inference since the inference from the second step of this argument to the conclusion contains modal fallacy: the necessity of p does not follow from the impossibility of $\sim p$, because the impossibility of $\sim p$ in the second premise of the argument is to be read as *de dicto* modality⁶. What follows from the second step of the argument, it is the conclusion that, necessarily, p , but not the inference that p is necessary. Compare:

(23) Necessarily, if something has been the case, it has been the case.

(24) If something has been the case, it has been the case necessarily.

At t_1 , A will happen at t_2 . Hence, at t_1 , God essentially knows that A will happen at t_2 . Is it derivable from the previous sentence that A will happen necessarily? No. We can conclude that, necessarily, if God had, at t_1 , a knowledge that A will happen at t_2 , A will happen at t_2 . Here the necessity is a necessity of the sentence telling us that A will happen, but not the necessity of A itself, i.e., it is not the case that A will happen necessarily. God had knowledge (at t_1) that A . We can therefore legitimately conclude that if God had knowledge that A , then it is not possible that God didn't have a knowledge that A (in the same way as in (18)). But the main idea of the usage of (18) in the context of divine foreknowledge, as it was shown above, is ambiguous. Suppose that we know that KgA . Hence, we can conclude that $KgA \rightarrow A$. Then, it follows from KgA that $\sim \diamond (KgA \& \sim A)$. But (by 18*), (impossible that $\sim A$) does not follow from KgA . If KgA , and respectively, A , then it follows that $A \& \sim A$ can't both be true, but not that A is necessarily true, and the impossibility of $\sim A$ follows from KgA only if A is necessarily true. To see why it is so, consider the following argument:

(P1) Necessarily, Lionel Messi is either a man or a woman

(P2) Lionel Messi is not a woman

(P3) Thus, Lionel Messi is necessarily a man

(P1) is true in virtue of the Law of Excluded Middle (let us accept for the simplicity of the argument that there are only 2 genders). (P2) is true because Messi is not a woman (he is a man). (P3) however is false; (P1 – P3) is an example of a logical mistake, known as *Sleigh's Fallacy*. (P3) would follow from (P1 – P2) only if (P2) had the meaning that Lionel Messi is not a woman necessarily. However, Lionel Messi could have been born as a woman. The fact that Messi is a man is a *contingent* fact about Messi. Thus fatalist can argue that in virtue of the fact that Messi, necessarily, is either a man or a woman, and Messi actually is not a woman

⁶ The contemporary defenders of this argument are Schwarz [Schwarz 2001: 226-227], and Weingartner [Weingartner 2008, 108].

(the fact that Messi is not a woman is logically equivalent to the fact that God at t_1 had foreknowledge that Messi is not a woman at t_2), then such a state of affairs as *Messi is a woman* is impossible at t_2 . However, the fact that Messi actually is a man is compatible with the property of Messi *possibly be a woman*. Actually, in the world in which Messi is a man Messi, of course, has this property. He is possibly a woman and actually a man in the world in which he is a man.

Therefore despite the fact that (P1) is true, and thus it is necessarily true that Messi is a man only if Messi is not a woman, it is not the case that Messi necessarily is not a woman in the world in which he is a man. Thus, fatalism is unable to argue directly for the impossibility of $\sim A$ from the truth of A . The problem is that Messi is not a man at t_2 necessarily, even if God at t_1 knows that Messi is a man at t_2 . Suppose that God at t_1 knows that Messi is a man at t_2 . Thus at t_2 , Messi is actually a man and possibly a woman, and so the proposition *Messi is a woman at t_2* is possibly true, contradicting the statement of fatalism according to which it is impossible for Messi to be born as a woman at t_2 , if God at t_1 had knowledge that Messi will be born as a man at t_2 . Suppose again that Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man. The fact that Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man is the fact of the past, and thus, according to the Edwards's (*Necessity of the Past*), the proponent of fatalism concludes that if Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man, then Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man necessarily.

