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GÖDEL'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT, POSITIVE PROPERTIES, AND GAUNILIST OBJECTION

1. From Anselm to Gödel

In *Proslogium*, Anselm offers his famous argument for God's existence. This argument runs as follows. God is a perfect being – the being “than which nothing greater can be conceived” [Anselm 1962: 8]. We understand the meaning of the word “God”, thus God exists in our understanding. Suppose that God exists only in our understanding, but not in reality. Then God can be conceived to exist in reality, and the being which exists in understanding and reality is certainly greater than the being which exists only in the understanding. Given that God, by definition, is the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, we would have then that the being than which nothing greater can be conceived is the being than which a greater can be conceived. No contradiction is possible, and thus it is not the case that God could lack existence – God's existence follows from the nature of God.

Despite the fact that this argument seems to be formally (logically) true¹, many thinkers have raised doubts that Anselm's argument is sound. There are two main lines of arguing against Anselm's proof – (1) existence does not follow from the notion of an object; and (2) Anselm's notion of “(maximal) greatness” is vague. The first line traces its origins from the counter-argument of the monk Gaunilo: we can imagine the greatest possible island, but it is not the case that we can conclude that this island actually exists. A similar argument was proposed by Kant – the existence of God does not follow from His notion, because “being” is obviously not a real predicate, that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of thing” [Kant 1933: 504]. Existential statements, by Kant, are never analytical, and thus, for every object X, existence does not belong to the nature of X, and cannot be inferred from X's notion. If this objection is correct, existence does not belong to the set of great-making properties of God. For suppose otherwise. If existence is a great-

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¹ In *God and Other Minds* [Plantinga 1967: 66-67], Plantinga offers the following reconstruction of Anselm's argument:

- a) Suppose God exists in understanding and does not exist in reality
- b) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone
- c) It is logically possible that there be a being having all God's properties plus existence
- d) A being have all God's properties plus existence is greater than God (from a and b)
- e) So, it is possible that there be a being greater than God (from c and d)
- f) It is false that it is logically possible that there could be a being greater than God – a being than which nothing could be greater

making property then, following Anselm's argument, if X exists, and Y does not, then X is greater than Y. We would have then a parody, offered by James Tomberlin [Tomberlin 1985: 259] – if the least impressive basketball player in the world exists, and the most impressive basketball player in the world does not, then the least impressive basketball player is more impressive than the most impressive basketball player, which is obviously absurd. And another, quite similar parody has been offered by Oppy [Oppy 1995: 181]. If existence is a great-making property of X, then X, if possesses existence, is actually greater, or "better" than X, if nonexistent. Consider Devil – a being than which nothing worse can be conceived. It would be worse if Devil did exist in the understanding and in reality than in the understanding alone. So, if existence adds a portion of greatness to Devil, then the existent Devil is greater than nonexistent. As a result, we have a contradiction – existence, at the same time, is both a good-making and bad-making property of the Devil. Thus, Anselm's assumption that existence is necessarily a great-making property is wrong.

Finally, many philosophers argue that Anselm's argument, strictly speaking, is a vicious circle. Consider, for example, the argument of Rowe [Rowe 2001: 39-41]. Rowe asserts that Anselm, in his proof, presupposes what he tries to infer – if the notion of God necessarily includes its existence then, of course, God exists. We can reconstruct the argument of Rowe as follows:

- 1) God is a greatest possible being
- 2) Existence is a great-making property
- 3) Possibly, God does not exist
- 4) If God does not exist, then God is not the greatest possible being (from 1, 2, and 3)
- 5) It is false that God is not the greatest possible being
- 6) Thus, necessarily, God exists (from 4 and 5)
- 7) If, necessarily, God exists, then God, necessarily, has existence.

