New equilibria for games with lateral interests of participants / Smol’yakov. (2016)
Ukrainian

English  Cybernetics and Systems Analysis   /     Issue (2016, 52 (4))

Smol’yakov E.R.
New equilibria for games with lateral interests of participants

Complicated concepts of equilibrium are given for static and dynamic conflict problems described by differential equations. The problems are considered both on a game set common to all participants and on partially overlapping game sets. The concepts are useful in searching for the strongest equilibrium in game problems and for determining a fair division of cooperative income. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.

Keywords: complicated equilibrium, game on overlapping sets, Differential equations, Dynamic conflict problems, Fair divisions, game on overlapping sets, Game problem, Game theory


Cite:
Smol’yakov E.R. (2016). New equilibria for games with lateral interests of participants. Cybernetics and Systems Analysis, 52 (4), 29-42. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-016-9854-x http://jnas.nbuv.gov.ua/article/UJRN-0001294502 [In Russian].


 

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