However, as demonstrated above, the fact that it is true that Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man does not express a *de re* truth. The truth of this fact is *not a truth about Messi*. Given that Messi was born in the year 1987 as a man, we can conclude that it is a necessary truth that in the year 1987 Messi was born as a man (*de dicto* truth), but it is not true that in the year 1987 Messi was born as a man necessarily. Regarding this issue, Fisk asserts that „Edwards's view of the necessity of the consequence *a priori* rules out contingency“ [Fisk 2016: 340]. According to Fisk, the necessity inferred by Edwards as a consequence of his argument is not a *consequential necessity*, but rather a necessity of the *consequent*, contrary to Edwards's statements that the necessity he describes is the necessity of consequence and not a necessity of the consequent [Fisk 2016: 340]. Thus, Edwards confuses a *de re* and *de dicto* types of truth, so he is unable to infer $\Box A$ from $K_g A$, and also he is unable to infer $\Box A$ from A . If it is so, then the argument from theological fatalism fails in virtue of the fact that it rests on a modal fallacy.

Another relevant proposal showing how to reject (1) to avoid the fatalistic consequences is the argument of Arthur Prior [Prior 1968]. The logic of this argument is as follows. Suppose that $K_g A$ is a fact of the past. Hence, it follows from the Law of Excluded Middle that $\Box (K_g A \vee K_g \sim A)$. From the distribution of the operator, we get $\Box K_g A \vee \Box K_g \sim A$. Assuming that $K_g A$ (at t_1) entails A (at t_2), and $K_g \sim A$ (at t_1) entails $\sim A$ (at t_2), then it follows from $\Box K_g A \vee \Box K_g \sim A$ that necessarily, at t_2 , $\Box A \vee \Box \sim A$. The last sentence is fatalism. Consider however the proposition „It is now the case that it will be the case“. This sentence is equivalent to “It is now (say at t_2) the case that it has been the case that it will be the case“. Hence, if God had foreknowledge about the fact of future, then the proposition „It has been the case that God had knowledge that it will be the case“ is true. But, as it was pointed out by Edwards, if the fact about the past is true, it is true necessarily (compare with the fact of Obama's birthday from (1)).

Can we say that the sentence „It has been the case that God had a knowledge that it will be the case“ is equivalent (in this context) with a statement „Obama was born in the year 1961“, i.e., are these statements express the facts of the past in the same way? In accordance with Prior, no. At t_1 , there is no such fact as „It will be the case that A “ (let A be this fact), since there are

no “facts” about future contingents at all⁷. Hence, by Prior, we are within our rights to reject not only (at t1 it will be the case that at t2, A), but also (at t1 it will be the case that at t2, A v ~A). Hence, the inference from (1) to (4), following the argument of Prior, is unsound.

Free Will, Truth, and Contingency

Necessarily, if (at t2), A or ~A, God knows it. Suppose that I can voluntarily refrain from A. A, hence, is contingent. Moreover, by (5), if ~A, then God necessarily knows that (a) ~A and (b) ~A is contingent. But if God necessarily knows that ~A (or A) is contingent, whether it follows from KgA that ~A (or A) that the contingent event ~A (or A) turns out to be necessary? Suppose that, at t2, A. We have therefore a challenge coming from the Edwards` assumption (4): If at t1, God had a knowledge that, at t2, A (A is contingent) will be the case, and God`s knowledge about A is necessary, then A is itself necessary (not contingent). It would mean, however, that it follows from the premise that God necessarily knows about a contingent state of affairs that this state of affairs is necessary. Hence, in order to avoid this conclusion, we should provide an argument that God`s knowledge about future contingents does not change their ontological status.

Consider the argument of P. Weingartner [Weingartner 2008: 113]. Suppose firstly that, at t1, God has a knowledge that, at t2, A. A is itself contingent, i.e., $A^{CON} \leftrightarrow \text{df. } \Diamond A \ \& \ \Diamond \sim A$, and it follows from the definition of divine omniscience that whatever God knows, it is true. Thus, the argument of Weingartner [Weingartner 2008: 113] goes as follows („T” abbreviates „truth”)⁸:

- 25) KgA
- 26) KgA \rightarrow Kg (T(A))
- 27) T(A) & $A^{CON} \rightarrow T(A^{CON})$
- 28) Kg(A^{CON})
- 29) Kg(Kg (A^{CON})) & Kg ((T(A)) (25)/(26), (28)
- 30) Kg (T(A)) & A^{CON} Distribution (&) (29)
- 31) Kg (T(A^{CON})) (27), (30), by the principle ((p \rightarrow q) & Kp) \rightarrow Kq

Hence, it is derivable from KgA and A^{CON} that Kg (T(A^{CON})). Is this argument sound? Let us substitute A^{CON} for $\Diamond A \ \& \ \Diamond \sim A$. Consequently, if, at t1, KgA, then at t2, Kg (T($\Diamond A \ \& \ \Diamond \sim A$)). The last clause entails that it is possible that KgA \rightarrow Kg (T($\Diamond \sim A$)). But KgA, by (26) and the principle of Infallibility of divine foreknowledge (KgT(A) \rightarrow T(A)), entails T(A).

⁷ Zagzebski [Zagzebski 2015: 192-193] indicates that the problem of future contingents rests upon the modal asymmetry of past and future. Her argument goes as follows (\Diamond^2 is a symbolization of „possible at t2”)

- 1) At t2, A \rightarrow at t1, KgA (at t2)
- 2) A^{CON}
- 3) $A^{CON} \rightarrow \Diamond A \ \& \ \sim A$
- 4) $\Box (A \rightarrow KgA) \vee \sim \Box (A \rightarrow KgA)$
- 5) At t1, $\Diamond^2 KgA \ \& \ \Diamond^2 Kg \sim A$
- 6) At t1, KgA & Kg~A
- 7) KgA $\rightarrow \Diamond^2 KgA$
- 7*) Kg~A $\rightarrow \sim \Diamond^2 KgA$
- 8) $\sim \Diamond^2 KgA \vee \sim \Diamond^2 \sim KgA$

Hence, (8) gives a contradiction with (5) The alternative (for a temporalism) argument is developed by successors of so-called timeless solution. This argument states that the inference from t1 to t2 is redundant because KgA is timeless and the truth-value of A does not vary from time to time. See Cobreros [Cobreros 2016] and De Florio and Frigerio [De Florio & Frigerio 2015].

⁸ The numbering of the arguments is mine. Also my symbolism differs insignificantly from Weingartner`s one. All the rest is Weingartner`s.

Hence, if $KgA \rightarrow Kg(T(\diamond\sim A))$ is true, then it is the case that $KgA \rightarrow Kg(T(A) \& (Kg(T(\diamond\sim A))))$. Remember that $KgA \rightarrow \square KgA$, and the necessity does not apply to A. So:

$$(32) KgA \rightarrow \square KgA$$

And by substitution of A^{CON} for A:

$$(33) A^{CON} \rightarrow \square KgA^{CON}$$

Thus, if $(T(A^{CON}))$ follows from KgA^{CON} (from 26 and 28; if God knows that A, God knows that A is true. A is contingent. Thus, God knows that A^{CON} is true), and KgA^{CON} is a kind of necessity (i.e., $\square KgA^{CON}$), then it is a necessary truth that A is contingent (not necessary) (from the principle that what follows from the necessary truth is itself a necessary truth):

$$(34) \square KgA^{CON} \rightarrow \square T(A^{CON})$$

Thus, it follows from the Weingartner argument that if A is *necessarily* contingent, then A does not change its ontological status even being known by God. If God knows that some contingent fact about future (A), then God definitely knows that A is contingent, and thus $\square KgA$ entails that A is necessarily possible, but not the statement that A is necessary (see Weingartner [2015: 108-109, 113]. Hence, given (32) and the fact that A is not necessary, we have:

$$(35) \square KgA^{CON} \rightarrow \square Kg(\sim \square A)$$

(35) is the alternative reading of the Edwards' principle (3). By Edwards, necessarily, if God knows A (a contingent fact about future), then A is itself necessary. And by (35), necessarily, if God knows A, then God necessarily knows that A, and God necessarily knows that A itself is not necessary (only contingent). Thus, the consequent of (35), contrary to the consequent of (3), does not include fatalistic implications. The only way to preserve fatalism (in accordance with (3)) is to argue that if God knows that A, and A is contingent, then God necessarily knows that A and not-A is possible (i.e., God knows that A will happen voluntarily), and it follows from the knowledge of God that A will happen voluntarily that it is necessarily the case that $\sim A$ will not happen, i.e. it is necessarily the case that God, at t1, does not have knowledge that, at t2, $\sim A$. Hence:

(36) $\square KgA^{CON} \rightarrow \square Kg(\diamond\sim A)$ (If, necessarily, God knows that A is contingent, then necessarily, God knows that it is possible that $\sim A$).