Thus, by arguing that God is the greatest possible being, we presuppose that God *possibly* exists, and to prove that God has existence, we must find an argument that God's existence follows from his notion. But if existence is one of the great-making properties, then Anselm's argument presupposes God's existence as its premise – from this argument, if God possibly exists, then God exists because a possibility of God's existence necessarily implies that God actually has existence, and this reasoning is viciously circular. Maydole [Maydole 2009: 562] objects to Rowe that his argument, first, is a confusion between the *assuming* of God's existence and its *implying* that God exists (that is, that God's existence follows from the definition of God), and second, that Rowe's argument presupposes mistakenly that Anselm, by claiming that God possibly exists, already presupposes the actual existence of God. I find this objection implausible. First, the argument of Rowe does not presuppose that if God possibly exists (by Anselm's argument), then God's possible existence entails His actual existence. Rowe derives this conclusion from the fact that existence, from the argument of Anselm, is necessarily included in the list of great-making properties, and God, by definition, has them all. Thus, the fact that God has existence follows naturally from the argument of Anselm in its premise, and so the whole argument is just a clarification of the fact that the existence of God follows analytically from His definition. So, it is true that Anselm's inference – God exists – is presupposed in the premise of his argument – in the definition of God. Thus, Maydole's argument misses the target. Secondly, Maydole's objection to Rowe could be true only if it were possible that (in some possible world) God's possible existence does not entail his actual existence. Of course, it is not the case that being possibly existent directly

implies being actually existent, and this is what Maydole exactly says against Rowe. But consider, for instance, the property of being possibly true. Suppose that someone argues that P is possibly true only if it includes a property of being (actually) true. Thus, despite the fact that being possibly true does not entail being actually true, the fact that P, in order to be possibly true, is necessarily actually true, results in the inference that P is actually true because P is actually true. The same goes for Anselm's argument. Even if possible existence does not imply (directly) actual existence, this derived fact – actual existence – necessarily follows from possible existence, because God possibly exists, by Anselm's argument, necessarily presupposes the actual existence of God (because it is a great-making property of God). Thus, I suppose, the argument of Rowe is immune to Maydole's objection.

Another questionable point of Anselm's argument is his notion of *maximal greatness*. If God is a possessor of maximal greatness, then if God did not exist in the actual world, there would be a possible world W such that the greatness of God in W would exceed the greatness of God in the actual world (following the standard equation between *possibly, X*, and *there is a possible world W, such that in W, X*). But if it is impossible that something could exceed God's greatness, why should we think that in W, there couldn't be a being (God) such that it is impossible for this being to exceed the greatness of God in the actual world? It is reasonable to think that the maximal greatness in W could possibly exceed the maximal greatness of the same being of another possible world (that is, of the actual world). In another world, there could be different degrees of maximal greatness in different possible worlds. This argument was put forward by David Lewis in his "Anselm and Actuality" [Lewis 1970]. Following Lewis, Plantinga provides a *reductio* of Anselm's argument that establishes the implausibility of the main Anselm's intuition – that is, the impossibility for something to exceed God's existence. Suppose God does not exist in the actual world @, but exists in another possible world W. Then, we have

(I) There is a possible world W such that the greatness of God in W exceeds the greatness of God in @

From (I) we have

(II) There is a possible being (God) in W, such that the greatness of this being in W exceeds the greatness of God in the actual world

Hence, from (II) we have

(III) It is possible that something is greater than God

And given the definition of God, we have

(IV) It is possible that there be a being greater than a being than which it is impossible that there could be something greater

Since (IV) is self-contradictory, and thus obviously false, we conclude

(V) It is not possible that there be a being greater than a being than which it is impossible that there could be something greater

Now, suppose that W is a possible world such that, for some X, nothing in other possible worlds exceeds the greatness of X. Thus, in W, there is some possible being, X, such that the greatness of X exceeds the greatness of God in @. Given this result, what can be said about (V)? If nothing exceeds the greatness of X in W, obviously, it is not true that there is a

possible world W^* such that the greatness of X in W^* could exceed the greatness of X in W . However, it does not follow from this result that nothing could exceed the greatness of God in @. Remember that the target of Anselm's argument is to refute the claim that there is a possible being X such that the greatness of X could exceed the greatness of God – that is