Thus, the defender of Pike-Edwards's fatalism could argue that if (35) was true, it would be true that God could, at t1, have a knowledge that both A and that $\sim A$ is possible, and therefore there is a possible circumstance in which God knows $(A \& \sim A)$. But according to argument (V), it is impossible (even for God) to have knowledge that $(A \& \sim A)$. By assumption, God knows (at t1) that, at t2, A.

Thus, fatalist can argue that if it is the case that A, then it is not the case that $\sim A$, and it follows from the fact that if God has a knowledge that A, God necessarily knows that A and thus God necessarily does not have knowledge that $\sim A$. But if God does not know that $\sim A$ *necessarily*, then (from the principle that God's knowledge is infallible, i.e. God have only true knowledge), it follows that $\sim A$ not only untrue but also can't be true. Thus, we can reintroduce a fatalistic argument (as the objection to (35)) as follows:

$$(37) \square KgA^{CON} \rightarrow \square Kg(\sim \diamond \sim A)$$

Hence, it follows (from the principle of infallibility of God's foreknowledge) that if God knows A, $\sim A$ is impossible. But if God knows that A is A^{CON} , i.e., A^{CON} is true (from 31), and A^{CON} is necessarily true (from 34). But by the definition of A^{CON} and (34), the fact that A^{CON} is necessarily true, and thus $\sim A$ is necessarily possible, So it would follow from the assumption that God knows that A is contingent, and God necessarily knows that it is necessarily the case that $\sim A$ if it is the case that A:

$$(38) ((\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \& (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A))) \rightarrow \sim \Diamond \sim A$$

(38) seems to be contradictory. Finally, from (38), by the rule of (*Exportation*), we have $(\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A) \rightarrow \sim \Diamond \sim A)$. Now we have $(\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A) \rightarrow \sim \Diamond \sim A) \rightarrow ((\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A))) \rightarrow ((\Box (\Diamond \sim A) \rightarrow \sim \Diamond \sim A))$ (from the rule of Propositional Logic $(P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow R)) \rightarrow ((P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow (P \rightarrow R))$). Thus we have $((\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A))) \rightarrow ((\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\sim \Diamond \sim A))$ (by *Modus Ponens*) and so we have $((\Box (\Diamond \sim A)) \rightarrow (\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A)))$. From (*Omniscience*) we have that $(\Box (\Diamond \sim A))$ implies $(\Box \text{Kg}(\Diamond \sim A))$ (that is, if it necessarily the case that $\sim A$ is possible, then it is necessarily the case that God knows that $\sim A$ is possible). And from (*Infallibility*) we have that $(\Box \text{Kg} (\sim \Diamond \sim A))$ implies $(\sim \text{Kg}(\Diamond \sim A))$ (that is, if it is necessarily the case that God knows that $\sim A$ is impossible, it is not the case that God knows that $\sim A$ is possible).

So we have:

$$(39) \Box \text{Kg}(\Diamond \sim A) \rightarrow \sim \text{Kg}(\Diamond \sim A)$$

Since (39) is impossible, we must conclude that it is not the case that it is possible that $\Box \text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}}$ entails $\Diamond \sim A$. Hence, fatalism survives. Contrary to fatalism, the argument of Weingartner results in the inference:

$$(40) \text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}} \rightarrow \Box A^{\text{CON}}$$

However, the consequent of (40), as it has been proved above, does not follow from the antecedent. The correct consequence from $\text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}}$ is

$$(40^*) \text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}} \rightarrow \Box \text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}}$$