(VI) There is a possible world W and a possible object X , such that the greatness of X in W exceeds the greatness of God in @

It seems to be true that (V) is true only if (VI) is false. Thus, it is impossible that there be a being greater than a being than which it is impossible that there could be something greater, only if there is no W – that is, there is no possible world such that the greatness of X in W exceeds the greatness of God in @. However, the truth of (V) does not entail the falsity of (VI). For if (V) is true, then (V) entails that

(VII) There is no possible world W^* such that the greatness of any possible object in W^* exceeds the greatness of X in W

But (VII) is compatible with (IV). Obviously, (VII) is not a target of Anselm's argument. In order to prove the truth of (V), the ontological argument must provide proof that

(VIII) There is no such possible world as W , and so there is no X such that the greatness of X in W exceeds the greatness of God in @

However, (VIII) does not follow from the argument of Anselm, because it doesn't follow that there is no W . If God possesses the maximal greatness in some possible world, then the degree of this greatness is related to *this* possible world. But the target of Anselm's argument is the thesis that nothing could exceed the greatness of God in the *actual world*. And this thesis does not follow from his proof. Given this result, Plantinga asserts that Anselm's argument (at least in this version) fails [Plantinga 1974: 205].

So, the main problem of Anselm's argument is this. Why should we think that existence is a great-making property? This problem can be divided in two parts. One can reasonably reject the proof of Anselm following Kant's objection – that is, existence is not a property ("real predicate") at all. And the other side of this problem is as follows – even if existence is a property, what is a reason to accept that this property is "great-making"? Counter-examples are easy to found. If existence is "great-making", then the existing London garbage dump is greater than the not-existing London garbage dump [Tomberlin 1985: 258-259]. If numbers exist necessarily, and individuals do not, consider the possible circumstance in which Socrates is just a fictional character from Plato's dialogues. If so, the number 5 must be greater than Socrates. However, this sounds counterintuitive. Finally, Anselm's argument depends crucially on the claim that God's existence follows directly from the notion of *maximal greatness*. But if we accept a modal version of understanding what the term *maximal greatness* could mean, then Anselm's argument just asserts that there is a possible world W such that the maximal greatness of God in W couldn't be exceeded in any possible world. But even if this assertion is correct, it does not follow from this claim that God is maximally-great-in-@ (in the proper sense of the word "maximal"). Hence, it does not follow that God in @ has existence necessarily. For suppose there is a possible "possibilistic" world W^* in which the degree of maximal greatness is identical to our world, @, except that this world is inhabited by mere possibilities. So, if God is a possessor of maximal greatness in W^* , if existence does not belong to W^* , it is impossible for us (from the standpoint of W^*) to conceive the existence of God in W^* , and so God in W^* is necessarily maximally great and

nonexistent. Thus, the existence of W^* proves that it is possible for God to be a bearer of maximal greatness without having existence.

The main weakness of Anselm's argument is his metaphysical premise, according to which existence is a property – a "great-making property". This assumption raises various objections and, as it follows from the above considerations, is inconsistent. But do we really need this assumption? This flaw of Anselm's proof was fixed by Gödel. In Gödel's modal proof, existence is not presupposed to be a great-making property of God (or, following Gödel's terminology, "God-like being"), but follows from the existential quantification over properties of God-like being. Thus, Gödel's ontological argument is a necessary step in the development of sound and consistent ontological proof.

2. Gödel's Argument and Positive Properties

In a nutshell, Gödel's argument is this. First, Gödel defines the primitive notion of his argument – "positive property" – as "positive in the moral aesthetic sense" [Gödel 1995a: 404], or "purely good-making" property [Gödel 1995b 435]. Then, Gödel introduces the following axioms:

(Ax. 1) $P(\phi) \leftrightarrow \sim P(\sim\phi)$ ²

If ϕ is positive, then the negation of ϕ is not positive

(Ax. 2) $P(\phi) \ \& \ \Box \forall x (\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)) \rightarrow P(\psi)$

Positive properties entail only positive properties

(Ax. 3) $P(G)$

God-likeness is a positive property

(Ax. 4) $P(\phi) \rightarrow \Box P(\phi)$

Every positive property is necessarily positive

(Ax. 5) $P(E)$

The property of being a necessary being is positive

Given (Ax1 – Ax.5), Gödel argues as follows. Let God-like being be a possessor of every positive property. Suppose that God-likeness (G), as the essence of God-like being, is impossible property. G, by (Ax.3), is a positive property, and so by (Ax.1) the negation of G must be not positive. However, by (Ax.2), G could entail only positive properties, so the negation of G must also be positive. Thus, by (Ax.1) and (Ax.2), the negation of G is both positive and not positive. Hence, the assumption that G is impossible is wrong. So, G is possible. If G is possible, then G is possibly instantiated by God-like being. God-like being, by definition, has every positive property, thus God-like being must be necessary. So, if God-like being is possible (because G is possible), and the possessor of G must be a necessary being, then necessarily, something is a God-like being. Now, given the Brouwerian principle $P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond P$, we conclude that if something is possibly God-like, then necessarily, something God-like necessarily exists. Thus, God-like being exists.

² In the version of Dana Scott [Scott 1987: 257], Gödel's (Ax.1) has the following form: $P(\sim\phi) \leftrightarrow \sim P(\phi)$. But Anderson [Anderson 1990: 225] offers an objection. Let D be the property of being a dog. Given that this property is neither positive (in the Gödelian sense) nor negative, we have both $\sim P(D)$ and $\sim P(\sim D)$, contradicting $\sim P(\phi) \rightarrow P(\sim\phi)$. Thus, the replacement of $P(\sim\phi) \leftrightarrow \sim P(\phi)$ with $P(\phi) \leftrightarrow \sim P(\sim\phi)$ allows to avoid the unwelcome consequences of Gödel's argument. Sobel [Sobel 2004: 562] agrees also that this replacement is necessary to avoid the modal collapse in Gödel's proof. See also [Anderson & Gettings 1996].

Due to the fact that Gödel did not give a precise logical definition of positive properties, many philosophers argue that his proof relies on the implausible axiological principles. Arguably, the most serious objection to Gödel's (Ax.2) has been raised by Hajek [Hajek 2002: 105]. If G , by (Ax.3) is positive, consider then a disjunctive property $(G \vee D)$ (where D is a property of being devil-like). So, we have that $(G) \rightarrow (G \vee D)$, and by (Ax.2), if G is positive, then $(G \vee D)$ must also be positive. However, this is implausible [Sobel 2004: 122], because we have no reason to think that disjunctive properties like $(G \vee D)$ must be positive. Consider, for example, such property as $(G \vee \sim G)$. We can then assert that $(G \vee \sim G)$ is not positive, even if G is positive. For suppose $(G \vee D)$ could be positive. We know that D is not positive and, similarly to (Ax.2), D entails only non-positive (negative) properties. So we have, by (Ax.2):

$$(1) \quad N(\phi) \ \& \ \Box \ \forall x (\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)) \rightarrow N(\psi)$$

And from (1), by definition of D , we have that every property entailed by D must be negative. Remind however that:

$$(2) \quad G \rightarrow G \vee D$$

Given that G , by (Ax.3), is positive, we have by (Ax.2):

$$(3) \quad P(G) \rightarrow P(G \vee D)$$

However, we have also:

$$(4) \quad D \rightarrow (G \vee D)$$

Given that D is negative, we have by (1) that

$$(5) \quad N(D) \rightarrow N(G \vee D)$$

Finally, from (3) and (5) we have:

$$(6) \quad P(G \vee D) \ \& \ N(G \vee D)$$

which is obviously false, since no property could be positive and negative. Also, (6) is inconsistent with (Ax.1) and (Ax.2). Hajek tries to avoid the possibility of inference from $P(G)$ to $P(G \vee D)$ by introducing a fixed axiom [Hajek 2002: 156]:

$$(7) \quad P(\phi) \ \& \ \Box \ \forall x (\phi(x) \rightarrow \psi(x)) \rightarrow \sim P(\sim \psi)$$