Or

$$(40^{**}) \text{Kg}A^{\text{CON}} \rightarrow T(A^{\text{CON}})$$

Nevertheless, the consequent of (40^{**}) is derivable from the consequent of (40). Hence, if A^{CON} is true, then A^{CON} . By Brouwerian axiom, $A^{\text{CON}} \rightarrow \Box \Diamond A^{\text{CON}}$. Then, taking into account the definition of Divine Omniscience, we can construe the following fatalistic inference:

$$(41) \Box (At t_2, A \rightarrow at t_1, \text{Kg}A)$$

$$(42) At t_2, \sim A \rightarrow at t_1, \sim \Diamond \text{Kg}A$$

Hence

$$(43) (At t_2, \sim A \rightarrow at t_2, \sim \Diamond A)^9$$

The validity of (41) is quite obvious. It follows from (*Omniscience*) that it is necessarily the case, if Lionel Messi is a football player in the year 2020, God in the remote past had a knowledge that Lionel Messi will be a football player in the year 2020. And the (*Necessity*

⁹ The structure of this inference is taken from Stephanou [Stephanou 2000].

of Past) gives us that if (at t1, KgA), then (necessarily, at t1, KgA), and so (at t2, A) only if (necessarily, at t1, KgA). A sentence (42) is true too. By (42), if Lionel Messi is not a baseball player in the year 2020, it is impossible that God in the remote past had a knowledge that Lionel Messi will be a baseball player in the year 2020. Thus, the validity of (42) follows directly from (*Infallibility*). And by (43), it is necessarily the case that if Lionel Messi is not a baseball player in the year 2020, it is impossible for Lionel Messi to be a baseball player in the year 2020. The argument (41-43) has a form $(\Box (P \rightarrow Q)) \& (R \rightarrow \sim\Diamond Q)$, so $(R \rightarrow \sim\Diamond P)$. Hence (41-43) is (at least technically) correct. Thus, if (*Omniscience*), (*Necessity of Past*), and (*Infallibility*) are true, (41-43) is true, and if (41-43) is true, Edwards's fatalism is true.

By (*Axiom of Distribution*), or (K), from (43) we have:

$$(44) \text{ At } t2, \Box\sim A \rightarrow \text{at } t2, \Box\sim\Diamond A^{10}$$

Hence, if at t2, $\sim A$, then, at t2, $\Box\sim A$, so A is necessarily impossible at t2. Thus, it follows from $\Box\sim\Diamond A$ that, given S5 principle $(\Diamond A \rightarrow \Box\Diamond A)$, we have by (*Contraposition*) $(\sim\Diamond A \text{ if } \Box\sim\Diamond A)$ that together with $(\Box\sim\Diamond A)$ gives us, by (*Modus Ponens*), $\sim\Diamond A$. But, by the definition of A^{CON} , A is possible. Hence:

$$(45) A^{\text{CON}} \rightarrow \Box\Diamond A \text{ (Brouwerian axiom)}$$

Thus if (by 45), A (i.e. A^{CON}) is necessarily possible, and God knows that A is necessarily contingent (by 33), thus by (*Hypothetical Syllogism*; hereafter (*HS*)) $((P \rightarrow Q) \& (Q \rightarrow R)) \rightarrow (P \rightarrow R)$ we have from (33) and (45) that $A \rightarrow \Box\Diamond A$ and $\Box\Diamond A \rightarrow \Box\text{Kg}A$ (we substitute $\Box\Diamond A$ into (33) for A. The Brouwerian axiom allows us this substitution, because by Brouwerian axiom, every contingent existing being or proposition is necessarily possible, and thus A (if existent¹¹) is $\Box\Diamond A$, and thus we have:

$$(46) A \rightarrow \text{Kg}\Box A$$

From (46), by principle $\Box A \rightarrow \Box\Diamond A^{12}$, we infer:

$$(47) \text{Kg}\Box A \rightarrow \text{Kg}\Box\Diamond A$$

Now suppose the situation in which (43) is true. If at t2, $\sim A$, then this fact trivially entails that $\sim\text{Kg}A$. If (43) is true, and it is necessarily the case that the fact that, at t2, $\sim A$ implies the impossibility of A at t2, it seems very plausible to think that it follows from the impossibility of A at t2 that KgA is impossible at t1. Our reason is as follows. If $\sim A$ at t2, then from the (*Infallibility*) we have that it is not the case that KgA at t1, and thus it is the case that $\text{Kg}\sim A$ is the case at t1. But $\text{Kg}\sim A$ at t1 is a fact of remote past and thus, by the Edwards's principle (*Necessity of the Past*) is a necessary fact. But if $\text{Kg}\sim A$ is a necessary fact, then God couldn't have a knowledge that A at t1. Thus:

$$(48) \Box (\sim A \rightarrow \sim\Diamond \text{Kg}A)$$

¹⁰ (44) highlights the controversial nature of (41). In fact, (41) can be re-written as "If something is A, then A, necessarily, is A". Thus, KgA, if necessarily A. But then the inference will be as follows: A would be known by God if, necessarily, A (i.e., if impossible that not-A). Hence, not-A would be known by God if, necessarily, not-A. But God, actually, does not know not-A, because, actually, it is not the case that not-A. The question is whether God knows a counterfactual states of affairs. See Moonley [Moonley 2018] for a details.

¹¹ If A is **merely possible**, then A is actually nonexistent and possibly existent, and if A is **contingent**, then necessarily, A is existent and possibly nonexistent.

¹² Proof: From (M) and (B), by (*HS*), we have $\Box A \rightarrow \Box\Diamond A$.

From (48), by the principle that what is impossible is not the case, we can infer (49):

$$(49) \Box (\sim\Diamond KgA \rightarrow \sim KgA)$$

Finally, in accordance with Brouwerian principle we have $(KgA \rightarrow \Box\Diamond KgA)$, and from (48) and (49), by *(HS)*, we have $\sim KgA$. From (43) and *(Omniscience)* of the form $A \leftrightarrow KgA$, we infer $\Box (\sim KgA \rightarrow \sim\Diamond KgA)$, and by *(Axiom of Distribution)* we have $(\Box\sim KgA \rightarrow \Box\sim\Diamond KgA)$. Given the fact that, from *(Infallibility)*, it is not the case that God could have a false knowledge, then $\sim A$ implies $\Box\sim KgA$. So we have $(\Box\sim KgA \rightarrow \Box\sim\Diamond KgA)$ and $\Box\sim KgA$, and by *(Modus Ponens)* we have:

$$(50) \Box \sim\Diamond KgA$$

And now we have from (50) and $(KgA \rightarrow \Box\Diamond KgA)$ (by *(Modus Tollens)*) that $(\sim KgA)$. From *(Omniscience)* we have that $(\sim KgA \rightarrow \Box\sim KgA)$. We have also $(\Box\sim KgA \rightarrow \Box\sim\Diamond KgA)$. Finally, from another application of *(HS)* we obtain that $\sim KgA$ implies $\Box\sim\Diamond KgA$

$$(51) \sim KgA \rightarrow \Box\sim\Diamond KgA$$

But (51) is very implausible: in accordance with (51), if God does not have a knowledge that A, God couldn't (at all) have a knowledge that A. $\sim A$ is contingent, and thus it is the case that if at t_2 , $\sim A$, then at t_2 , $(\sim A \ \& \ \Diamond A)$. Thus, A is possible at t_2 , if $\sim A$ is actual at t_2 , but from (51), it is impossible for God to have a knowledge that A, if $\sim A$ is actual, and thus it would be impossible for God to have a knowledge that A is possible at t_2 if A is possible at t_2 , contradicting *(Omniscience)*. Hence, we can suspect that the metaphysical principles underpinning (41-43) are incorrect; we are suspicious about the idea that KgA necessarily entails $\sim\Diamond\sim A$, and the idea that $\sim A$ entails $\sim\Diamond A$. Consequently, we can doubt the validity and consistency of fatalism. Thus, we have a good reason to reject (4) and (h) of Edwards' argument (and thus to reject the whole argument), since this argument, as was shown above, has many false instances.