Given (7), it could be easily demonstrated that we can derive $P(\phi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$, which is a necessary premise of Gödel's Possible Instantiation Claim (that is, a claim that G is possible). Take the property of *being God-like*. By (Ax.3), (Ax.4), and (7) we have $\forall x (\phi(x) \leftrightarrow (\forall \phi(P(\phi) \rightarrow \phi(x))))$. Thus, by Existential Introduction, we have $\exists x \rightarrow (G(x) \leftrightarrow (\forall \phi(P(\phi) \rightarrow \phi(x))))$, and so we have $(G(x) \leftrightarrow (\forall \phi(P(\phi) \rightarrow \phi(x)))$. By (Ax.5) and Possible Instantiation we have $\Diamond \exists x G(x)$, and so we have that, possibly, something which is a God-like being, exists – (that is, $(\exists a \ \& \ G(a))$). From $(\forall \phi(P(\phi) \rightarrow \phi(x))$ and $(\exists a \ \& \ G(a))$ we can derive $P(\phi) \rightarrow \phi(a)$, and thus, by Existential Generalization, we have $P(\phi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$. The idea of (7), by Hajek, is that we no longer need to apply implausible axiological principles like (Ax.2) – using (7), we cannot derive statements like (6). However, Gustafsson convincingly showed that Hajek's (7) is unsatisfactory [Gustafsson 2020: 234]. Consider the conjunctive property of being omniscient (O) and black-haired (B). O is positive, while B and $\sim B$ seem to be both

neutral. Thus, from the statement that the conjunction of positive and neutral property must be positive, we have

$$(8) P(O \& B)$$

and

$$(9) P(O \& \sim B)$$

And given the fact that $(O \& \sim B)$ and $(O \& B)$ are incompatible, we have

$$(10) \Box \forall x (\lambda y (O(y) \& B(y)) (x) \rightarrow \sim \lambda y (O(y) \& \sim B(y)) (x))$$

From (10) and (7), we have

$$(11) \sim P(\sim \sim (O \& \sim B))$$

Finally, by eliminating double negation, we have

$$(12) \sim P(O \& \sim B)$$

But (12) contradicts (9), and thus Hajek's (7) cannot be right [Gustafsson 2020: 234]. The same goes for the proposal of Andersson and Gettings to replace (Ax.1) with $\sim P(\Box \phi) \leftrightarrow P(\sim \Box \phi)$ [Andersson & Gettings 1996: 169]. Consider, for example, any arbitrary neutral property (say B). Then, the property of *being necessarily black-haired*, as well as the property of *being not necessarily black-haired*, doesn't seem to be positive. If so, we would have both $\sim P(\Box B)$ and $\sim P(\sim \Box B)$, contradicting Gödel's (Ax.1).

Recently, Gustafsson [Gustafsson 2020: 234-236] offers an argument showing how to avoid Gödel's problematic assumptions like (Ax.1) and (Ax.2). The idea is this. Take the property of being not-self-identical. It is plausible to assert that this property is not positive. Now suppose, that Gödel's Possible Instantiation claim is false – that is, $\sim \forall \phi P(\phi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$. We have thus $\exists \phi \sim P(\phi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$, and so by Existential Instantiation, we have $\sim P(\phi') \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi'(x)$, and so we have

$$(13) P(\phi')$$

But from Possible Instantiation and $\sim P(\phi') \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi'(x)$ we also have $\sim \Diamond \exists x \phi'(x)$, and thus, by normal modal logic, $\Box \forall x \sim \phi'(x)$. Now, given the fact that non-self-identity is impossible, we have $\Box \forall x \sim \lambda y (y \neq y)(x)$. From this, by (Ax.2), we have $\sim P(\phi') \leftrightarrow \sim P \lambda y (y \neq y)$. Thus, given that non-self-identity is not positive, we conclude that there is no such positive property, that is