Conclusion

The argument of Edwards determines indirectly (via Pike's argument) the content of discussions between fatalists and the advocates of free will in the 20th and 21st centuries. The core of this argument is the principle of closure and necessity of the past. Historically, the first (and one of the most serious) objection to the argument of Edwards-Pike is a distinction between "hard" and "soft" facts (which can be traced back from W. Ockham). Current debates about the problem of foreknowledge and free will (inspired by „Ockhamist Response“) center on the discussions between Ockhamists (Plantinga, Widerker) and Anti-Ockhamists (Fischer) on the logical and metaphysical validity of „soft fact conception“, as well as between the supporters of the conception of temporal modal asymmetry (Zagzebski, Weingartner), and the proponents of „Timeless Solution“ and Supervaluationism (Cobrerros, De Florio, Frigerio). In the light of Fischer's critique of Ockhamism, we can doubt that the „soft fact conception“ is an adequate solution to the problem of necessity of the past, but we can nevertheless be sure that this principle (i.e., the necessity of the past), at least in the version of Edwards and Pike, rests upon the modal fallacy. Hence, without the additional argumentation, this principle is unable to disprove the logical possibility of free will. However, it is clear that this principle can be consistently modified, and every defender of free will theory necessarily faces variations of (1).

It has also been demonstrated that the argument of Edwards has many false instances and contradicts the Brouwerian principle (*if something exists, it is necessarily possible*). Of course, the question of whether we should accept the universal validity of BP is debatable.

Nevertheless, the statement „If it is not the case that $\sim A$ and God, therefore, does not know that $\sim A$, then it is impossible that God could have had a knowledge that $\sim A$ ” seems to be contradictory and unacceptable. Thus, fatalists must somehow explain this contradiction. For instance, fatalists can reject (42). But it would mean that $\sim A$, and it is possible that God knows A . Since God is omniscient being, it would follow that $K_g A$ entails $T(A)$, and, as a result, $K_g A$ would entail $\sim A \& A$ – contradiction! Hence, it seems that the fatalism of Edwards has many false instances and thus is not valid.

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Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

In the book "Freedom of the Will", Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong argument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike.

The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that $\sim A$ is possible (Infallibility of God's knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose $\sim A$. The article argues that (i) the Edwards' inference $K_{gp} \rightarrow \Box p$ rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of $\sim p$; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary.

Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if K_{gp} is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose $\sim p$. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

Олег Бондар

Едвардс про несумісність Божого передзнання і людської свободи волі

У праці «Свобода Волі» Джонатан Едвардс (1703-1758) висунув потужний аргумент на користь теологічного фаталізму. Цей аргумент, як я вважаю, можна розглядати як універсальний базис дискусій між фаталістами й антифаталістами ХХ століття, особливо в контексті найпотужнішого аргументу на користь фаталізму, представленого Нельсоном Пайком.

Аргумент Едвардса спирається на такі принципи: (а) якщо дещо відбулося в минулому, воно відбулося з необхідністю (Принцип необхідності минулого); (в) якщо Бог знає дещо (наприклад А), то невірно, що $\sim A$ є можливим (принцип безпомилковості божого знання). Отже, Едвардс висновує: якщо Бог мав передзнання, що А, то А є необхідним, і невірно, що будь-хто міг би вільно обрати $\sim A$. У статті аргументується, що: (і) висновок Едвардса $K_{gr} \rightarrow \Box p$ засновується на модальній помилці; (ii) амбівалентним виявляється висновок «Бог мав знання, що р трапиться, отже висловлювання "Бог мав знання, що р трапиться" є пропозицією про минуле, а отже, необхідно істинною пропозицією»; тому є хибним, що ця пропозиція з необхідністю імплікує неможливість $\sim p$; (iii) невірно, що контингентна р, будучи знаною Богом, є необхідною.

Таким чином, ми можемо уникнути висновку Едвардса «якщо K_{gr} є фактом про минуле, то ми не можемо вільно обрати $\sim p$ ». Продемонстровано, що головні положення Едвардсового аргументу зберігають свою значущість в контексті сучасних дискусій про передзнання і свободу волі (Теорії м'яких фактів, анти-окказізм, теорії темпоральної асиметрії, теорія позачасового рішення. Окрім того, в статті був представлений новий виклик для фаталізму – аргумент від аксіоми Брауера.

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