$$(14) \sim P(\phi')$$

But from (13) and (14) we have now

$$(15) P(\phi') \& \sim P(\phi')$$

Since (15) is impossible, we must give up our assumption that $\sim \forall \phi P(\phi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists x \phi(x)$. Thus, following Gustafsson's proposal, we no longer have difficulties with Gödel's Possible Instantiation – that is, we can reasonably assert that Possible Instantiation relies on plausible axiological principles.

3. Ontological parody: the debate between Oppy and Gettings

Even if Gödel's definition of positive properties is based on unsatisfactory axiological principles, we can (as follows from Gustafsson's argument) reformulate the proof of the Possible Instantiation so that the definition of positive properties would follow from acceptable axiological principles. Thus, we can assert that the core notion of Gödel's Ontological Proof – “positive property” – is valid, and Hajek's objection could be successfully avoided. However, Graham Oppy [Oppy 1996] has offered an argument showing that Gödel's proof fails. Oppy utilizes the same strategy that Gaunilo used to prove the falsity of Anselm's argument. Gaunilo argued that Anselm's argument could be used to prove the existence of the largest island and other absurd entities. Likewise, Oppy's argument aims to prove that Gödel's argument can be used to prove the existence of quasi-gods – God*-like beings. This possibility, Oppy believes, follows from the central concept of Gödel's theory – that is, from the concept of positive properties. Oppy's argument begins with a core concept of his neo-Gaunilist parody – a “God*-like being” [Oppy 1996: 227]:

Def. 1*. X is God*-like if X has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive, except for $P_1 \dots P_n$

By Def.1, God*-like being is a being that has *almost* all positive properties, including necessary existence. Since, for some P_i , P_i is not included in the set of properties of God*-like being, God*-like being is distinct from God-like being. Since necessary existence is included in the set of properties of God*-like being, God*-like being(s) necessarily exist(s), and thus a property of *being God*-like* entails the property of *being necessarily existent*. And that is what Gaunilist wants to prove – if God*-like beings have necessary existence, then Gödel's argument is false because the essence of Ontological Proof is that only God-like being exists necessarily.

However, in order to prove that Gödel's proof entails the necessary existence of God*-like beings, Oppy's parody requires a crucial reformulation of (Ax.3):

(Ax.3*) God*-likeness is a positive property

In response to Oppy, Michael Gettings [Gettings 1999: 309] argues that, strictly speaking, Oppy's argument is unable to prove the truth of (Ax.3*). Consider the notion of God*-likeness with respect to (Def.1*). Take any P_i such that P_i is not among the properties of God*-like being. Now, according to Gödel's (Ax.2)

(Ax. 2) Positive properties entail only positive properties

If P is the set of positive properties such that God*-like being has all members of P (excluding P_i), then the property of *not having P_i* , by (Ax.2), must be positive. Now take a look at the (Ax.4). According to (Ax.4), every positive property is necessarily positive. So, if *not having P_i* , by (Ax.2), is positive, then by (Ax.4), the property of *not having P_i* must be necessarily positive. However, if P_i is positive, and so (by definition of G), God-like being necessarily has P_i , then by (Ax.1), the property of *not having P_i* is not positive. Let us now return to the crucial premise of Oppy's argument, namely (Ax.3*). If God*-likeness is positive, God*-like being has necessary existence, and the property of *not having P_i* follows from God*-likeness, then for every possible world, God*-likeness entails the property of *not having P_i* essentially. Due to the fact that *not having P_i* essentially is not positive, God*-likeness necessarily entails a non-positive property. However, according to (Ax.2), positive

properties entail only positive properties. Thus, by (Ax.2), God*-likeness cannot be a positive property. Here is, as Gettings expresses himself, “a crucial disanalogy” between Oppy’s and Gödel’s argument [Gettings 1999: 309] – Oppy cannot derive the conclusion that God*-likeness is positive, and thus his (Def.1*) is inconsistent with his (Ax.3*). However, we do not have the same contradiction within Gödel’s proof, because we do not have any problem with Gödel’s claim that God-likeness is positive.

Given the fact that (Ax.3*) does not follow from (Def.1*), Gettings can successfully refute the first sub-argument of Oppy’s parody – the claim that God*-likeness is a positive property. Now, the second sub-argument of Oppy’s argument aims to define God*-likeness in terms of positive* properties. A property P^* is positive* if, for the set of positive properties P , P^* is a proper subset of P such that P^* necessarily includes necessary existence. Given this definition, the crucial premise of Oppy’s second sub-argument is his reformulation of (Def.1*) in terms of positive* properties

(Def.1**) X is God*-like if X has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive*

The goal of Oppy’s sub-argument is to provide proof that God*-likeness is not positive in Gödel’s sense – similarly to the argumentation of theist, the Gaunilist can introduce the notion of God*-like being (that is, quasi-God) in terms of quasi-positive properties. But due to the fact that a formulation of (Def.1**) is very close to the previous formulation of what is to be God*-like – (Def.1*) – we can provide a similar argument against (Def.1**). If P^* is a proper subset of P , then there is $P_i \in P$ such that P_i is not a member of P^* , and thus, for any single member of P , P entails the property of not-being P_i essentially. By (Ax.1) P_i then is not positive, and by (Ax.4) this property is necessarily non-positive. Hence, if the property of not-being P_i essentially is entailed by God*-likeness, God*-likeness, by (Ax.2), cannot be positive. Remind that P^* , by definition, is a proper subset of P . Now, given that every positive* property is positive, the property of being God*-like is not positive* [Gettings 1999: 311], contradicting Oppy’s assumption that God*-likeness is positive. Thus, the second sub-argument of Oppy’s parody also fails.

In [Oppy 2000], Oppy agrees that his argument in [Oppy 1996] fails to prove the possibility of God*-like being. However, he offers a “fixed” proof, that aims to eliminate the conceptual possibility of defining positive* properties in terms of positive properties. Oppy’s fixed argument is this. Take the set of independent³ properties $\{I, G_i\}$. This set is closed by entailment and “necessitation” – if the property belongs to the set, then necessarily, this property belongs to the set. Now take some proper subset of $\{G_i\}$, $\{G_j\}$, such that $\{G_j\}$ will contain necessary existence plus at least one arbitrary property. We have then the set $\{I@, G_j\}$, where “ $I@$ ” is the property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set generated by $\{I@, G_j\}$. This subset generates a set of positive* properties under closure by entailment and “necessitation” [Oppy 2000: 365]. Suppose now that the property of being God*-like is the member of $\{I@, G_j\}$. By definition of I , God*-like being is essentially God*-like, and God-likeness does not belong to the nature of God*-likeness since God-likeness is not in the set created by $\{I@, \text{God*-likeness}\}$. Given that the set generated by God*-likeness includes necessary existence, God*-like being necessarily exists. Finally, the

³ The properties in the set are *independent*, by Oppy, if for any property P belonging to this set, P is not entailed by all the rest properties in this set [Oppy 2000: 365].

crucial inference from Oppy's argument that positive* properties (that is, the properties generated by our set) are not positive, and so God*-likeness is not a positive property. Thus, Oppy concludes that the objection of Gettings, according to which his notion of positive* properties are parasitic on the notion of positive properties, is finally refuted [Oppy 2000: 366].

Again, there is a crucial disanalogy between Gödel's argument and Oppy's parody. To see this, take, for example, the property of *being black-haired*, and assume that the property of *being black-haired* is a sole member of $\{I@, Gj\}$. Hence, this property is positive*. Given that the set is closed by necessitation, *being black-haired* is necessarily positive* and, of course, includes necessary existence. So being black-haired includes as essential properties those and only those properties which are in the set, - that is, only positive* properties. Thus, being black-haired, being positive, entails every positive* property of the set $\{I@, \text{being black-haired}\}$. Also, being black-haired is necessary due to the fact that this set is closed under necessitation. The same goes for the property of being God*-like. In other words, Oppy's conception entails that there is no substantial difference between the property of *being God*-like* and the property of *being black-haired*. Both are necessary and entail every positive* property in appropriate generated sets, and the property of being black-haired is identical to the property of being God*-like. Replace the property of being black-haired with another positive property, and you will have the same result. Thus, if Oppy's argument is correct, we can prove that every positive property is equivalent to the property of being God*-like (that is, every positive* property could be interpreted as the property of being God*-like), which is obviously false. Finally, consider the following axiom of Oppy's fixed parody, which is a necessary part of his argument [Oppy 2000: 365].

(Ax.5*) Necessary existence is positive*

If positive* properties, following the new formulation, are essentially not positive, then necessary existence, by (Ax.5*), is essentially not positive. But in the original Gödel's formulation - (Ax.5) - necessary existence is a positive property. So, Oppy must disprove (Ax.5). But take some proper subset of $\{Gi\}$ from his parody, such that this subset includes only positive properties. Being closed by necessitation, this set contains a necessary existence of its members. So, if being the member of $\{Gi\}$ entails necessary existence, and $\{Gi\}$ contains only positive properties, then necessary existence is positive. So, by (Ax5) and (Ax.5*), necessary existence is both positive and positive*, and this is obviously not acceptable from both points of view, Gödel's and Oppy's. As a result, if being God*-like is positive*, Oppy's argument is not able to provide proof that God*-like being has necessary existence. We can conclude that Oppy's fixed parody is no more successful than his initial objection, and Gödel's ontological argument is immune to his neo-gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy's parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm's Ontological Proof, does not work against Gödel's Ontological Argument, and so Gödel's argument successfully overcomes the flaws of Anselm's proof.

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Gödel's Ontological Argument, Positive Properties, and Gaunilist Objection

The article is devoted to Gödel's Ontological Argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of Ontological Proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of Ontological Proof. Second, we show that Gödel's argument (namely, its core concept – “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek's counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson's argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel's argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel's Ontological Proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel's Ontological Argument is immune to Oppy's neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy's parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm's Ontological Proof, does not work against Gödel's Ontological Argument (this fact, we suppose, is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).

Олег Бондар

Гьоделів онтологічний аргумент, позитивні властивості і гаунілістське заперечення

Стаття присвячена онтологічному аргументу Курта Гьоделя, його місцю в історії філософії і сучасних дебатах стосовно валідності онтологічного доказу. По-перше, ми аргументуємо що Гьоделів аргумент є необхідним кроком в історії розвитку онтологічного аргументу. По-друге, ми показуємо, що Гьоделів аргумент (а саме його ключове поняття – “позитивна властивість”) засновується на незадовільних аксіологічних принципах (що сприяє виникненню багатьох заперечень, зокрема контраргументу Гайєка), проте може бути переформульований в термінах задовільних аксіологічних принципів (аргумент Густафсона). Також ми розглядаємо дебати щодо валідності Гьоделевого аргументу між сучасним неогаунілістом Іремом Опі та захисником онтологічного аргументу Майклом Гетінгсом. Ми приходимо до висновку, що онтологічний аргумент Гьоделя є невразливий до гаунілізму Опі. Нарешті, враховуючи той факт, що пародія Опі є, імовірно, найбільш досконалим аргументом гаунілістського гатунку в історії філософії, ми висновуємо, що гаунілістська лінія аргументації, навіть якщо є успішною проти аргументу Ансельма, не працює проти аргументу Гьоделя (що засвідчують результати дебатів між Опі та Гетінгсом).

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